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Abstract
This thesis explores how hardware security technologies can be applied to satisfy
the diverse set of requirements inherent to identity management systems and
technologies. This thesis focuses on the use of existing hardware-based security
technologies by software rather than developing new hardware components. All
concepts proposed in this thesis are subjected to an in-depth evaluation and
are validated by means of a prototype.
The first part of this thesis deals with device authentication between resource-
constrained nodes and more powerful devices. A security architecture is
presented that allows low-cost resource-constrained devices to establish a
secure authenticated channel with more powerful devices using symmetric-
key cryptography. The constrained devices can enforce fine-grained access
control policies based on the information obtained during authentication. In
application domains with a limited scope a tamper-resistant module containing
a common cryptographic key can be added to the constrained devices to
increase the scalability of the key management process.
In the second part of this thesis a new user-centric identity management system
is presented. Instead of relying on digital signature algorithms to assert the
validity of attributes to service providers, the identity management system
proposed in this part relies on a trusted application running on a tamperproof
secure element. The service provider is assured that the received information
originates from a genuine secure element in the system. The tamperproofness
ensures that an attacker cannot directly access the memory of the secure
element to extract or modify information. The identity management system
combines several interesting features of existing governmental and federated
identity management systems.
In the third part of this thesis a trusted execution environment that can
be established on commodity workstations and laptops using TPM-based
technologies is used to increase the security and privacy of existing identity
iii
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management technologies. Two complementary case studies are presented. The
first case study focuses on the prevention of credential abuse through sharing or
theft. The user’s credential is, therefore, bound to one or more of his biometric
traits. The second case study focuses on increasing the security and privacy of
authentication infrastructures that rely on a smart card containing an X.509
credential and the identity information of the user. The system increases the
security by allowing the user to enter his passcode via his workstation while
protecting it from malware running on the operating system. The system
increases the privacy of the user by giving the user more control over the
disclosure of his information.
Beknopte samenvatting
Deze thesis onderzoekt hoe hardware-gebaseerde beveiligingstechnologieën
kunnen ingezet worden om de diverse set aan vereisten inherent aan identity
management systemen en technologieën te realiseren. Deze thesis focust op
het gebruik van bestaande hardware-gebaseerde beveiligingstechnologieën via
software in plaats van het ontwerpen van nieuwe hardware componenten. Alle
concepten voorgesteld in deze thesis worden onderworpen aan een grondige
evaluatie en worden gevalideerd aan de hand van een prototype.
Het eerste deel van deze thesis behandelt authenticatie tussen nodes met
beperkte rekenkracht, geheugen en vermogen, zoals bijvoorbeeld draadloze
sensoren, en krachtigere toestellen zoals een smartphone, laptop of werkstation.
Er wordt een beveiligingsarchitectuur gebaseerd op symmetrische cryptografie
voorgesteld. De beveiligingsarchitectuur laat toe om een veilig geauthentiseerd
kanaal op te zetten tussen goedkope toestellen met beperkte middelen en
krachtigere toestellen. In applicatiedomeinen met een beperkte scope kan een
sabotagebestendige module met een gemeenschappelijke cryptografische sleutel
toegevoegd worden om de schaalbaarheid van het sleutelbeheer te verbeteren.
In het tweede deel van deze thesis wordt een nieuw identity management
systeem voorgesteld. In plaats van digitale handtekeningen te gebruiken om
de geldigheid van gebruikersinformatie te attesteren aan een dienstverlener
maakt het systeem gebruik van een vertrouwde applicatie die draait op
een sabotagebestendige module. De dienstverlener wordt verzekerd dat de
ontvangen informatie afkomstig is van een geldige module in het systeem. De
sabotagebestendigheid zorgt er voor dat een aanvaller geen directe toegang
heeft tot het geheugen van de module om zo informatie uit te lezen of
te wijzigen. Het identity management systeem combineert verschillende
interessante eigenschappen van bestaande identity management systemen.
TPM-gebaseerde technologieën maken het mogelijk om een vertrouwde om-
geving te realiseren op werkstations en laptops. In het derde deel van deze
v
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thesis wordt gebruik gemaakt van deze vertrouwde omgeving om de privacy-
en veiligheidseigenschappen van bestaande identity management technologieën
te verbeteren. Twee complementaire case studies worden voorgesteld. De eerste
case studie focust op het voorkomen van misbruik via het delen of stelen van
persoonlijke geheime sleutels. De geheime sleutels van de gebruikers worden
hiervoor aan één of meerdere biometrische eigenschappen van de gebruiker
gebonden. De tweede case studie focust op het verbeteren van de privacy-
en veiligheidseigenschappen van authenticatiesystemen die gebruik maken van
een smartcard met een X.509 credential, zoals bijvoorbeeld de Belgische
elektronische identiteitskaart. Het systeem verhoogt de veiligheid door het
ingeven van de pincode in het werkstation af te schermen van malware die
draait in het besturingssysteem. Het systeem verhoogt de privacy door de
gebruiker meer controle te geven over het vrijgeven van zijn informatie.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When the first commercial email system was introduced in the mid-seventies,
it was one of the first analogue services being digitized. Today most analogue
services have a digital counterpart. This varies from tax filing to shopping and
social networks. Many of these services require the user to release personal
information. In today’s registration processes, service providers cannot rely
on the correctness of user-disclosed attributes, opening the door for identity
fraud. Many critical services require corroborated user information. Hence,
simple password-based authentication is no longer sufficient to satisfy the
security requirements of these services. This has led to the development
of more sophisticated credential technologies such as X.509 and anonymous
credentials [53, 58, 47]. These technologies allow the user to release reliable
personal attributes during authentication, facilitating the development of online
personalized services.
A credential technology is, however, only a small part in an entire Identity
Management (IdM) system. An IdM system supports administration of identity
attributes including the development and choice of the partial identity and
pseudonym to be (re-)used in a specific context or role [165]. An Identity
Provider (IdP) is responsible for asserting one or more identity attributes
of the user. Each identity provider can typically provide a specific set of
attributes. For instance, the government can assert someone’s name and
address, while a university could assert someone’s degree. Service providers
can, subsequently, rely on these assertions to grant the user access to a specific
service. For instance, students under the age twenty-five could be allowed to
buy public transport tickets at a reduced rate. Some identity management
systems assign Levels Of Assurance (LOAs) to each type of attribute provided
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by an identity provider. Some identity providers are authoritative for a specific
set of attributes while other identity providers may be able to provide the same
attributes but with a lower level of assurance [60].
Several European countries are establishing a digital identity management
infrastructure for their citizens by issuing electronic identity cards [153].
Contrary to their analogue predecessors, these electronic identity cards can also
be used to authenticate in the digital domain. Governmental and commercial
service providers can use this infrastructure to obtain reliable user information.
The convenient and real-time nature of this process should further stimulate
the transition from analogue to digital services. Although the government
can assert many identity attributes, the presence of only one identity provider
seriously limits the number and diversity of identity attributes supported
by the system. Not only governments discovered the advantages of identity
management infrastructures. Where companies used to have their own isolated
authentication infrastructure, cooperation between companies spurred the
development of Federated Identity Management (FIM) systems [60, 18]. These
allow members of one organization to authenticate and access resources of
another organization in the association. As a result, many identity management
systems exist, each conceived within a specific context and each with its own
advantages and constraints.
There are several hardware security technologies that can be used to realize
the security and privacy requirements of these identity management systems.
Secure Elements (SEs) such as smart cards have long been used to securely
store the credentials of the user. However, the tamperproof properties of
secure elements can have a broader use. Instead of relying on digital signatures
to assert the authenticity of the user information the secure element can be
used to assert the authenticity of the information. This principle is, for
instance, used in the German electronic identity card [32] and in [35]. A
second evolution is the use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [186]
and related technologies [68, 80] to realize a Trusted Execution Environment
(TEE)[142] on commodity workstations. The TEE allows the execution of code
in isolation from the operating system and, hence, from any malware running on
the operating system. Embedding these technologies in identity management
systems opens up many opportunities for research.
This thesis explores these two research directions and thereby tries to contribute
to answering the question how hardware based security technologies, more
specifically secure element and trusted execution environment technologies,
can be applied to realize the diverse set of requirements inherent to identity
management systems and technologies. This thesis focuses on the use of existing
hardware-based security technologies by software rather than developing new
hardware components.
APPROACH AND SCOPE 3
1.1 Approach and Scope
Many identity management systems, both in academia and industry have
already been presented. This PhD, however, addresses the issues related to
identity management from a new perspective. We apply commodity hardware
security technologies to increase the security, privacy and user-centricity of
identity management systems. They can provide an alternative to conventional
security technologies or they can be used to realize complementary security
properties. No new cryptographic protocols or credential technologies are
developed, instead this work strongly focuses on IdM architectures and on the
innovative use of existing technologies. All concepts proposed in this PhD are
subjected to an in-depth evaluation and are validated by means of a prototype.
The focus of the prototypes is illustrating the feasibility of the system and not
on providing a fully verified industry-ready implementation.
This approach is applied in three settings. In the first part, authentication
between resource-constrained and more powerful devices is addressed. To
satisfy these resource constraints, only lightweight cryptographic protocols
are used. This work is performed on a two-year IWT1 Technology Transfer
(TeTra) project. There was close collaboration with local SMEs participating
in the project to define the presented case studies. This type of projects
aims at stimulating innovation by illustrating how existing technologies and
knowledge can be used in concrete applications. In the second part, a new user-
centric identity management architecture is developed. It combines concepts
of different types of identity management systems to improve upon state of
the art solutions. The last part focuses on using TPM technology to provide
security and privacy enhancing solutions that can be plugged in to existing
identity management systems. The research of the second and third part is
conducted for an IWT Strategic Basic Research project.
1.1.1 Hardware-Backed Authentication using Symmetric Key
Technology
The first part of this text deals with authentication between resource-
constrained and more powerful devices. Many systems have already been
developed with this concern in mind, each making different assumptions
about the requirements of the resource-constrained devices. These devices
can range from RFID tags to (wireless) sensor nodes. Even within RFID
tags a categorization can be made in those that do not have cryptographic
1The IWT is the Flemish agency for innovation through science and technology and
provides funding for innovative industry-relevant projects.
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capabilities, tags that have basic capabilities such as symmetric encryption
and hashing, up to tags that can even run asymmetric cryptographic
algorithms. This text assumes a setting where resource-constrained nodes can
execute basic cryptographic computations such as symmetric encryption and
cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator.
As a first main contribution, a key infrastructure is presented that allows
mutually authenticated key establishment between the resource-constrained and
the powerful devices. Fine-grained access control policies can be deployed and
enforced. The system is validated by applying it in several case studies. Its
feasibility is illustrated by developing a prototype for a sports environment
setting.
The work presented in this part was first published [198] in the proceedings of
the Mobisec 2010 conference. An extended version [194] was published in a
special issue of the Security and Communication Networks journal.
1.1.2 Secure Element-Backed Identity Management
The second part focuses on user authentication towards a service provider.
Several systems have already been developed that address this use case.
Federated identity management systems aim at increasing the user-friendliness
of authentication procedures, while at the same time ensuring strong authen-
tication to service providers. However, the user has typically limited or no
control over the attributes that are exchanged between the identity provider
and the service provider. Moreover, the identity provider can compile extensive
profiles containing the services access by each user. Second, many countries are
rolling out electronic identity technology. A majority uses a smart card that
contains a few certificates and private keys that can be used to authenticate
the user to multiple services. Service providers develop authentication and
authorization modules that are eID-compliant. Although the user now has the
credentials to authenticate to multiple services, current solutions pose many
drawbacks. First, electronic identity cards typically only store static attributes
(i.e. personal properties that do not change, such as name, date of birth, etc.).
Moreover, users often have little impact on the attributes that are released
during authentication. In some systems, they are always identifiable and they
are required to release attributes that are not needed for the particular service.
The integration of anonymous credentials technologies in identity management
systems can go a long way towards increasing the privacy of the user. They
are, however, rarely used in practice. This is caused by several reasons:
high complexity of cryptographic building blocks, performance demands,
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compatibility with legacy infrastructure and complexity of the revocation
procedure [128, 46].
As the second main contribution, a new identity management architecture
is presented. It uses technologies that are commonplace in today’s identity
management systems, such as X.509 credentials and smart cards while focusing
on preserving the user’s privacy. It combines several interesting features of
existing governmental and federated identity management systems. Mechanisms
for trust establishment between user, service- and identity providers are
implemented. Special attention is paid to user control and policies. A prototype
of the architecture is implemented and validated in multiple case studies.
The identity management architecture was first published [195] in the
proceedings of the EuroPKI 2010 conference. An extended version [200] was
published in a special issue of the Mathematical and Computer Modelling
journal. The prototype was published [196] in the proceedings of the
PrimeLife/IFIP 2010 Summer School. The validation case studies were
published [42, 41] in the proceedings of the PrimeLife/IFIP 2011 Summer
School and the Mobisec 2012 conference.
1.1.3 TEE-Backed Identity Management
Policy makers are reluctant to replace existing infrastructures as this typically
involves high costs. The third part of this research, therefore, takes a different
approach. Instead of creating a new identity management architecture, a
system complementary to existing architectures and technologies is developed
to increase their security and privacy properties. To this end, TPM-
based technologies are used to realize a trusted execution environment on
the workstation of the user. The TEE can assure the user and the
service provider that the authentication protocols are executed in a secure
environment, in isolation from potential malware on the user’s workstation.
Two complementary case studies that illustrate the feasibility and added value
of the approach are worked out in depth.
The first case study focuses on the prevention of credential abuse through
sharing or theft. The most commonly applied solution is embedding the
credential in a tamperproof module, such as a smart card. This impedes
making digital copies of the credential. Users can, however, still pass their
smart card to other users. Moreover, users sometimes pick an easy-to-guess
passcode, which defeats the purpose of the passcode.
The third main contribution presents a new solution for activating creden-
tials. The credentials are bound to the biometrics of the user. This binding
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is verified in a TEE running on the workstation of the user. A prototype
implementation of this system, requiring only commodity hardware, is presented
to validate our solution.
This work was published [199] in the proceedings of the CMS 2013 conference.
The second case study tackles several issues related to smart card-based
electronic identity infrastructures. The user often enters his PIN via the
workstation. This allows malware on the workstation to intercept it, which may
lead to further abuse. Second, currently many systems use X.509 credentials for
user authentication, which do not offer the same privacy-preserving properties
as anonymous credential systems.
As a fourth main contribution, a solution is presented that allows users
to securely enter their PIN on their workstation to activate the credentials on
their smart card. The solution further extends existing smart card assisted
authentication technology based on X.509 credentials with privacy-preserving
features such as multi-show unlinkability and selective disclosure. The system
can, hence, be used to improve the privacy properties of these existing
infrastructures. This is realized using a TEE environment on the workstation.
A prototype implementation of this system validates our solution.
This work was published [197] in the proceedings of the SEC 2014 conference.
1.2 Outline
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows:
Chapter 2: Identity Management Technologies shortly introduces the most
important credential technologies and identity management systems. The
strengths and weaknesses of these technologies and systems are discussed.
Part I: Hardware-Backed Authentication using Symmetric Key
Technology
Chapter 3: Authenticated Key Establishment between Resource-Constrained
nodes and Powerful Devices proposes a security architecture for authentication,
access control and secure data transfer between resource-constrained devices
and powerful stations.
Chapter 4: Lightweight Authentication: Validation and Case Studies validates
the security architecture proposed in the previous chapter by applying it
in multiple case studies. A prototype is implemented to demonstrate the
feasibility of our approach.
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Part II: SE-Backed Identity Management
Chapter 5: User-Centric Identity Management using Secure Elements presents
a new approach for user-centric identity management that tackles several
privacy and security problems in current systems.
Chapter 6: User-Centric Identity Management: Validation and Case Studies
validates the identity management system proposed in the previous chapter by
developing a prototype and applying it in multiple case studies.
Part III: TEE-Backed Identity Management
Chapter 6: An Architecture for TPM-Backed Identity Management introduces
several concepts related to TPM-based TEEs and presents a security evaluation.
This chapter additionally presents a solution that allows the user to establish
trust in the software running on the TEE on the workstation, via his
smartphone.
Chapter 8: TPM-Backed Identity Management: Validation and Case Studies
uses the setup presented in the previous chapter to increase the security and
privacy in existing identity management systems. Two complementary case
studies are presented, each of which tackles distinct security and privacy issues
related to identity management systems/technologies.
Chapter 9: General Conclusions.
Chapter 2
Identity Management
Technologies
The main goal of this chapter is to establish the context in which the rest of this
text can be viewed. The first section gives an overview of several credential
technologies that are being used as building blocks for identity management
systems. The second section discusses several identity management models
and systems. The third section introduces the hardware-security technologies
that are used in this work. Privacy-preserving identity management is only a
small aspect in protecting the privacy of the user. The fourth section shortly
introduces several additional technological challenges to protect the privacy of
the user.
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Terminology
This section discusses the terminology used in the remainder of this text.
The terminology presented by Pfitzmann et al. [165] is used to describe the
privacy features of credentials technologies and identity management systems.
An extensive survey on key establishment can be found in Chapter 12 of the
Handbook of Applied Cryptography [144].
• A pseudorandom function is a function that can be used to generate
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output from a random seed and a data variable such that the output
is computationally indistinguishable from truly random output. For a
formal definition of a pseudorandom function, please refer to [102]. In
practice, pseudorandom functions can be implemented using, for instance,
a block cipher.
• Key establishment is the process by which two entities establish a
shared secret key. This key can subsequently be used to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of data exchanged between both parties.
• Implicit key authentication is realized if both parties in the key agreement
protocol are assured that no other entity aside from the identified other
party can learn the value of the established secret key.
• An authenticated key agreement protocol is a key agreement protocol
which provides implicit key authentication to both participating entities.
• Key confirmation is provided by a key agreement protocol if both parties
in the key agreement protocol are assured that the other party actually
has possession of the established secret key.
• An authenticated key agreement with key confirmation is a key agreement
protocol which realizes both implicit key authentication and key confir-
mation to both participating entities.
• Authentication encryption [31] is encryption mode that simultaneously
provides confidentiality, integrity and authenticity assurances on the data.
It can either be realized using specific block cipher modes or by combining
an encryption and MAC algorithm.
2.1.2 Notation
• prfs(x) Denotes a pseudorandom function with seed s and input data x.
• {a}k Denotes the symmetric encryption of a with secret key k.
• a||b Denotes the concatenation of binary strings a and b.
2.2 Credential Technologies
This section discusses three types of credentials that are commonly used in
industrial or academic identity management systems namely password-based
solutions, public key credentials and anonymous credentials.
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2.2.1 Username and Password
A username/password combination is still the most commonly used type of
credential for user authentication in a Web-based context. With the increasing
amount of online services, users have to remember more and more passwords.
User circumvent this problem by reusing passwords, by writing them down or
by storing them in a file on the workstation. This, however, introduces several
security and usability weaknesses.
Several systems have been developed to improve the security of password-based
authentication. Two-factor authentication solutions [19, 17, 188] require users
to prove knowledge of a valid username/password combination and possession
of a second token. This token can, for instance, be a mobile phone [19] or a
bookmark [17]. This prevents that a stolen username/password combination
alone is sufficient to impersonate the user. Second, PwdHash [168] is a browser
extension that transparently generates a different password for each service
provider based on a master password entered by the user, some unique data
associated with the service provider and a private salt stored on the client
machine. The password is generated by applying a cryptographic hash on a
combination of these sets of data. The user, hence, only needs to remember
one password. To address the issue that passwords can be replayed, One-Time
Passwords (OTPs) can be used. A one-time password is only valid for one
login session. Additional technological support ensures that users do not need
to retain a set of one-time passwords in memory. The most basic system prints
a set of OTPs on a sheet of paper for each user. This is used in the Danish eID
infrastructure [111]. Other systems, for instance, generate passwords based on
the previous password, a challenge or the time. A well know OTP system is
SecurID [169] from RSA Security. These OTP systems can also be used as a
complementary element to username/password-based authentication to realize
two-factor authentication.
Graphical passwords [67, 205, 36] is an approach to improve the usability of
password-based authentication. During registration, the user clicks certain
image areas or orders images in a certain order. This pattern is then used as
a secret to authenticate the user. This approach assumes it is much easier for
users to remember these patterns than a strong textual password. Each image
can trigger the user to remember the unique secret pattern.
While several solutions have been proposed to increase the security and usability
of password-based authentication, the main disadvantage remains that they do
not allow the user to prove identity attributes. While this is an integral part of
identity management systems, it does not mean that passwords are never used
in these systems. They are typically used to activate another credential which
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does allow proving identity attributes.
2.2.2 Public-Key Credentials
A public-key certificate [96] links the public key of the user to a set of
information pertaining to the owner. During authentication, the user proves
ownership of the certificate by proving possession of the corresponding private
key. Multiple approaches can be used to establish trust [38] in the link between
the public key and the user’s information. The most common approach is
working with a Certificate Authority (CA) that issues the certificates. The
relying party trusts the CA and can verify the link between the public key
and the user’s information using the public key of the CA. Typically, a multi-
layer architecture is used with multiple entities between the root CA and the
end user’s certificate. An alternative to the CA approach is working with a
web of trust [15], as is done in PGP. In this approach, there is not one but
multiple entities that endorse the link between the public key of the user and
the identity, distributing trust over multiple entities. The most common type
of public-key certificate is X.509, an ITU-T standard. The most broad scale
adoption of X.509 credentials is the Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) for server
authentication in the HTTPS protocol.
Several electronic identity technologies use X.509 credentials for user authenti-
cation. During authentication all the information contained in the certificate
is released to the service provider. This technology, hence, does not support
selective disclosure where the user can select which information is released
during authentication. This can be mitigated by linking identity files to the
certificate instead of embedding all the identity information in the certificate
itself. This allows the user to separate different types of information in
different identity files. During authentication, only the identity file relevant
to the specific service is released. For instance, online shops can request an
address file but should not have access to the driver’s license information of
the user. An alternative approach is to include a cryptographic hash of the
attribute values concatenated with a salt (i.e. Hash(valueat || saltat)) in the
credential [193], instead of the attribute value itself. This allows the user to
selective disclose attributes by releasing the credential, the requested attribute
values and the corresponding salts. The service provider can verify the integrity
of the disclosed information but cannot derive the attribute values that are
not released. However, since every authentication with the same credential
is linkable, different service providers can merge their profiles of a user to
compile one large profile. Hence, public-key credentials are mostly suited for
server authentication and contexts where the credential is always used towards
the same service provider.
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Public-key credentials can be revoked based on a unique serial number
contained in the credential. During revocation, the serial number is added to
a Certificate Revocation List (CRL). During authentication, the relying party
checks the revocation status of the credential by verifying that the serial number
is not included in the CRL. Alternatively, the relying party can send the serial
number to an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) server. The server
checks the revocation status and sends a signed response back to the relying
party.
2.2.3 Anonymous Credential Systems
Anonymous credential systems [65, 47, 53, 54] enable privacy preserving
authentication. Where public key credentials force the user to release all
information contained in the certificate, anonymous credential systems enable
selective disclose of the information contained in the credential. The user can
also choose to release no attribute information, only proving possession of a
valid credential. Moreover, it also allows the user to prove unique service-
specific pseudonyms, impeding efforts of service providers to cooperate and
compile large user profiles.
All these features allow the user to minimize the information disclosed to
service providers during authentication. These features, however, come at a
certain cost. Anonymous credential systems are computationally much more
expensive compared to regular public key credentials. This increases the
duration of the authentication and the load on the server. Also the revocation
protocols for anonymous credentials are much more complex than for public key
credentials [128, 46]. The Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) used for public
key credentials require a global identifier known to both the credential issuer
and relying parties. This would defeat the unlinkability property achieved by
anonymous credentials. Short-term credentials could be used as an alternative
to revocation. This approach, however, also has several drawbacks. The
computational load on the issuer increases since periodic credential updates are
required. The issuer is required to be online to allow the user to periodically
update his credential(s). Further, if a short-term credential is renewed on
demand before it is used, the renewal and use of the credential may be linkable
via timing correlation.
Anonymous credential systems are often split into two categories. Credential
systems where the blinding is performed during the credential issuance phase
(i.e. using blind signatures [64]) can only be used once if the user does not
want to be linkable between transactions as the public key and certificate are
revealed to the verifier. To prevent this linkability, a credential issuer can issue
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several credentials to a user, who can dispose of a credential after using it.
This technique is used in the U-Prove [47] credential system. For credentials
where the blinding is executed during the credential show phase (i.e. using
zero-knowledge proofs [103, 93, 73]), there is no limitation on the number of
times it can be shown without degrading the privacy of the user. This system
is applied in the Idemix framework [53, 54, 58]. The European ABC4Trust1
project aims at defining a common unified architecture for these types of
credential technologies and delivering an open reference implementation. In
the IRMA2 project, this type of credential technology is used to develop
and evaluate an experimental framework for privacy-friendly attribute-based
identity management using smart cards.
When users can access services anonymously/pseudonymously, they might be
more inclined to try and abuse the service if they cannot be held accountable.
Hence, measures need to be implemented to enable deanonymization if abuse
is detected. Verifiable encryption [57] can be used to encrypt the identity of
the user with the public key of a trusted third party. The service provider can
verify that the correct identity is contained in the encryption without learning
the actual value. The encryption can be randomized to ensure that multiple
encryptions of the same identity cannot be linked. The trusted third party is
trusted to only reveal the identity in case of abuse.
Despite the computationally intensive nature of anonymous credential systems
several attempts have been made to port them to smart cards. Initially,
only a limited set of the functionality was implemented [35, 178]. More
recent implementations [150, 201] realize more of the functionality. Other
approaches [34] execute only the security critical operations on the smart
card and delegate the privacy-preserving calculations to the host, speeding-
up the process. Although there are still some barriers for using anonymous
credential systems (e.g. there is no universally good revocation strategy), these
and other [29, 25] advances make anonymous credential systems an increasingly
viable option for rolling out electronic identity infrastructures.
2.3 Identity Management Systems
This section discusses several identity management systems relevant to this
work.
1ABC4Trust is an EU-funded research project, more information can be found on http://
abc4trust.eu.
2IRMA is a project led by the Digital Security group of the Radboud University Nijmegen,
more information can be found on https://www.irmacard.org/.
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2.3.1 Web-Based Identity Management Systems
Several identity management systems such as Shibboleth [149], openID [167]
and UMA [137] (User-Managed Access) have been developed to manage the
identity of the user in a Web-based setting. Shibboleth [149] and openID [167]
are two common examples of federated identity management systems [60, 18].
UMA is an identity management system developed by the Kantara Initiative3
based on OAuth4 for granting access to Web resources.
In federated identity management systems a user is known to at least one
organization (i.e. the identity provider) in the federation (i.e. a group of
organizations with mutual trust agreements). If a user contacts a service
provider, authentication is delegated to the identity provider of the user.
The user authenticates to the identity provider using one of the supported
credential technologies. Subsequently, the identity provider releases the
requested personal data to the service provider.
Shibboleth and OpenID can realize a high level of scalability and interoperabil-
ity (e.g. based on standards and easy integration in Web services) but also have
major drawbacks. For instance, a high level of trust is required in the identity
providers. They are trusted to only release the required/requested attributes to
the service provider and not to impersonate the user. Impersonation is possible
since no authentication between the user and the service provider is required.
The identity provider also knows which services a user is accessing. This allows
the identity provider to protect the user’s privacy by not transferring the user’s
personal information to blacklisted malicious service providers. It, however,
also allows the identity provider to compile a user profile which consists of all
the services accessed by a user. Moreover, combining attributes from different
identity providers (i.e. attribute aggregation [61]) is not supported. The model
is also not suited for oﬄine use. Some initiatives try to mitigate some of these
drawbacks. For instance, UApprove [159] is a Shibboleth extension that gives
the user more control over the attributes exchanged between the identity and
service provider. The identity provider is also a single point of failure since it
actively participates in the authentication of its users.
In these types of systems, the service provider or a dedicated discovery service
is trusted to redirect the user to the correct identity provider. A malicious
service provider could redirect the user to a phishing server to obtain the
login information of the user. Where Shibboleth is currently used in closed
3The Kantara Initiative is a non-profit professional association dedicated to advancing
technical and legal innovation related to digital identity management. More information can
be found on http://kantarainitiative.org.
4OAuth is an authorization framework for controlling access to a Web resource, more
information can be found on http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749.html.
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federations, many OpenID providers have a much more open philosophy, aiming
for the broadest possible adoption. In OpenID, each user has a global identifier
(i.e. URL) that is released to the service provider. The latter can use the
global identifier to locate the corresponding OpenID provider and handle the
authentication procedure. OpenID systems are, therefore, more vulnerable
to phishing attacks than Shibboleth. Further, several implementation flaws
have been found with several popular OpenID providers [203] and TLS is
not mandatory during the authentication process which an active attacker can
abuse [187].
2.3.2 Governmental Identity Management systems
Several European countries are issuing electronic identity cards [153]. Many
countries use a tamperproof device, typically a smart card, to store the
authentication credential and personal information of the user.
• Many European countries such as Italy [22], Spain [110], Portugal [70]
and Belgium [75, 76] use a smart card containing an RSA private
key and corresponding X.509 certificate for user authentication. This
credential is activated via the PIN of the user. The government provides
a middleware package that needs to be installed on the workstation
of the user and facilitates authentication of the user towards a remote
service provider. The Belgian middleware, for instance, implements a
PKCS#11 module that other applications (e.g. the browser) can use to
support authentication with the Belgian electronic identity infrastructure.
It handles the communication to the card and allows the user to enter
his PIN. This type of identity cards uses X.509 credentials without any
privacy enhancing measures. They, hence, inherit many of the privacy
issues related to that credential technology.
• In the German electronic identity card [32] system, a common key pair
is shared by a large set of smart cards. This key pair is used to set up a
secure authenticated channel between the card and the service provider.
Since a key pair is shared with lots of other smart cards, no uniquely
identifying information is released during the establishment of the secure
channel. The number of smart cards with the same key pair should be
high enough to provide an acceptable anonymity set. The card can now
release user information over the secure channel. The service provider
can only query a limited subset of the personal information stored on
the card. This subset depends on the nature of the service and is
regulated by the government. The policy is stored in the service provider’s
certificate, allowing the smart card to enforce it. Service provider-specific
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pseudonyms are generated by the card, based on a card-specific secret and
data in the service provider’s certificate. The government knows the link
between a user and the card-specific secret. This link is used to revoke
identity cards. The revocation procedure consists of generating service
provider-specific revocation lists containing the card-specific pseudonyms
of each revoked card. Hence, when the number of service providers and
revoked identity cards increases, the overhead of the revocation procedure
increases considerably. Knowledge of the card-specific secret also allows
the government to deanonymize the user based on a pseudonym (i.e. by
generating the pseudonyms of all users for a specific service provider) or
link profiles of users with different service providers. Relying on a key
pair shared by a large set of smart cards introduces significant overhead
if it is compromised. If a key pair is compromised, all smart cards
containing that key pair need to be replaced. Since the system relies
on the tamperproofness of the smart card to assert the validity of user
attributes, compromising the tamperproofness allows an attacker to forge
information.
• The Austrian [134] and Finnish [162] electronic identity card is a technol-
ogy neutral concept that can be deployed on different valid physical tokens
(i.e. devices that comply with Austrian/Finnish legislation for serving as
an eID card). Moreover, multiple organizations can issue identity cards
(e.g. banks issue ATM cards and one of the telecom operators issues SIM
cards that are considered valid eID cards).
Governmental identity cards mitigate multiple drawbacks of federated identity
management systems. The common identity domain model, however, also
has several disadvantages. The model is not as flexible as federated IdM
systems with respect to attribute provisioning. The model only supports one
identity provider, limiting the diversity of attributes available in the system.
Further, attributes are typically stored in the card during the whole card’s
lifetime. This implies that only (relatively) static attributes can be stored
in the card. The procedure to modify the attributes is typically expensive
(e.g. involving the user going to the town hall). To enrich the diversity of data
available via the electronic identity card, the Belgian government developed
a centralized platform that allows service providers to retrieve information
about the user via a unique identifier obtained from the identity card. This
centralized platform is connected to several remote databases that contain user
information. These databases are managed by different entities and contain
diverse sets of user information. When a request for user information is received,
the centralized platform checks whether the requesting entity is allowed to
access that information. If so, the requested information is retrieved from the
databases and provided to the requesting entity. Gradually, more and more
IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 17
information can be made available this way. In the eHealth domain, the social
identity card is being phased out since the social security number and insurance
status is now available through the centralized platform. This greatly increases
the application domain of the identity card but at the same time increases the
risks associated with the system. Although only certified instances can retrieve
specific sets of information, the user has much less control over the exchange
of his information since the whole process of retrieving the information via the
central platform is transparent to the user. Abuse handling is mainly focused
on logging, as each data request is logged in a database.
Further, since each country is rolling out its own electronic identity infrastruc-
ture, service providers would have to provide authentication modules specific
for each country. To establish European electronic identity interoperability, the
EU STORK5 project adopted the federated identity management model. Each
country provides an identity provider that asserts the identity of their citizens
to (cross-border) service providers. The user uses his electronic identity card
to authenticate towards the local identity provider. Service providers then only
have to support the common authentication protocol adopted by all identity
providers. This, however, also introduces some of the disadvantages of the
federated identity management model such as increased trust in the identity
providers.
2.3.3 Identity Management Systems Based on Anonymous
Credentials
Several identity management systems have been proposed that use anonymous
credential systems for user authentication [56, 132, 34, 182]. In [182], Suriadi
et al. propose a user-centric federated single sign-on system based on the
private credential system proposed by Bangerter et al. [27]. To alleviate
the computational expensive nature of anonymous credential systems, the
anonymous credential is only used to authenticate towards an identity provider,
during which the required information is released. The identity provider
provides SSO functionality to the user. It uses standards (i.e. Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML)6 messages) to assert the identity of the user to
service providers. Service providers are, hence, shielded from the complex
nature of anonymous credential systems. In [34], the mobile device is used to
manage the Idemix credentials of the user. Different identity providers can issue
credentials containing information about the user. The mobile device scans a
5STORK is an EU-funded research project, more information can be found on https://
www.eid-stork.eu/.
6SAML is an XML based standard for the exchange of authentication and authorization
data.
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QR code7 containing the policy [55] of the service provider. Subsequently the
mobile either generates a QR code containing a proof satisfying the service
provider’s policy or transfers that proof over the mobile’s Internet connection
to the service provider. While anonymous credential systems can be used to
minimize the information disclosed during authentication, using those types
of systems also presents some drawbacks. It increases the computational load
on the server and client compared to X.509 credentials Further, supporting
revocation is a challenging task.
2.4 Hardware Security Technologies
This text uses two types of hardware security technologies: trusted execution
environment technologies and secure elements. Trusted execution environments
technologies are contained in commodity hardware such as mobile phones or
workstations. They provide a separate execution environment that protects the
software running in that environment from malware that is potentially running
on the operating system of the device. Where trusted execution environment
technologies run on commodity hardware and mainly aim to protect against
software attacks, secure elements are dedicated hardware components that run
a trusted application and also provide protection against hardware attacks.
Both types of technologies are discussed in more detail below.
2.4.1 Trusted Execution Environment Technologies
As defined by GolbalPlatform,8 a Trusted Execution Environment [100] (TEE)
is a separate execution environment that runs alongside a rich operating
system (e.g. Android, Windows). The TEE provides security services for the
rich environment and isolates access to its hardware and software security
resources from the rich OS and its applications. This section shortly discusses
two different technologies to realize a TEE. The ARM TrustZone technology
is mainly used in mobile devices such as smartphones, while TCG Trusted
Computing technologies are integrated in laptops and workstations.
7A Quick Response (QR) code is a two-dimensional machine-readable optical label.
8GlobalPlatform is a cross industry, non-profit association which identifies, develops
and publishes specifications that promote the secure and interoperable deployment and
management of multiple applications on secure chip technology - Wikipedia.
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ARM TrustZone
ARM TrustZone [23] is a security extension embedded in several commercial
ARM processors. An ARM physical CPU with TrustZone extensions is
presented as two virtual CPUs. One virtual CPU runs a normal world rich
environment such as Android and one virtual CPU executes secure world
applications. The security extension supports restricting hardware resources
(e.g. memory, screen, keyboard, notification LED) to applications running in
the secure world. Applications running in the secure world have access to the
full power of a device’s main processor and memory, while applications running
in the main operating system have restricted access.
Upon boot, the ARM processor starts executing in secure world mode. The
software first loaded is, hence, secure world software. The secure world software
is responsible for booting the rich operating system in the normal world. To
establish trust in the secure world software, a secure boot procedure can be
implemented. The secure boot procedure uses a chain of trust. The root of
trust is the first software module that starts executing. Each software module
is responsible for verifying the integrity of the software module(s) it loads.
To enable integrity verification, each software module is signed by a trusted
authority. This trusted authority is typically the platform vendor or a dedicated
third party that manages the software running in the secure environment. In
the context of the ARM TrustZone technology, especially the secure world
software should be verified. To prevent simple hardware attacks, the root of
trust should be located in the on-SoC ROM. On-SoC one-time-programmable
hardware can be used to store (a cryptographic hash of) the public key used
by the root of trust to verify the software module(s) it loads.
An important remark to make is that ARM’s hardware platform architecture
is only a specification. Device manufactures are free to customize a specific
implementation. The potential security features offered by the ARM TrustZone
technology are, hence, not always realized in practice [191].
Giesecke & Devrient developed a secure world middleware layer and application
framework called MobiCore [98] to facilitate the development and deployment
of applications running in the ARM secure world. So far Giesecke & Devrient’s
MobiCore was integrated in the Samsung Galaxy S3 and the Galaxy Note II.
Sierraware implemented the SierraTEE and SierraVisor TEE solution [99],
which is freely available under the GNU GPL v2 license for the Samsung Exynos
4412 and nVIDIA Tegra 3 SoCs.
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TCG Trusted Computing
TCG Trusted Computing relies on a separate hardware module (i.e. a Trusted
Platform Module [186] (TPM)) that is physically attached to the computer’s
motherboard, extending the system with a set of security related features. Most
commodity laptops and workstations are nowadays equipped with a TPM. It
can be used to measure and attest the software stack running on the system.
The TPM can also be used to seal data to a specified trusted software stack.
The sealed data can then only be accessed if the device is running the software
stack specified during sealing.
The trusted execution technologies [68, 80] embedded in several chipsets
from Intel and AMD allow the execution of measured code independently of
previously executed software. It can, hence, be used to interleave the regular
operating system with the execution of TEE applications. Both the regular
OS and the TEE applications are in full control of the hardware. Before
executing the TEE software, the processor measures the code via the TPM
(i.e. a cryptographic hash of the TEE software binary is stored in the TPM).
Hardware protections such as disabling interrupts, preventing DMA access
to the code in memory and even prohibiting access by hardware debuggers
attached to the motherboard, ensure that the measured code is the code
executed by the processor. The secure measurement of the code by the TPM
ensures that data can be locked to the application and is, hence, not available
to any other application running on the system.
Evaluation
There are several important distinctions between the ARM TrustZone and the
TCG Trusted Computing approach to realize a trusted execution environment.
First, with ARM TrustZone technology each device attached to the bus can, if
it supports the required bus protocols, distinguish between secure and normal
world requests. This allows hardware resources to be restricted to the secure
world. In the TCG approach, both the applications running in the trusted
execution environment and the rich operating system are in full control of the
hardware. The only device that can distinguish between TEE applications
and normal applications is the TPM. The TPM is used to seal the data of
the TEE applications so that it cannot be accessed by any other software
component running on the system. It is, hence, much easier to inform the user
whether or not a trusted application is running in a TrustZone system (e.g. by
using a LED only accessible from the secure world) compared to a TCG-based
system. Knowing when a trusted TEE application is running is a key factor
in establishing a trusted path [209] between the user and a hardware resource
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such as (a smart card. Second, the mechanism to establish trust in the TEE
software differs between both approaches. In ARM TrustZone, a secure boot
mechanism is used to ensure that the software running in the secure world
is trustworthy. In the TCG approach, the software attestation capabilities
of the TPM are used to establish trust in the TEE applications. Software
attestation is a mechanism that allows asserting which software components
are running on a workstation to a local or remote party. This makes the
TCG approach more open compared to the TrustZone system. To develop
and deploy applications for a TrustZone-based trusted execution environment
on end-user devices such as smartphones, cooperation of hardware integrators
such as Samsung or framework (e.g. MobiCore) providers such as Giesecke &
Devrient is required.
A trusted execution environment can also be implemented through pure
software virtualization (e.g. Xen, OKL4 Microvisor). These solutions, however,
lack the additional security through hardware support. The hardware security
extensions, for instance, provide protections against DMA attacks that can be
used to add malicious software to memory.
2.4.2 Secure Element
As defined by GlobalPlatform, a secure element is a tamper resistant platform
(typically a one chip secure microcontroller) capable of securely hosting
applications and their confidential and cryptographic data in accordance with
the rules and security requirements set forth by a set of well-identified trusted
authorities. These authorities are trusted by the different actors interacting
with the secure element (e.g. user, service provider). Secure elements are most
commonly deployed in the form of smart cards. They are typically used in
applications with strong security requirements such as payment applications,
electronic identity systems and access control systems.
A secure element is, typically, a resource constrained device. Most secure
elements do not allow direct interaction with a user but have to rely on
a dedicated reader or a general purpose device such as a workstation or
laptop to interact with the user. This can introduce security risks since the
software running on these devices is not as trustworthy as the software running
on the secure element. This can make the system vulnerable to malware
attacks [101, 26, 120, 175]. Malware could, for instance, intercept the passcode
of the user or mislead the user about the data that is actually signed by the
secure element. A trusted execution environment could be used to tackle these
challenges. The TEE could, for instance, offer a trustworthy user interface to
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securely transmit a passcode to the secure element and inform the user about
the transaction before it is processed by the secure element.
2.5 Supporting Privacy-Preserving Authentication
This text follows the privacy as control paradigm as defined by Guerses et
al. [107]. It focuses on systems that increase the control users have over the
disclosure of their information. Several identity management systems try to
increase the privacy of the user by implementing mechanisms to give the user
more control over the disclosure of his information and minimize the data
released during authentication. However, service providers or third parties
have many other techniques at their disposal to gather (privacy sensitive)
information about the user. Users are, typically, much less aware about which
information is gathered using these techniques and have, hence, virtually no
control over this type of information gathering. This section gives a short
overview of several techniques service providers or third parties can use to
gather information about the user and what techniques can be used to limit
the impact.
Users often access remote services via their browser. Web technologies allow
many ways for service providers to gather information about users. Cookies
have been developed with the explicit goal to recognize a user over multiple
page requests. The goal was to improve user experience and allow stateful
services by providing dynamic user-specific content. It, however, does not
stop there. Since many websites import third-party content in their sites
(e.g. for advertising, statistics, content-delivery), these third parties can use
cookies to track a user over the Internet. This not only provides them with
tracking data, it also allows them to gather general information about the
user [127]. Some efforts try to raise awareness about this large scale tracking
on the Web. For instance, Lightbeam [6] is a Firefox add-on that visually
shows which third parties are contacted when you visit a specific website. In
the Netherlands, service providers are obliged to inform the user if they use
cookies. As awareness rises, users might start deleting their cookies more
often. Hence, some service providers employed additional technologies such
as HTML5 and flash storage to store uniquely identifying information on the
computer of the user, creating so called Supercookies that are very hard to
remove from the browser. Other initiatives try to block tracking. For instance,
NoScript [10] and Ghostery [3] are browser add-ons that block requests to
tracking sites. Recently, most browsers added support for the Do Not Track
(DNT) header. This is a HTTP header field that requests Web applications to
disable its tracking of an individual user. The header is, however, not legally
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binding, leaving service providers free to either honor or completely ignore the
request. A recent study [16] showed that this header is completely disregarded.
Moreover, apart from cookies, the browser itself can also be used to identify the
user [87, 16]. Service providers can also retrieve other information about the
user. For instance, the Geolocation API in HTML5 enables service providers,
given permission of the user, to obtain the location of the user via the browser.
The nature of the provided service also allows the service provider to obtain
information about the user. Mail providers can scan the content of mails
for targeted advertising and online shops offer personalized recommendations
based on the shopping behavior of the user. Some service providers also learn
information about users from what other users release. For instance, users
upload photos of other users on social networks and tag users in photos, events,
locations etc.
With the increasing popularity of smartphones, more and more services are
being accessed via the smartphone of the user. To be able to provide more user-
friendly and rich services, service providers are switching from Web services to
developing dedicated applications. These applications often require numerous
permissions [112], allowing them to access the rich sources of information
(e.g. contacts, location, SMSes and calendar data) on the mobile device. Some
of these permissions are necessary due to the nature of the application, but
often applications require permissions that are not strictly necessary for the
application to function correctly [112]. Moreover, users are typically unaware
of how the information is used and whether or not it is transferred to remote
parties. Hence, for meaningful deployment of privacy-preserving identity
management systems on mobile devices, the user needs more control over the
access and use of data by mobile applications. This is the subject of much
current research [91, 33, 112, 152, 171, 24].
The communication layer also allows third parties to gather information about
the user. The IP address alone can be used to identify a user and learn its
location. Traffic analysis can be used to compile large profiles of the browsing
behavior of the user. Anonymous communication protocols [183, 81, 147, 151,
146, 88] have been developed to impede efforts to gather information of the
user based on network communication.
2.6 Conclusions
This section gave an overview of credential technologies and identity man-
agement models. Each technology and model has their own (dis)advantages.
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Common identity domain systems are well suited for authentication in a specific
domain. The limited diversity of available information and the limited scope
of a domain with only a specific set of service providers mitigates the privacy
implications of public-key credentials. However, to increase the application
domain, electronic identity infrastructures are being extended to provide an
increasingly diverse set of information. Moreover, this information is no longer
stored on the identity card of the user but available to service providers with
virtually no control of the user. Common identity domain systems using
public-key cryptography without any additional privacy-preserving measures
are insufficient to protect the privacy of the user in this setting. The federated
SSO identity model provides a scalable architecture for exchanging information
between providers. The control over the exchanged information, however, lies
largely with the identity provider. Moreover, the system is not usable in oﬄine
scenarios and most implementations allow the identity provider to profile the
user regarding the visited services and do not support attribute aggregation.
User-centric identity management tackles most of these shortcomings. These
solutions, however, typically rely on anonymous credential technologies which
are computationally more expensive and increase the management burden and
are, therefore, hardly used in practice.
Currently most identity management systems rely on the workstation to
provide a secure environment for handling the user’s credentials. Although
identity management systems can incorporate tamperproof modules, they
are often activated and accessed via the workstation. This allows malware
potentially running on the workstation to intercept and abuse the activation
credentials. Most systems deal with this threat in a reactive way, by revoking
credentials. It would be better to handle this proactively and try to prevent
this abuse from occurring.
Chapter 3
Authenticated Key
Establishment between
Resource-Constrained Nodes
and Powerful Devices
Today, PKI solutions are widely adopted to establish secure authenticated
communication channels between devices. Standards such as SSL/TLS were
developed to facilitate the establishment of these secure channels. The HTTPS
communication protocol, for instance, uses these protocols to set up a secure
communication channel between a client workstation and a Web server. Public-
key infrastructures allow tackling the security requirements that apply in open
environments (i.e. secure communication between parties that have no previous
relation) between computationally powerful devices. Symmetric cryptography
is, however, superior in terms of performance, energy consumption and cost.
Therefore, symmetric key solutions are often adopted in settings where these
parameters are of paramount importance. Typical examples are small devices
such as sensors that need to be online for long periods without an external
power source. These sensors can, for instance, be used in body area networks
or wireless sensor networks that sense environmental parameters (e.g. such as
oscillators in volcano areas or temperature sensors in transport monitoring
systems).
Many protocols [173, 63, 86, 92, 136, 45] have been developed to secure
communication in a network of (lightweight) devices using symmetric key
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solutions. However, those networks are not isolated. Today, many scenarios
exist in which (networks of) lightweight devices need to release data securely
and implement strict access control policies towards more powerful devices. For
instance, body area networks can be used in health monitoring systems. The
sensors may release parameters and status information to mobiles or gateways
for statistical analysis or to detect and start alert procedures. Caregivers can
read specific parameters with their smartphones to assess the situation of the
patient. In supply chain systems, several environmental parameters need to
be monitored and be available for inspection by authorities. These networks
of constrained devices can be managed by an administrator who issues rights
to other parties to activate and use certain functionality of the constrained
nodes. The data that may be retrieved often depends on certain roles or
specific privileges. For instance, a wireless node that is installed in a truck
or attached to a container on a ship may contain a lot of information. A
border control entity can read out a detailed history (e.g. route, driving and
rest times) while relay stations or warehouses can only read out product related
information (such as temperature history). Outsiders are not allowed to read
out any information or eavesdrop on data that is exchanged.
These use cases require reader devices from multiple organizations, and hence
with tailored privileges, to access specific services from constrained nodes. This
chapter presents a security architecture for authentication, access control and
secure data transfer between resource constrained devices and powerful stations,
often with networking capabilities, that tackles these requirements. Symmetric
key operations are performed on both sides. Asymmetric operations might
be required by the powerful device when acquiring the necessary privileges
from a management service. The systems supports commodity hardware such
as smartphones to be used as reader devices. Our approach is compared to
several other solutions.
3.1 Related Work
Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags are small, wireless devices to
identify objects and people. They are proliferating in trillions [121] due to the
dropping costs. Juels [121] gives an overview of existing RFID tag designs and
their applications, and evaluates their security and privacy properties. They
are classified into two categories: basic RFID tags and symmetric-key tags.
The former cannot perform cryptographic operations. Although the lack of
cryptography is a big impediment to the security design, a few lightweight
technical approaches can address certain security and privacy concerns. Some
basic tags can be killed, put to sleep or blocked. Also, certain tags are protected
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with a passcode. However, passcodes can be eavesdropped on. Symmetric-
key tags have richer cryptographic capabilities which are typically used for
(mutual) authentication, and for the prevention of tracking/tracing and cloning
attacks. Multiple security designs are presented in the literature [181, 158, 148].
However, these solutions mostly focus on identification. More complex
scenarios with multiple actors with tailored privileges and advanced access
control requirements regarding the data stored on the tags are not supported.
High-end tags which are, for instance, used in e-passports [122] also support
public-key cryptographic operations [138, 28, 130, 204, 113, 131]. Most RFID
security research focuses mostly on identifying the tag and authenticating data
to (trusted) readers. This work focuses more on nodes that maintain and/or
generate a richer set of information or provide personalized services. Hence,
the constrained node needs to be able to enforce fine grained access control
policies and a secure channel needs to be established between the constrained
nodes and the reader to securely transfer data.
Wireless smart cards can also be used for radio-frequency identification. For
instance, MIFARE technology is often used in access control application
(e.g. public transport, tolling). In these settings, the card is merely a mobile
storage medium for data that can be read and updated by dedicated readers
in the system. The entire infrastructure (i.e. constrained nodes and readers) is
typically managed by a single authority (e.g. the public transport company).
There also exist high-end tamperproof smart cards that can have richer
cryptographic capabilities such as RSA and ECC. These cards can, typically,
run customs application allowing them to provide tailored support for the
requirement of each specific use cases. They are, however, more expensive
and only support very close range communication (i.e. around ten centimeters).
They are mostly used in high security applications such as electronic payment
and identity management.
Many lightweight cryptographic libraries [116, 59] containing (optimized)
versions of symmetric cryptographic algorithms are available. They provide
implementations of lightweight cryptographic blocks (e.g. GRAIN [166],
PRESENT [40] and Trivium [74]) or optimized implementations of traditional
cryptographic blocks (e.g. DES and AES). For instance, the IAIK cryptographic
libraries [115] of the Graz University of Technology contain several implemen-
tations of the AES algorithm. They are often optimized for specific processor
types, and designed for minimal energy consumption and high speed encryption.
Many solutions have been proposed to secure and authenticate traffic within
wireless sensor networks using symmetric cryptography [173, 63, 86, 92, 136].
Contrary to these proposals, our work focuses on authentication of external
devices to sensor nodes. Multiple entities may require access to specific sets of
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data or services from sensors. Each entity can have different privileges, hence,
fine-grained access control policies should be supported. Several systems [202,
174, 50, 109, 108, 210] have been proposed that rely on public-key cryptography
to control access from external readers to wireless sensor networks. This chapter
investigates how similar requirements can be tackled under the assumption
that constrained nodes can only use symmetric cryptography and compares
the proposed solution to systems using public-key cryptography.
3.2 Design
This section presents a security architecture that tackles the requirements
that apply in settings where readers, both general purpose readers such as
smartphones or dedicated readers, need to mutually authenticate with resource
constrained nodes. This section first lists the different roles in the system, after
which the requirements and adversary model are discussed. This section ends
with the presentation of our approach.
3.2.1 Roles
The system administrator manages a set of resource constrained devices (cd).
Third parties can request access to certain services or data contained on the
constrained nodes using a powerful reader device (pd).
3.2.2 Requirements and Adversary Model
Resource Requirements
This chapter poses some general resource requirements that aim at minimizing
energy consumption and cost while achieving reasonable performance in
settings where powerful devices from a potentially diverse set of owners (and
corresponding privileges) need to establish secure authenticated sessions with
constrained devices.
R1 Resource constrained devices only execute symmetric key operations
for reasons of performance and cost. These nodes might be oﬄine.
Even though ECC algorithms have been highly optimized [28, 130, 204],
symmetric algorithms [89] are still significantly more efficient. The
protocols should have a low communication overhead (i.e. limited
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data transfer and short distance communication protocols) as wireless
communication can have an even bigger impact on the autonomy of
devices than the cryptographic operations [160].
Security Requirements
S1 The system should support authenticated key agreement between re-
source constrained and powerful nodes so that data can securely be
exchanged between both parties.
S2 The constrained nodes carry or generate sensitive data. Not all entities
should be able to access all the data and services that are available from
a node. The system should, therefore, allow fine-grained access control
policies to be enforced.
Adversary Model
With respect to the cryptographic capabilities of the attacker, we follow
the Dolev-Yao attacker model [85]: attackers cannot break cryptographic
primitives, but they can perform protocol-level attacks. The administrator
is trusted to issue capabilities to readers reflecting the privileges of their owner
and to correctly deploy and configure the constrained nodes. This entails
enforcing the desired access control policies and running software that correctly
realizes the specified functionality.
3.2.3 Approach
This section presents the approach taken to satisfy the requirements presented
in the previous section. First, the key infrastructure is presented. The second
section illustrates how the key infrastructure can be used to establish a secure
authenticated channel between a resource constrained and powerful device.
The last section discusses revocation. In the protocol listings, authenticated
encryption is assumed. Hence, apart from the confidentiality, also the integrity
and authenticity of encrypted messages is protected.
Key Infrastructure
The system administrator is responsible for issuing and initializing the resource
constrained devices with a symmetric key (KM ). Different settings can have
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different requirements regarding key distribution. For instance, each device
can store a unique KM , KM can be shared by a small group of devices or
by all devices managed by the administrator. In Chapter 4 our approach is
applied in two distinct settings. Each constrained device is also equipped with
a dedicated secret key Kcd and seed for pseudo-random number generation.
The administrator maintains a mapping between each KM and a serial number.
To enable authentication between the constrained nodes and powerful devices,
the system administrator issues capabilities to powerful devices. A capability
(CAPX) contains the identity and rights of its owner and a random value. A
secret key KX and the serial number assigned to the KM used to construct the
capability are also issued to the owner. KX and CAPX are defined as follows.
• KX := prfKM (rand)
• CAPX := {idX ||roleX ||rand}KM .
Mutually Authenticated Key Agreement
During the key agreement protocol, illustrated in Table 3.1, the powerful device
pd generates a challenge and sends it together with its capability CAPpd to the
constrained device cd (1-2). The latter decrypts CAPpd, generates a challenge
and calculates Kpd and Ks (3-5). The challenge is then sent to pd. The latter
can now calculate the session key Ks using Kpd (6-7). An additional round can
be added to realize key confirmation.
Table 3.1: Key agreement protocol between a constrained (cd) and powerful
(pd) device.
keyAgreement():
(1) pd : chal1 := genChallenge()
(2) cd ← pd : CAPpd, chal1
(3) cd : [idpd||rolepd||rand] := symDecrypt(CAPpd, KM )
(4) cd : chal2 := prfKcd (seedcd++)
(5) cd : Kpd:= prfKM (rand);
Ks := prfKpd(chal1 || chal2)
(6) cd → pd : chal2
(7) pd : Ks := prfKpd(chal1 || chal2)
The challenges generated by both parties ensure the freshness of the session key
and key control by both parties. Authentication and identification are realized
through key confirmation. If key confirmation is completed, cd has proven
knowledge of KM and is, hence, authenticated (i.e. a genuine constrained
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device managed by the administrator). The constrained node is also uniquely
identifiable if each constrained device is equipped with a unique KM . This
does require the reader to have a separate CAPX and KX for each constrained
device it interacts with.
Further, cd knows that the other party possesses the secret Kpd and, hence,
knows that the data contained in the capability (i.e. id, role and rand) is
associated with that party. Note that the protocol does not offer forward
secrecy, since the session key can be reconstructed if either KM or Kpd is
compromised.
Revocation
To mitigate the impact of compromised capabilities several approaches can be
taken, some of which can be combined to improve efficiency. The best approach
depends on the setting in which the systems is used. In Chapter 4 our approach
is applied in two distinct settings, in each of which a different approach is used.
• A serial number could be included in the capability, allowing the
constrained nodes to check whether a capability is compromised by
matching the serial number with a list of revoked serial numbers. This
approach requires the constrained nodes to have sufficient storage to store
the list of revoked serial numbers and to be able to contact a revocation
service at regular intervals to update the list. The required storage space
can be limited using certificate revocation trees [125] based on Merkle’s
hash trees. To further limit the required storage, each constrained node
could be equipped with an additional secret key that is shared with the
administrator. The administrator can then periodically update KM using
that additional secret key. This effectively invalidates all previously issued
capabilities. Since the constrained devices typically only have short range
communication capabilities, this approach scales badly in most settings.
• The contents of the capability can also be extended with a validity
interval. If short-lived capabilities are used, the vulnerability interval
of compromised capabilities is short. To check the validity interval,
the constrained device is, however, required to have a real-time clock.
In [157] a solution is proposed for constrained devices without real-time
clock. The constrained node interacts with its owner to verify the validity
period. This approach can, however, only be used in settings where each
constrained device is under constant supervision by a user trusted to
correctly verify the validity period.
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When a KM needs to be revoked, the administrator adds the serial number
assigned to that KM to a revocation list. Before using a capability, the powerful
device checks the revocation status of the KM used to construct the capability
by verifying that the serial number received during the issuance of the capability
is not included in the revocation list.
3.3 Evaluation
3.3.1 Security Evaluation
This section briefly discusses how the protocol protects against several well
known attacks.
• Replay attack. Replay attacks are prevented since both parties generate
a challenge based on which the session key is generated. Hence, old
messages cannot be reused to authenticate successfully.
• Man-in-the-middle attack. Except for the trusted administrator, KM
is only known by the constrained node and KX is only known by the
owner of the corresponding CAPX and generated by the constrained
node during authentication. During authentication only CAPX and two
random challenges are sent in the clear. The session key is generated
using a keyed (KX) cryptographically secure pseudo-random number
generator using the two challenges as a seed. Hence, an attacker requires
KX to generate the session key. To obtain KX from the exchanged
messages an attacker would need KM . Hence, only the constrained node
and the powerful device can generate the session key Ks, ensuring a
secure end-to-end channel. In settings where KM is shared by a group
of constrained nodes, the constrained node could execute a man-in-the-
middle attack. These devices are, however, managed and controlled by
the system administrator.
• Denial-of-service attack. Since, message authentication is a crypto-
graphic operation, it is possible for a malicious device to trigger expensive
operations on the constrained nodes. An attacker could, for instance, send
random data to the node which would trigger an integrity check. Time-
outs after a number of failed authentication attempts could mitigate this
problem.
• Mafia fraud attack. A mafia fraud attack is a type of relay attack
in which the attacker forwards messages between an honest prover and
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an honest verifier. The approach does not foresee a specific strategy to
prevent this type of attacks. To prevent such attacks several approaches
can be taken. A dedicated mechanisms to activate the authentication
functionality on the constrained node could be used. Straightforward
solutions use a slider or button; in [72] a more complex approach is
proposed in which a dedicated activation pattern is measured with
an accelerometer. Additionally, after the key agreement, a distance
bounding [44] phase could be added to ensure that the reader and
the constrained node are in each other’s vicinity. The efficiency and
effectiveness of many current distance bounding protocols is, however,
limited [69, 30].
• Hardware/malware attacks. Hardware or malware attacks can be
used to obtain KM or the credentials of the powerful devices. The
revocation strategies presented in the previous section can be used to
limit the impact.
3.3.2 Requirements Review
The key agreement protocol requires only one pass (i.e. message exchange to
and from each party) for the two parties to generate the session key. The
exchanged data consists of two challenges and one encrypted value containing
three entries of limited length. The required cryptographic operations can be
realized using a symmetric cipher. Either lightweight implementations [115]
of traditional ciphers such as AES or implementations of lightweight ciphers
such as PRESENT [40] can be used to realize the cryptographic protocols
(cf. R1). The latter has superior performance when implemented in hardware
but decreased security parameters with an 80-bit key and a 64-bit block size.
An overview of the performance results of lightweight cipher implementations
in hardware and software is given in [89]. In [106], several authenticated
encryption modes using the AES algorithm were implemented and optimized
for a specific microcontroller family.
As illustrated by the security evaluation above, the key agreement protocol
realizes strong mutual authentication and provides protection against several
well-known attacks. All sensitive information is sent over the secure channel
established during authentication (cf. S1).
The constrained node can enforce fine grained access control policies based on
information that is embedded in the capability of the powerful device (i.e. a
unique identifier and role). The capabilities can also be extended to support
application-specific needs. The policy enforcement component restricts the
information released over the secure channel (cf. S2). This approach is well
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suited in settings where capabilities have a long lifetime and where the policies
on the constrained nodes are easily updated. In settings where capabilities
have a short lifetime, however, it is better to have the system administrator
embed the actual allowed actions in the capability instead of the role. The
access control policy is, hence, specified centrally with the system administrator.
This is illustrated in the following chapter, where the approach is applied in
two distinct settings.
3.4 Comparison with Existing Systems
Several other protocols for authentication based on symmetric cryptography
have been developed. For instance, the 3GPP AKA [211] system is used
for authentication between mobile phones and the telecommunication network.
Kerberos [145] is used in enterprise networks to control access of workstation
to networked services such as a file server. MIFARE technology is often
used in access control applications. Compared to approaches using public-key
cryptography, the main downsides of the approach proposed in this chapter are
that it does not realize forward secrecy and key management is more complex.
The upside is the increased performance for lower cost of the constrained nodes
resulting from the use of symmetric cryptography.
In Kerberos, all devices share a long term secret with a key distribution center.
This key allows the key distribution center to issue tickets that allow two
devices to set up a secure mutually authenticated channel. Contrary to our
approach, Kerberos mostly focuses on authentication between devices managed
by the same domain. Hence, the access control decision is taken centrally by
the administrator. The system does not support enforcing fine grained access
control policies locally. Revocation is also checked centrally, hence, tokens are
always issued on-the-fly and cannot be used oﬄine for prolonged periods.
In the 3GPP AKA scheme, each SIM card (and hence each mobile phone)
shares a secret key with the telecom operator that issued the respective SIM.
Base stations can retrieve tokens from an authentication center to mutually
authenticate towards a mobile device. There is no need and, hence, no support
for the SIM to differentiate between different base station. Our system focuses
on settings where multiple readers have different roles and, hence, different
access rights to information stored on the constrained node.
On a MIFARE card, the data is split into different blocks on the card. Each
block can either be read, modified or is inaccessible by a reader, depending
on the keys held by the reader. The keys to authenticate towards the cards
are shared between readers with the same privileges. The card can be used
CONCLUSION 35
in multiple application domains by storing the data of each application in
a separate block. The access control policy is determined during system
deployment, making it ideal for static access control application such as public
transport and tolling. Our system focuses on systems where policies are
modified during runtime.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented a security architecture allowing authenticated key
establishment between resource constrained and powerful nodes. The system
assumes short range communication capabilities of the constrained node
and requires the constrained node to only execute symmetric cryptographic
operations ensuring good performance and efficiency. Having only short range
communication capabilities impedes updating revocation lists on constrained
nodes. Hence, an approach with short-lived capabilities is the most scalable
technique to limit the impact of compromised capabilities in most settings.
The constrained nodes are managed by an administrator. The administrator
also issues credentials to the different actors in the system, allowing them to
authenticate and establish a secure channel with the constrained nodes. The
constrained nodes can enforce access control policies based on the information
contained in the credentials of the actors. An informal security analysis of the
protocol is presented. The following chapter applies this security architecture
to tackle the requirements in two different types of systems. For each type of
system, a concrete case study is worked out.
Chapter 4
Lightweight Authentication:
Validation and Case Studies
Electronic devices are more than ever integrated in our everyday environment.
Some of these devices are powerful such as workstation, laptops or smartphones,
others are more resource constrained. For instance, small sensors can be used
in supply chain systems and patient monitoring systems [172, 43, 184, 20].
Some health monitoring sensors are not only used by patients, also athletes
use heart rate sensors to achieve optimal training results. Powerful devices
such as a smartphone or base station can gather the data generated by the
sensors. Wireless implantable medical devices [77, 104] such as pacemakers
not only monitor but also safeguard the health of the user. These implantable
devices typically need to be initialized with patient specific parameters. Only
the physician of the user should be able to read and change these parameters.
Some devices provide a direct interface to the user, others require an additional
device such as a smartphone. These constrained devices might contain sensitive
data or provide security critical services (e.g. implantable medical devices).
Hence, a security infrastructure needs to be deployed that allows these powerful
devices to authenticate and establish a secure channel towards the constrained
nodes. In Chapter 3, a security architecture was presented that specifically
aims at tackling the security and resource requirements of those settings.
It requires the constrained nodes to only execute symmetric key operations,
minimizing the cost and the power consumption. The system allows the
resource constrained nodes to enforce fine grained access control policies. The
proposed architecture is generic and can be applied in many settings that
require powerful/constrained device interaction. This chapter illustrates how
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the security architecture can be applied to tackle the requirements in both open
and closed environments. For each environment a case study is presented. The
case study of the closed environment is worked out in detail and a prototype
is implemented. Both case studies are developed during a Technology Transfer
(TeTra) project, in close collaboration with local SMEs.
4.1 Closed Environments
In closed environments where the scope is limited to one organization, the
number of constrained nodes and powerful devices is limited. All devices
are certified by a single administrative entity. Every constrained device can
be equipped with a common KM that is hardware protected. It can, for
instance, be stored in on-chip ROM of the microcontroller; a more high-
cost solution would be to use tamperproof modules. The limited scope of
the closed environment should ensure that the cost for extracting the key
is higher than the potential gains for the attacker. Since a common KM is
used for all constrained nodes, each powerful device can be equipped with a
single capability allowing them to access services and data from constrained
nodes based on their privileges. The constrained device proves to be genuine
during the authentication. To allow the powerful device to identify the
constrained node, the on-chip ROM can also store other information, such as a
unique identifier which can be sent over the secure channel established during
authentication. This additional information and KM never leave the controller
unencrypted, ensuring that it is not possible for an attacker to retrieve or
modify this data (information and KM ) without resorting to invasive or side-
channel attacks.
Several use cases can be developed in closed environments. For instance, smart
homes may contain several sensors and controllers that can be configured or
read using the smartphone or workstation of the user. Finally, in a sports club,
each athlete can receive a bracelet that is used to access/consume multiple
services of that club. This last case study is discussed in more detail in the
remainder of this section.
4.1.1 Sports Association
Many sports associations already have their own website on which information
is (publicly) available. Examples of available information are training and
contest schedules, results and events. Some websites also provide personalized
Web pages. Sports clubs also provide several other services. Examples
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are entrance control, access to lockers, a free refreshment after a match,
etc. Currently, each type of service requires their own type of credentials.
Password-based authentication is typically used to control access to the website,
analogue keys are used to access lockers and printed tickets are used to pay for
consumptions. These services could be made more user-friendly, more reliable
and more secure by digitizing them.
The case study discussed in this section presents an attractive solution to
integrate multiple electronic services in the context of a sports association. The
solution is tailored to youngsters and makes use of a wireless chip embedded in a
bracelet. It realizes a reasonable trade-off between multiple (often conflicting)
requirements. First, the bracelet must be low-cost and low-power. On the
other hand, security and privacy are major concerns. For instance, locker and
refreshments services involve important security requirements. Since sensitive
personal data (such as contact information) is kept in the bracelet, privacy
is also a crucial concern. The security architecture presented in Chapter 3 is
applied to tackle these requirements.
Roles
The sports club has a Web Server (WS) providing a centralized platform
to manage and disseminate information of the club. An athlete (A) is a
member of a sports club. After registration, each athlete receives a bracelet
(B). This bracelets grants access to Lockers (L) and the online platform, via
a Workstation (W), of the sports club. A coach (C) is responsible for a group
of athletes (typically with the same age, grade, or level). An administrator
initializes and issues the bracelets to athletes. The administrator also issues
capabilities to coaches to read and update information on the bracelets using
his Smartphone (S). The administrator is responsible for maintaining the IT
infrastructure.
The athlete can benefit from multiple services using this bracelet:
• Personalized Web service. Athletes can log in on the website of the
sports association using the security tokens stored in the bracelet. The
personalized Web pages provide detailed information about training and
contest schedules (e.g. time and type), personal achievements, contest
results, etc. Moreover, the athlete can submit personal information
(personal physician, phone numbers, whereabouts, . . . ). Also, after
logging in, the user can update information in the bracelet (personal
achievements, phone numbers, . . . ), modify the access control policies
and download tokens to access lockers and to pay for drinks at the
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sports canteen. The coach can update the content of the website using a
dedicated application on his mobile phone.
• Information retrieval service. For instance, some athletes are willing
to disclose/compare personal achievements with their friends. Further,
phone numbers of relatives and/or physicians can be read by coaches in
case of injuries, especially for very young athletes.
• Locker service. Each locker is equipped with a small embedded device
with wireless communication capabilities that controls the opening and
closing of the locker. Registered athletes have access to one or more free
lockers via their bracelet. The maximum number of lockers that can be
used simultaneously can depend on several parameters (e.g. registration
fee, sport’s type or age of the athlete). The coach can also open the
locker of an athlete. This might be necessary in case the athlete lost
his bracelet. Support for accountability should prevent the coach from
abusing this privilege.
• Refreshments service. Each bracelet can contain a number of free or pre-
paid tickets for refreshments in the sport club’s canteen. Those tokens
can be downloaded from the website into the bracelet at regular times.
Security and Privacy Requirements
This section describes the most important non-functional requirements.
• Access control. Athletes must be able to control access to the data stored
in the bracelet. Only a subset of information is released when the bracelet
interacts with other components. The data that are released depend on
the type of information and the privacy preferences of the user. The
athlete’s personal pages on the website of the sports club can only be
accessed by the athlete itself. Lockers closed by an athlete can only be
opened by the same athlete or one of the coaches. In the latter case, the
system could provide some accountability (e.g. by logging this fact).
• Location privacy. It must not be possible to track athletes based on
information obtained over the application layer. Tracking based on, for
instance, the unique radio frequency pattern of the antenna is out of scope
of this text.
• Reliability. Appropriate back-up and revocation mechanisms must be
implemented (in case of lost or stolen bracelets and mobiles).
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• Confidentiality. Transmitted data cannot be eavesdropped by external
attackers.
Security Infrastructure
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the devices in the ecosystem and the data stored
on each device. This is further discussed below.
Figure 4.1: Overview of information storage, key infrastructure and
capabilities.
Constrained Devices. Each sports association owns a set of lockers and
bracelets. They should be low cost and low power. They do have NFC
capabilities to interact with other devices. For reasons of performance, public-
key cryptography cannot be performed by the bracelets and lockers.
The administrator manages the symmetric secret KM that is stored on
each constrained device during initialization. During initialization, the
administrator also assigns an identifier (i.e. idb/idl), newly generated serial
number (i.e. serialb/seriall) and a secret key (i.e. Kb/Kl) to generate
cryptographically secure pseudo-random numbers. The lockers and bracelets
also store a separate secret key (Kc) to secure communication between lockers
and bracelets. The bracelet contains a tamper-resistant module on which this
information is stored. The lockers are embedded in a physically locked secure
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casing, preventing access to anyone but the administrator. This allows the
administrator to update the keys if they are compromised.
Each bracelet also stores an Access Control List (ACL) and a set of personal
data. The ACL and personal data are initialized by the administrator and
can later partially be modified/updated by the athlete using the Web service.
The bracelet also keeps a list containing the identifiers idl of lockers closed by
the bracelet and the tokens to open them. A green/red light shortly lights up
when a protocol has been successful. Note that each bracelet also contains a
button to activate it for a short period. This protects against relay attacks or
malicious readers trying to connect without knowledge of the athlete.
Powerful Devices. The sports club manages a Web server running a website
and content management software. Each coach has a smartphone with wireless
communication capabilities to read out the information stored in the bracelet
and update the information contained on the website. The Web server and
smartphones both hold a public-key credential (i.e. respectively certw/skw
and certs/sks) for authentication between powerful devices via standardized
protocols and a capability, CAPX , and corresponding KX for authentication
with bracelets and lockers. The Web server also maintains a revocation list for
both constrained and powerful devices. Athletes can log in with the bracelet
on the Web server via a workstation or laptop. These devices should, hence,
be able to connect with the bracelet. Some laptops have NFC (e.g. to interact
with wireless smart cards) built-in. For workstations, on which these wireless
communication capabilities are rarely available by default, an external reader
can be used.
Revocation. The capability of the Web server grants the necessary rights to
update a revocation list on the bracelet. This allows revocation of capabilities
issued to coaches or other potential parties in the system based on the serial
number contained in the capability. If the key of the Web server is compromised,
new bracelets need to be issued and the keys on the lockers need to be updated.
The access of individual bracelets to the Web server can be revoked by adding
the serial number of the revoked bracelet to a revocation list. If the shared
KM or Kc is compromised, new bracelets are rolled-out, the capabilities of the
different actors are updated and the lockers are updated with new keys.
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Protocols
This section presents the protocols to realize the services proposed in the
beginning of this section. The refreshment service is not discussed in detail
as the protocol is similar to that of the information retrieval service. Also, the
use case of the coach updating information on the website using a dedicated
smartphone application is not further discussed since it can be realized with
standardized authentication algorithms using public-key cryptography.
Personalized Web Service. To access a personalized Web page (see also
Table 4.1), the athlete activates the bracelet (1) and browses to the right url
on his workstation (2). Next, an HTTPS session is set up: the Web server
authenticates to the browser using certW (3). The Web server and bracelet then
agree on a mutually authenticated session key (4). The browser is extended
to forward communication between both parties. Next, the bracelet encrypts
his ID idb and serial number serialb with the session key (Ks) and sends the
result to the Web server where it is decrypted (5). If serialb is still valid,
idb is used to retrieve the corresponding identity from the database and a
customized page is sent to the client browser (6-8). The athlete can now
view personalized information (such as training schedules) and update some
data (such as contact information). The Web server also allows the athlete to
securely update information stored in the bracelet using Ks. The Web server
can now also update the list of revoked capabilities on the bracelet.
Table 4.1: Retrieving personalized website after mutual authentication (A:
Athlete, W : Workstation, B: Bracelet, WS: Web Server).
accessPersonalizedWebPage():
(1) A : activate_bracelet()
(2) A → W → WS : requestService(url, "personalized_website")
(3) W ⇆ WS : setUpHTTPS(certw , skw)
(4) B ⇆ W ⇆ WS : (Ks; idw; rolew) := keyAgreement(KM , CAPw, Kw)
(5) B → W → WS : {idb, serialb}Ks
(6) WS : if (isValid(serialb) == false) abort()
(7) WS : personal_page := genPersonalPage(idb)
(8) W ← WS : personal_page
Controlled Release of Data. An athlete can specify its own privacy policy.
Three access control levels are defined in the policy. Level 0 defines which
information can be read by any device. No security tokens are required to
access the information. Level 1 defines role-based access control rules. Level 2
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defines information that should only be released to certain individuals (i.e. more
restrictive than roles).
Table 4.2 shows the protocol for releasing privacy-sensitive data. First, the
bracelet is activated, after which the coach instructs his smartphone to read
out data from the bracelet (1-2). The mobile and bracelet then agree on an
mutually authenticated session key (3). Next, the bracelet selects the data
(i.e. datab) that can be released to idX with roleX (4). The bracelet encrypts
the concatenation of datab and its serial number serialb with Ks, and sends the
result to S (5). The smartphone decrypts the data and checks the revocation
status of the bracelet. The smartphone either periodically downloads a
revocation list from the Web server or performs an online revocation check.
Subsequently, the data is displayed to the coach (6).
Table 4.2: Releasing personal information to coach (A: Athlete, C: Coach, S:
Smartphone, B: Bracelet).
releasePersonalInformation():
(1) A : activate_bracelet()
(2) C → S : request(read_data)
(3) S ⇆ B : (Ks; ids; roles) := keyAgreement(KM , CAPs, Ks)
(4) B : datab := privilegedData(idC , roleC)
(5) S ← B : {datab||serialb}Ks
(6) C ← S : datab
Locker Service. The bracelet contains a number MAX that defines the maxi-
mum number of lockers that the owner of a bracelet may close simultaneously,
and also a counter nb_closed that counts how many lockers are currently in
use by the bracelet’s owner. Moreover, the bracelet keeps a list of the identifiers
(idl) of the lockers in use and the corresponding tokens key to reopen them.
Closing a Locker. This protocol is shown in Table 4.3. The athlete activates the
bracelet by pressing. Once activated, the bracelet can be detected by the locker
which is periodically scanning for nearby NFC devices. If a nearby bracelet is
detected, the locker checks its status (i.e. opened or closed). If the locker is
open, it initiates the close protocol (1-2). The locker generates a key to open
the locker after the close protocol is complete and a session key (Ks) (3). The
locker encrypts the session key with Kc. Subsequently, the concatenation of
key and the identifier of the locker are encrypted with the session key. These
encrypted values are sent to the bracelet that holds Kc and can, hence, obtain
the decrypted values (4). The bracelet now verifies that it can still close a
locker (i.e. nb_closed < MAX) and, subsequently, stores the identifier of the
locker together with the key to reopen it (5-6). The bracelet checks if the
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identifier of the locker is not already in the list of closed lockers. If it is in
the list, the key is updated and nb_closed is not incremented. This ensures
that failed runs of the protocol do not block the system (e.g. if the bracelet
is removed from the proximity of the locker before the protocol is completed).
The bracelet now encrypts its identifier and serial number with the session
key and sends the resulting value to the locker where it is decrypted (7). The
locker verifies the revocation status of the bracelet and subsequently stores the
identifier of the bracelet with the key to open it and updates its status (8-10).
The protocol for opening a locker is similar to the close protocol and is, hence,
omitted.
Recovery Procedure. A mechanism is implemented to ensure that lockers can
be opened when bracelets are lost. A trivial solution uses a physical key. The
key can be used to open the locker. After opening, the embedded device can be
reset. A more advanced solution gives privileges to (certain) coaches (and/or
administrators) to open lockers. The coach can set up an NFC connection
between his mobile device and the locker. To open the locker, the coach then
authenticates with his smartphone to the Web server (e.g. over the mobile
Internet connection of the smartphone). The smartphone then submits a
request to open a locker to the Web service. The Web server verifies the identity
and role of the requesting entity. Next, a secure connection is established
between the locker and the Web server. The mobile phone of the coach is
used to forward data between the locker and the Web server and the capability
CAPw of the Web sever is used to establish the secure authenticated channel.
The Web server then sends an open request to the locker. After the privileges
are checked, the locker sends the identifier of the bracelet to the Web server
and then opens. Finally, the Web server logs the transaction (i.e. it stores
the identifier of the coach, the locker and the athlete that closed the locker).
Athletes will be notified that one of their lockers was opened when logging in
to the Web service.
Prototype
A prototype was implemented based on the presented protocols. Table 4.4
shows the hardware used for the realization of the different entities. For the
functionality of the bracelet, a Java Card [5] applet is developed and deployed
on a wireless smart card. The NFC capabilities of the smartphone are used
to interact with the smart card. An Android application is written that uses
its capability to authenticate towards the smart card, read the information
and visualize it to the user. The Web services is implemented on an Apache
Tomcat [1] server. A Java Applet was developed and integrated in the website
to bootstrap communication between the back-end service and the smart
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Table 4.3: Closing a locker with a bracelet (B: Bracelet, A: Athlete, L: Locker).
closeLocker():
(1) B ← A : activate_bracelet()
(2) L : detectDevice() (status == "open")
(3) L : key, Ks := prfKl(counterl++)
(4) B ← L : close({Ks }Kc , {key ||idl}Ks)
(5) B : if (numberOfLockersClosed() == MAX) abort()
(6) B : if (store(idl, key) == false) nb_closed++
(7) B → L : {idb||serialb }Ks
(8) L : if (isValid(serialb) == false) abort()
(9) L : store(idb, key); status := "closed"
(10) L : close()
card, via a wireless smart card reader. The back-end service and smart card
execute the authentication protocol after which the service marks the session as
authenticated and grants the appropriate rights. The locker was implemented
by the DraMCo research group, the electronics partner in the TeTra project.
The random number generation and encryption were realized using 128-bit AES.
A cryptographic Message Authentication Code (MAC) was generated based on
the ciphertext to realize authenticated encryption. Since the CMAC algorithm
is not available on the smart card, HMAC [126] with RIPEMD-160 [82] is used
to generate the MAC.
Table 4.4: The hardware platforms for the realization of the different entities
(W : Workstation, WS: Web Server).
Entity Realization
Bracelet Gemalto TOP DM GX4 smart card
W, WS
DELL E4200: Intel Core2 Duo U9400 @ 1.4GHz, 4GB RAM
The laptop runs Ubuntu 12.04 32-bit, 3.2.0 kernel
Locker Atmel ATMEGA128 controller with NXP PN532 NFC-SoC
Smartphone
Nexus S: 1GHz ARM Cortex-A8, 512MB RAM
The smartphone runs Android 4.1.2
Evaluation
A similar approach can be used in several other settings. For instance, a fitness
center can give visitors access to their infrastructure for a limited period of
time (linear to the amount of money that is paid). A bracelet can keep credits
to consume drinks, avoiding the need to have cash at hand in the fitness
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center. The credits can be downloaded to the bracelet after payment using
the web service. The payment desk or automatic dispenser can decrease the
credit. Multiple strategies exist to implement credits. Either a counter can be
increased/decreased or signed tokens can be downloaded. The former strategy
is more flexible whereas the latter is more secure.
The security architecture presented in Chapter 3 is used to establish secure
authenticated channels between constrained nodes and powerful devices. Since
KM is shared by all constrained nodes, the powerful devices only need
one capability, ensuring scalability and supporting oﬄine authentication.
Revocation of bracelets and powerful devices is supported by means of
revocation lists. The bracelets are periodically updated with a new revocation
list via the website. The limited scope ensures that the revocation list remains
manageable and that it is, with respect to security, justifiable to use a KM
shared between all constrained devices. Athletes can control access to the
information stored on their bracelets by specifying access control policies and
loading them on to the bracelet via the website of the sports club. When closing
a locker, the bracelet stores a token that is required to open the locker and
prevents other athletes from opening his locker. When a coach opens a locker
of an athlete, for instance in case of a lost or broken bracelet, the transaction
is logged by the back-end and the athlete is informed via the website ensuring
accountability in case of abuse. The locker protocol relies on the close range
nature of the used communication protocols to thwart possible attacks in which
a second bracelet stores the token to open the locker while the athlete is under
the impression it is stored on his bracelet. The light embedded in the bracelet
also provides an indicator that the protocol was completed successfully. The
activation button attached to the bracelet ensures that it cannot be used for
tracking.
4.2 Open Environments
In an open environment, multiple different actors, each possibly acting under
a different authority with tailored privileges, require access to services or data
from one or more constrained devices. Resource constrained devices are further
referred to as nodes. These constrained nodes are managed by a node manager
who is responsible for their deployment and maintenance. Each actor may
require access to different services and data from the constrained node. Open
environments typically contain a large number of constrained nodes. Storing
a shared KM in on-chip ROM would provide insufficient protection in these
environments and equipping each constrained node with a tamperproof module
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would come at a very high cost. Hence, each (group of) constrained node(s) is
equipped with a unique KM .
Equipping each reader with a separate capability for each node is not scalable.
Hence, capabilities are issued on demand by the node’s manager. The manager
maintains a database containing the KM stored on each node under his
authority. When data or services are requested from a particular node, the
reader first authenticates to the manager (e.g. an online Web service). An
X.509 credential can be used in this phase. The manager assigns a set of rights
based on the attributes in the certificate of the requesting entity and embeds
them in a capability to access a particular node (with a unique KM ). The
capability and corresponding secret key are then returned. To construct the
right capability, the identity of the node must be known by the node manager.
A unique identifier can be transmitted by the node to the reader. The latter
can forward it to the node manager.
Typical open systems use cases can be found in the domain of supply chain
management. Multiple parameters of items or goods in the supply chain are
monitored using nodes in warehouses, sensors on trucks and on the supplies.
This case study is discussed in more detail in the remainder of this section.
Other potential domains are RFID ecosystems where the subset of information
that can be read and/or updated depends on specific privileges. In [95] a
detailed overview of potential applications of RFID in healthcare scenarios is
given.
4.2.1 Supply Chain Management
This section applies the security architecture presented in Chapter 3 to tackle
the security requirements of a supply chain management case study. The
validation is scenario-based, no implementation was made.
Wireless sensors in the supply chain
Cargo containers can carry wireless sensor nodes (WSN) that form a wireless
sensor network. These sensors gather (environmental) data, control actuators
such as air conditioning systems and/or store information about the content
of the containers. In harbours, unloading companies may want to learn the
location of individual parcels. Distribution centers can request a detailed
environmental history. Moreover, quality control agencies need physical and
logical access to containers to verify relevant parameters of transport conditions.
The latter can also store quality control information on the wireless nodes.
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The owner of the goods can define and update thresholds for environmental
conditions (such as temperature) that need to be satisfied during transport.
Forensic investigations may need to retrieve detailed information from the
sensors (e.g. who had access to the container and who updated certain
parameters). Further, customs require support from the sensor network to
obtain relevant information about the supply chain. For instance, they want
to know which products are stored in each container, their origin, their route
etc. All sensors/constrained nodes in a specific container could be equipped
with the same KM . This allows the entities in the supply chain to prefetch the
necessary capabilities each day based on the the work schedule. This ensures
that the reader devices do not constantly need to contact the manager.
Each sensor network is maintained by a management authority MA that
initializes the sensors with the required keys and issues capabilities to the actors
who want to interact with their sensors. Each actor can have a mobile device
(e.g. a dedicated reader or a smartphone) for that purpose. For instance, quality
control agencies and police forces could have a smartphone that enables them
to perform the required operations while unloading companies could have a
dedicated reader integrated in their unloading equipment. It is not scalable
for the node manager to regularly update revocation lists on the constrained
nodes, especially since separate revocation lists need to be maintained for each
KM . Hence, capabilities with small validity intervals are used to limit the
vulnerability interval of compromised KXs. The sensors are, hence, assumed
to have a real-time clock. In supply chain systems the validity interval could
be limited to a day since containers in transit typically won’t have interactions
with the same entity for prolonged periods. Since the capabilities have a short
lifetime and it is, typically, not easy to push policy updates to the constrained
nodes, the node manager embeds the actual privileges of the powerful devices
in the capabilities instead of the roles as proposed in the previous chapter. This
decreases the complexity and increases the manageability of the system.
Protocols
To retrieve data from a wireless sensor node (see also Table 4.5), the reader
(R) submits an identification request to that node (1). The latter returns
a unique identifier sensorID. The reader forwards the sensorID to the node
manager. It, therefore, first initiates a mutually authenticated TLS connection
with the management service (3). All further communication between the
reader and the management service is transmitted over the secure channel.
After authentication, the reader transmits the sensorID to the back-end system
that retrieves the node’s key from the database (4–5). Next, a capability
that contains the identity information and validity period is generated and
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transmitted to the device (6–7). The reader performs the authenticated key
agreement protocol with the node using the obtained capability and transmits
a request for service X to the node (8–9). The node verifies whether the reader
has the privilege corresponding to the requested service, after which the data
is released or the service is executed (10–11).
Table 4.5: Requesting services from the wireless sensor network (WSN :
Wireless Sensor Node, R: Reader, MA: Management Authority).
requestService():
(1) WSN ← R : "service_request"
(2) WSN → R : sensorID
(3) R ⇆ MA : setUpHTTPS(certm ,skm , certr , skr )
(4) R → MA : sensorID
(5) MA : KM := database.getKey(sensorID)
(6) MA : CAPr, Kr := genCred(certr , rand, valPeriod, KM )
(7) R ← MA : CAPr, Kr
(8) WSN ⇆ R : Ks := keyAgreement(KM , CAPr, Kr)
(9) WSN ← R : {service_X_request}Ks
(10) WSN : if(verifyPrivilege(CAPX , X) == false) abort()
(11) WSN ⇆ R : offerService(X)
Evaluation
Since capabilities are issued on demand by the node manager service, the
revocation status of the node can be verified centrally using a revocation
list. Short-lived capabilities are used to mitigate the impact of compromised
capabilities. The main disadvantage of applying the presented approach
in an open environment is that the node manager and reader devices are
required to be online to issue/receive capabilities. Readers can prefetch
capabilities to support authentication in oﬄine environments. The validation
is purely scenario-based. This evaluation is, hence, constrained by absence of
a prototype.
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter applied the security architecture presented in Chapter 3 for
authentication between resource constrained and powerful devices to tackle the
requirements of both open and closed environment. For each type, a concrete
case study is discussed, validating our approach. In closed environments, a
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key can be shared between all constrained devices. This greatly facilitates key
management. The limited scope of the system justifies the risk of the shared
key set up in these types of systems. In open systems, an online service needs
to be available that provides on-demand capabilities to readers. One case study
is worked out in depth illustrating the feasibility of our approach.
Chapter 5
User-Centric Identity
Management Using Secure
Elements
In user-centric identity management systems the user is in control over his
identity information flowing between service and identity providers. Hence,
no identity information is exchanged directly between service and identity
providers. To further increase the control and privacy of the user, features
such as selective disclosure in which the user can select which identity
attributes are released can be added. Currently most systems adhering to
these principals rely on anonymous credentials. This significantly impacts the
performance of these systems due to the computational load on client and
server during authentication and the complex revocation strategies. In current
anonymous credential systems, the performance, amongst others, depends
on the number of attributes contained in the credential. Hence, increasing
the number of attributes supported by the IdM system further degrades the
performance. This chapter, therefore, focuses on an alternative approach
for user-centric identity management relying on public-key credentials and
tamperproof hardware. It supports attribute aggregation [62]: attributes can
be retrieved from multiple identity providers and released to a service provider.
It tackles several privacy and security problems of current federated identity
management systems. Identity providers can no longer impersonate users and
do not learn which services a user is accessing. Similarly, service providers are
not necessarily aware with which identity provider the user is registered. In
some cases, this might be relevant information that also needs to be disclosed
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as an additional attribute. For example, when disclosing insurance information
the insurance provider can be released so that he can be contacted to handle
payment. Since not all identity providers can provide attribute values with the
same degree of certainty, a Level Of Assurance [60] (LOA) can be associated
with the attributes provided by identity providers and requested by service
providers. Some identity providers can be authoritative with respect to certain
attributes while other could be obtained during the registration process of the
user. There is strong control over the exchange of information. The right to
request attributes can be revoked if it is detected that a service provider abuses
the requested information. Service providers are assured that the information
is retrieved from trustworthy identity providers. The user can select which
information is released during authentication. Further, the system can also be
used in oﬄine settings.
5.1 General Approach
This chapter proposes a privacy friendly user-centric identity management
approach based on a secure element. Multiple identity providers can endorse
the user’s personal information to multiple service providers. The secure
element is the mediator between identity providers and service providers. More
precisely, an identity provider can store some of the user’s personal attributes
(or properties thereof) in the user’s secure element. Information that is endorsed
by identity providers can then be disclosed to service providers. A system-wide
ontology is used that allows the unique identification of attributes and attribute
properties. Service providers use the information to provide fine-grained access
control and offer personalized services. For instance, when acquiring a ticket
for a soccer contest, a student can request certain personal attributes from
identity providers and release them to the ticketing service to get reductions. A
university can vouch that the user is a registered student, while the government
can attest that the user has not been convicted for hooliganism.
Our approach combines several desirable privacy features of current identity
management systems. First, an identity provider cannot profile the user’s
actions, as there is no direct link between identity providers and service
providers (i.e. the secure element mediates personal information requests).
Moreover, collusion of identity and service providers is prevented by means
of provider-specific pseudonyms. Each user has a unique pseudonym for
each provider, the provider-specific pseudonym. The different pseudonyms
of the same user are generated by the secure element and cannot be linked
as such by any other entity in the system. Second, the disclosure of personal
information is controlled by multiple parties. The secure element controls access
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to identity information. Prior to user authentication, the service provider first
has to authenticate to the secure element and prove that he is authorized
to access certain personal attributes. A central authority issues rights to
service providers to request a set of attributes based on the nature of the
provided service. The secure element verifies the acceptability of the service
provider’s information request. Users can further restrict the disclosure of
personal information or explicit user consent is required prior to the release of
data. Each user can configure its own privacy policy. To lower the threshold
for using policies, some preconfigured policies could be presented to users.
Attributes can be cached temporarily in the secure element. This makes
the scheme more efficient and usable in an oﬄine environment. A flexible
and scalable revocation procedure is foreseen; even oﬄine services can check
whether or not a secure element is revoked. The mechanism is based on
a validation service that regularly updates status information in the secure
element. Our approach is also flexible and scalable in the sense that new
service providers and identity providers can easily be added. Moreover, a
service provider can also play the role of an identity provider for other service
providers.
The beneficial privacy properties that this scheme provides, originate in the use
of a secure element (application). Such a secure element can be for instance a
smart card or a SIM card, and is issued by a trusted third party. It acts as a
gateway between identity providers and service providers. Figure 5.1 provides
an overview of the proposed architecture.
5.2 Design
5.2.1 Roles
Each User (U) has a Secure Element (SE), in the remainder of this chapter
also referenced to as card. Middleware (M) is installed at the client side
(i.e. host or card reader). It allows users and remote parties to interact with
the card. The Service Provider (SP) offers personalized services to authorized
users. The Identity Provider (IdP) returns endorsed personal attributes to the
secure element which can be released to service providers. The Card Issuer
(CI) issues secure elements to users. The (Re)Validation Authority (RA) can
(re)validate or block secure elements. The Audit Authority (AU) grants rights
to service providers to retrieve and to identity providers to provide a specific
subset of identity information of the user. The Certification Authority (CA)
issues certificates to the different actors.
54 USER-CENTRIC IDENTITY MANAGEMENT USING SECURE ELEMENTS
Figure 5.1: Overview of the architecture.
5.2.2 Requirements and Adversary Model
Functional Requirements
F1 Service providers can retrieve personal attributes either stored in the card
and/or managed by an identity provider.
F2 Adding new services and identity providers is straightforward.
F3 The card can be used online and oﬄine.
Security and Privacy Requirements
S1 The service provider is assured that the received attributes are reliable
(i.e. meet a specified level of assurance from a trusted identity provider).
S2 The card issuer only provides the trusted environment. This should not
allow him to impersonate users.
P1 Controlled access to personal attributes that are accessible through the
card (i.e. based on rights/privileges). A trusted party, namely the audit
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authority, restricts the information that can be retrieved by service
providers. Users can further restrict the dissemination of personal data
(i.e. which information is transferred from which identity provider(s) via
the secure element to which service provider(s)).
P2 The systems allows proving possession of a valid secure element without
releasing uniquely identifying information.
P3 The system supports the generation of mutually unlinkable pseudonyms
for each provider.
P4 The system should support conditional anonymity. This allows identify-
ing suspects in case of abuse.
P5 The communication between providers and the secure element should
remain confidential, ensuring that attackers can’t gain access to identity
information by eavesdropping on the communication.
Adversary Model
With respect to the cryptographic capabilities of the attacker, we follow
the Dolev-Yao attacker model [85]: attackers cannot break cryptographic
primitives, but they can perform protocol-level attacks.
This scheme changes some of the trust assumptions that are inherent to
traditional schemes without a secure element. The paragraph below provides
a clear overview of the trust relations between all actors in the system.
• The card issuer is trusted by the user and providers to issue tamperproof
secure elements without hardware backdoor(s) containing software (i.e.
identity management applet) correctly implementing the presented
protocols (see Section 5.2.5) and to correctly manage the common keys.
As the card issuer has the common key pair, he could impersonate all
users, even non-existent users. However, the card-specific secret from
which the provider-specific pseudonyms are constructed is generated by
the card during initialization and is, hence, not known by the card issuer.
As such, he cannot perform directed attacks to a specific user with
providers where the user is known, alleviating the required trust from
the user-perspective.
• The secure element is trusted by the user and providers to correctly
execute the specified protocols and to securely store the cryptographic
data. This trust is supported by the tamperproof properties of the secure
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element and the trust in the card issuer to load a correctly functioning
applet on the card. Essentially, adversaries should not be able to influence
the card so that it deviates from the imposed protocols. Nor should
they be able to obtain direct access to the memory of the secure element
to extract information. Hence, providers can trust the data that was
returned by the secure element. A related discussion about trust in
trusted computing platforms is given in [164, 163]. Note that the German
electronic identity infrastructure [32] requires similar trust assumptions.
• The audit authority is trusted to formalize the trust relationships between
service and identity providers regarding the exchange of user identity
information. The audit authority therefore generates signed files. Each
signed file allows the secure element to ensure that it only transfers
information from identity providers to service providers which matches
their trust relationship without needing to inform the identity provider
which service provider the user is using and vice versa. Both entities need
not be aware of the actual identity of the provider to or from which the
information is transferred, only that both parties have a trust relationship.
Section 5.2.4 discusses several approaches for realizing the audit authority.
• Identity providers are trusted to provide correct user information to
service providers via the secure element. This trust is supported by the
audit authority that assesses which attributes can be provided with which
level of assurance.
• Service providers are trusted by the identity provider and users not to
abuse the data received during authentication. This trust is supported by
both the audit authority that can assess the privacy policies of the service
providers and the user that controls which information is disclosed during
authentication.
• The (re)validation authority is trusted by the users and providers to
correctly execute the (re)validation protocol.
• The workstation is trusted by the user to provide a secure interface via
which the user can enter his passcode, control the information disclosed
during authentication and activate policies on the card. The user, further,
trusts the workstation to implement adequate measures to anonymize the
communication with providers, as discussed in Section 2.5. To decrease
the trust required by the user in his workstation, a card reader with
pinpad and screen can be used. Alternatively, the middleware could be
implemented in a trusted execution environment on the workstation (see
Chapter 7), providing a secure interface to the card. If the secure element
is realized using a SIM or a Mobile Security Card [8], the middleware
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can be implemented on the mobile which serves as a proxy between
the secure element and the outside world. The mobile can inform the
user about authenticating service providers and allow the user to control
the disclosure of information. The mobile is typically more trustworthy
than a random workstation on which the user might need to authenticate.
Similarly to regular workstation, technologies [189, 90, 191, 206, 105, 177]
exist to implement (part of) the middleware in a trusted execution
environment.
5.2.3 Public Key Infrastructure
The keys and certificates that are maintained in the system are listed below:
• The public keys of CAs in the system are placed on the card during
initialization. This allows the card to verify the certificate of the
(re)validation authority, audit authority and providers.
• Each service/identity provider generates a key pair, the public key of
which is certified by a certificate authority (CA) in a certificate certp.
• The audit authority has a certified key pair for assigning the rights of
providers to their certificates. It generates a signed file containing the
provider’s privileges and a hash of the provider’s certificate. This allows
the secure element to enforce the correct access control policy for each
provider.
• The (re)validation authority generates a key pair, the public key of which
is also certified by a CA (i.e. certra). This certificate grants the necessary
rights to (re)validate cards.
• The cards contain a key pair (skCo, pkCo) – certified by a CA – that is
identical for a large set of cards. Since the private key is kept inside the
trusted environment, making a valid signature with it proves that the
card is genuine. Hereby, no uniquely identifying information about the
card nor the card owner is released.
Note that a provider can have the rights to both provide and request user
attributes.
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5.2.4 Controlled Release of Information
As previously discussed, sufficient control over the flow of user information
by all stakeholders is of paramount importance. Users want to be assured
that the information they disclose during authentication is not abused by
service providers. Service providers want to be assured that the received
information is obtained from trustworthy identity providers. Further, the
information that service providers can request should depend on the nature
of the service they provide. If service providers can independently determine
which information is requested during authentication, they may tend to request
more information than necessary for the provided service. Similarly, Android
applications often require more permissions than required to implement the
provided functionality [112]. Users have no choice but to ignore the potential
privacy implications if they want to install the application. Since many service
providers like to acquire user data, there are rarely privacy-friendly alternatives.
Users should also have control over the disclosure of their personal information.
They should be informed about which information is released to which parties.
by the identity provider and users to assign reasonable access rights (i.e. based
on the nature of the service) to service providers and to verify that service
providers enforce adequate security and privacy policies to protect the user’s
information. Service providers trust the audit authority to assess what
information an identity provider can assert, assigning different levels of
assurance to different attributes. This component replaces the pairwise trust
establishment process between service providers and identity providers as used
in today’s federated identity management model.
These control measures are partly realized via an audit authority that assigns
rights to providers. These restrict the set of queries (i.e. the set of attributes or
properties thereof) that can be requested from the card. Users are assured that
their information is only disclosed to service providers with a valid certificate.
This does not guarantee that a service provider will not abuse the information
received during authentication. However, if abuse is detected, the certificate of
the service provider can be revoked. For identity providers, they restrict the set
of attributes that can be provided. Two different approaches to establish the
audit authority are discussed below. Each option realizes different properties
regarding trust, scalability, complexity and control.
• A single trusted third party (i.e. the audit authority) can be used to assign
rights to service and identity providers, establishing one big federation.
This authority is trusted by the identity provider and users to assign
reasonable access rights (i.e. based on the nature of the service) to service
providers and to verify that service providers enforce adequate security
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and privacy policies to protect the user’s information. Service providers
trust the audit authority to assess what information an identity provider
can assert, assigning different levels of assurance to different attributes.
• A second approach generalizes the previous approach and maps the trust
model of federated identity management systems to the system described
in this chapter. Identity and service providers can establish trust
relations, founding a federation. Providers can be in multiple federations.
In a federation, user information can be exchanged between providers
via the secure element. Each provider in the federation can provide
and/or request a specific set of attributes. Which information can be
provided/requested by which providers and with which level of assurance
is decided by the members of the federation. This could be coordinated
by the federation authority which is responsible for administering the
federation and could also take up the role of the audit authority. The
federation authority can request an audit certificate from a CA and use
it to assign the access rights to the members from the federation. Each
federation is assigned a unique identifier that is included in the privileges
file(s) of each provider in the federation and allows the secure element to
enforce the restrictions bound to each federation.
Working with a single trusted third party as an audit authority is a relatively
simple approach. It is transparent to users as the attributes a provider can
request does not vary over federations. It is also easier to implement on the
secure element as the algorithm to determine whether a user can comply with
an attribute query and which identity providers need to be contacted is less
complex. Moreover, as a single audit authority is used, its certificate can
be cached on the secure element, minimizing data traffic. It is easy to add
new providers and they immediately have access to user information without
needing to negotiate and join an existing or establish a new federation. However,
each provider in this federation implicitly trusts each provider in the federation
to provide or request the attributes as specified by the audit authority. This
might be feasible if the number of providers in the system is relatively small.
However, as the number of providers in the system increases the more the trust
relationships as established in the federation will conflict with the trust actual
trust relationships. In these settings, the approach with multiple federations is
better suited. The smaller scope of a federation gives each party a better
overview of the different identity and service providers information can be
respectively requested from or provided to. The decision-making process for
allowing new members to the federation and assigning privileges to service and
identity providers can involve all the members in the federation. This gives
each member more control over the attribute aggregation process compared to
working with a single audit authority.
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5.2.5 Protocols
This section presents the different protocols of the system. In the protocol
listings, authenticated encryption is assumed. Hence, apart from the
confidentiality, also the authenticity of encrypted messages is protected.
Card Issuance
The card issuer issues cards containing the identity management applet and the
required keys to users. Before an individual can use the card, it needs to be
activated. During this phase, a unique card-specific secret SC is generated
on the card, which is later used to generate provider-specific pseudonyms.
Additionally, the user has to confirm a personal PIN. During initialization,
the card is also assigned a unique card-specific identifier (chip_number). This
identifier is used for blocking revoked cards.
During card issuance, CI can already store a set of immutable attributes (of
the card or the card holder) in the card. Alternatively, if the card is used as
a governmental identity card, CI may cooperate with a governmental identity
provider IdPGov to bind the card to a specific user. The card discloses the
provider-specific nymGov and chip_number to IdPGov . This allows IdPGov to
bind the citizen to the card and corresponding chip_number. The card can now
request attributes from IdPGov. The chip_number enables the government to
set up the (re)validation authority. If a user looses his card, the user can
present himself with the (re)validation authority to block the card. Either a
third-party token could be used to prove the identity of user or the user could
be provided with the chip_number during card issuance.
(Re)Validation of the Card
The card (re)validation protocol confirms that a card is still valid at a given
time. The validity of the card is verified by the (re)validation authority which
keeps track of the revoked cards referred to by their chip_number. If a card
has been revoked, RA will block the card so that further authentications
are no longer possible. Otherwise, the lastValTime is updated with the
current time. Whenever the card contacts a relying party, it ensures that
the lastValTime lies within a certain time frame that is acceptable for that
party (see following section). The middleware should periodically (re)validate
the card to ensure that it is not necessary to execute the (re)validation protocol
during authentication. This would degrade performance and allow the provider
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and the (re)validation authority to collude and link user information via a
timing attack.
Table 5.1 shows in detail how the lastValTime is updated when the card is
inserted in the card reader. When the card has not been revalidated recently,
user confirmation is requested1 to start the revalidation protocol (1–6). Next,
an authenticated key agreement protocol is executed. Therefore, SE uses
skCo/certCo) and RA uses skra/certra. This step results in a shared session
key Ks (7). SE then sends the chip_number (encrypted with Ks) to RA who,
subsequently checks the revocation status of the card. (8-9). If the card is
revoked, a block command is sent to the card. Otherwise, the current time is
encrypted with Ks and sent to the card (10–11). Finally, upon receiving the
encrypted time, the card decrypts it, and updates its lastValTime (12). The
actual revalidation time is sent to the card, giving it a notion of time, since
common secure elements such as SIM and smart cards do not have a real-time
clock.
Table 5.1: The card is regularly revalidated by the revalidation authority (SE:
Secure Element, M: Middleware, U : User, RA: (Re)Validation Authority).
revalidateTrustedModule():
(1) SE : inserted in reader
(2) SE ← M : "Hello", currentTime
(3) SE → M : reqRevalidation := (lastValTime < currentTime - δ)
(4) M → U : if (reqRevalidation) showRevalWindow() else abort()
(5) M ← U : response [assume Yes; otherwise abort()]
(6) M

→ RA : "RevalidationRequest"
(7) SE ⇆ M

↔ RA : Ks := authKeyAgreement(skCo, certCo; skra, certra)
(8) SE → M

→ RA : {chip_number}Ks
(9) RA : if (not isValid(chip_number)) sendBlockCommand(), abort()
(10) RA : time := getCurrentTime()
(11) SE ← M

← RA : {time}Ks
(12) SE : lastValTime := time
Mutual Authentication Between the Card and a Provider
Mutual authentication between the card and a relying party, which can be
either a service provider or an identity provider, is accomplished as follows.
If the card is not blocked, the card and relying party P initiate a standard
1Note that steps 4–5 are optional. If they are omitted, the card will automatically be
revalidated or blocked.
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authenticated key agreement protocol (1–2). The relying party, therefore,
uses its certificate certp, while the card uses the common certificate certCo,
preserving the privacy of the user. The resulting session key is used to encrypt
all messages sent between SE and P. The mutual authentication protocol is
presented in more detail in Table 5.2.
The signature of certp is verified using the public key of the CA which is stored
on the card. Since some secure elements, such as smart cards, do not have an
internal real-time clock, the lastValTime is used to verify the validity period
of the certificate. To handle compromised/revoked provider certificates, four
approaches can be used. First, the card can issue an Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) request via the middleware. This, however, introduces a
significant delay in the authentication process. Instead of using OCSP, the
CRL can also be loaded on the card. Since revocation of provider certificates
is typically much less common compared to revocation of end-user credentials,
the secure element may have sufficient memory to contain the entire CRL.
This list can, for instance, be updated during the card (re)validation protocol.
A third approach is to use short lived provider certificates. Providers can
periodically request a new certp based on a long term certificate. This approach
requires no revocation checks on the secure element but a vulnerability interval
(i.e. time between the certificate being compromised and the expiry date)
exists. Although, the reissuance of certp can be automated based on a long
lived certificate, the load on the CA infrastructure significantly increases. A
fourth approach is to use the middleware to check the revocation status of the
provider’s certificate. This minimizes the overhead caused by the revocation
check but increases the trust required in the middleware. This approach can,
for instance, be used when the secure element is integrated in a smartphone.
After key agreement, a new session is started (3-4), and the session identifier
sesId, is passed to P (5). The card manages session data that contains all the
information related to the context of the authentication. The secure element
supports multiple simultaneous sessions. This is necessary when one or more
identity providers need to be contacted to resolve the attribute query of the
service provider. The secure element can also maintain simultaneous sessions
with service providers. P will now send the oldest acceptable validation time,
accValTime, to the card (6). The card verifies if it has been revalidated more
recently than accValTime (7). This ensures that the card was at least valid
until accValTime, without revealing the precise value of lastValTime. How
fast revoked cards are blocked depends on the last acceptable validation time
required by the provider. The closer the last acceptable validation time is to
the current time, the faster revoked cards will be blocked. The middleware
should periodically (re)validate the card to prevent that the revalidation
protocol should be executed during authentication since that would decrease
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performance and potentially allow the (re)validation provider to collude with
providers and link profiles of users. If the card has been revalidated recently
enough, the card verifies the rights of the provider by checking the link with
the provider’s certificate and the signature by the audit authority (8). If the
verification succeeds, the card stores the name of the relying party and its
access rights in the temporary session object (9-10). The former can later
be used to generate a service-specific pseudonym. The latter specifies each
attribute (e.g. name), attribute group ( e.g. eHealth data) and/or attribute
property (e.g. age > 18 ) that can be requested/provided using attribute and
provider identifiers.
Table 5.2: Authentication between the provider and the card (P: Provider, SE:
Secure Element, M: Middleware).
sesId := Authenticate():
(1) SE : if (not isActivated() ∨ isBlocked()) abort()
(2) SE ⇆ M

↔ P : Ks := authKeyAgreement(skCo, certCo; skp, certp)
(3) SE : sesId := startNewSession()
(4) SE : session[sesId].sKey := Ks
(5) SE → M

→ P : {sesId}Ks
(6) SE ← M

← P : sesId, { "validatedAfter", accValTime, rightsp }Ks
(7) SE : if (lastValTime < accValTime) abort()
(8) SE : if (not verifyRights (certp, rightsp, pkau) ) abort()
(9) SE : session[sesId].rights := rightsp
(10) SE : session[sesId].subject := certp.subject
Access to (Personalized) Services
Before an individual can use a service, the service provider may require the
user to release certain personal attributes either stored in the card or available
from identity providers. This is realized as follows and illustrated in Table 5.3.
The card and the service provider mutually authenticate (see previous section)
(1). Next, the service provider sends its attributeQuery-command to the card
(2). This query can contain an explicit request to disclose the service-specific
pseudonym nymSP. Note that not every service provider should be able to link
different service requests by the same user. For instance, for some sites it is
sufficient to prove that you are older than 21 in order to access the service. Next,
the card verifies that the service provider is allowed to query this information,
based on the access rights obtained during authentication (3). User-policies
may further impose restrictions on the disclosure of these attributes. Optionally,
based on the user’s policies the card may send the query together with sesSP
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and SP’s name to the middleware M to be displayed to the user. The access
control policy of the service provider can also give the user the choice between
different sets of attributes. For instance, for asserting that a user is older
than 18, the user can choose to release his birthdate or prove possession of
a valid driver’s licence. By selecting the optimal policy, the number of IdPs
that need to be contacted to obtain the required attributes can be minimized,
speeding up the authentication process. After the user’s consent, the (possibly
modified) query (actually, the delta) is returned to the card (5-8). The card
removes the delta from the query (9) and the PIN is verified (10). The card
then checks which attributes are locally available on the card (11) and which
attributes have to be fetched from identity providers. For determining which
attributes should be retrieved from which identity providers to minimize the
number of contacted identity providers, attributeMap is used. This is a data
structure that defines which attributes can be retrieved from which identity
providers. This strategy was proposed as a Linking Service in [62]. First, the
attributes available locally, such as the provider-specific nymSP, are gathered
(12). Generating provider-specific pseudonyms can be kept very simple: nymSP
:= prfSC(certsp.subject) where subject is the name of the service provider as
it is kept in its certificate; SC is a card-specific secret. Note that in case the
service specific nymSP is revealed during enrollment (see following section),
disclosing this pseudonym may be sufficient to use the service. Second, the
card authenticates to all identity providers from which data has to be fetched
(using the protocol defined in the previous section), and sends the attribute
request together with the identity provider-specific pseudonym nymIdP. Based
on nymIdP, the identity provider can fetch the data from its database and
return it to the SE (13-21). Finally, the card encrypts all requested attributes
with Ks and sends them to the SP (22).
Oﬄine Use. The secure element can be used for proving attributes oﬄine.
Therefore, a caching system is implemented that retains commonly used
attributes or attributes specified by the user in the secure element. The
identity provider can define which attributes may be cached together with
a retention time. Additionally, the service may impose restrictions on the
freshness of the (cached) data; such restrictions can easily be passed to the card
by including them in the service provider’s certificate. The caching mechanism
can also significantly improve the performance of the authentication protocol.
Fewer identity providers need to be contacted to resolve the attribute query
if commonly requested attributes such as name and address are cached in the
secure element.
Deanonymization. For certain services, it must be possible to revoke the
user’s anonymity in case of abuse. One strategy consists of encrypting the
chip_number together with the service-specific pseudonym or a random number
DESIGN 65
Table 5.3: The card releases attributes to the authenticated service provider
(SE: Secure Element, M: Middleware, SP: Service Provider, IdP: Identity
Provider).
Identify():
(1) SE ⇆ M

↔ SP : sesSP := Authenticate()
(2) SE← M

← SP : sesSP, { "attributeQuery", query}session[sesSP].sKey
(3) SE : if (not verifyQuery(query, session[sesSP].rights)) abort()
(4) SE : query∗P := applyPolicy(query)
(5) SE → M : query∗P, sesSP, SP = session[sesSP].subject
(6) M → U : showQueryWin(SP, query∗P)
(7) M ← U : response [Assume OK [delta∗U, PIN]; otherwise abort()]
(8) SE ← M : "deltaQuery", sesSP, delta
∗
U, PIN
(9) SE : query∗P,U := query
∗
P − delta
∗
U
(10) SE : if (PINincorrect(PIN)) handleWrongPIN()
(11) SE : attsPerIdP := resolveQuery(query∗P,U, attributeMap)
(12) SE : atts := getLocalData(attsPerIdP ["local"])
(13) SE : forall (IdP in attsPerIdP):
(14) SE⇆ M

↔ IdP : sesIdP := Authenticate()
(15) SE : nymIdP := getNym(SC, session[sesIdP].subject)
(16) SE : qry := makeQuery(attsPerIdP [IdP])
(17) SE→ M

→ IdP : {nymIdP, qry}session[sesIdP].sKey
(18) IdP : attsIdP := getData(qry)
(19) SE← M

← IdP : {attsIdP}session[sesIdP].sKey
(20) SE : atts.add(attsIdP)
(21) SE : endfor
(22) SE → M

→ SP : {atts}session[sesSP].sKey
(in case no pseudonym is revealed) using the public key of a trusted third
party entitled to deanonymize the user under certain circumstances. The
attributeQuery-command can include a request to disclose the encrypted
chip_number. In case of abuse (and if the deanonymization option was used),
the service provider forwards the encrypted data together with proof of the
abuse to the trusted party, which can decrypt the data and use the chip_number
to obtain the user’s real identity from the card issuer. This approach results
in minimal overhead, but only links the identity of the user to the user
authentication itself. Hence, any actions by the user after authentication
cannot be provably linked to the deanonymization data. This complicates
the deanonymization process. To realize transactional accountability, a unique
private key and certificate can be included in the card. The card can sign a hash
of the transaction data with that private key. The signature and certificate are
encrypted with the public key of the deanonymization authority, which results
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in the deanonymization data. This links the identity of the user to a transaction
and allows the deanonymization authority to verify that the transaction violates
the service provider’s terms. For instance, an anonymous user posting racist
messages on an forum or making available copyright protected files via a public
storage provider. Moreover, since every card holds a unique private key, the
deanonymization data is provably linked to one user. This system, however,
increases the trust required in the middleware. The user needs to trust the
middleware that the transaction shown by the middleware is the one signed by
the card.
An alternative strategy consists of extending the responsibilities of the
(re)validation authority with deanonymization. The card can contact the
(re)validation authority to retrieve a deanonymization attribute. The card
releases chip_number, after which the (re)validation authority gets the user’s
identity from his database and signs an encryption (with the public key of
the (re)validation provider) of the user’s identity together with a timestamp.
The signature, encrypted identity and timestamp are then released to the
service provider, via the card. The service provider can check the validity
and freshness of the deanonymization data via the timestamp and signature.
The (re)validation authority can decrypt the encrypted identity of the user
using his private key. The advantage compared to the previous approach is
that it is harder for attackers who hacked a card to obtain deanonymization
data as the (re)validation authority will not issue deanonymization attributes
for revoked cards. Attackers who hacked their own card can only obtain
deanonymization data containing their own identity information as a valid
chip_number is required. The chip_number is sufficiently long to mitigate
the impact of brute force attacks.
Enrollment
Similar to accessing personalized services, a user may enroll with an identity
provider. During enrollment the card discloses the identity provider-specific
nymIdP and possibly attributes from other identity providers. During
enrollment, the identity provider links nymIdP to its profile of the user. The
same pseudonym is used during future requests for personal information by SE.
When a connection with the secure element is established, the identity provider
can update attributeMap based on the attribute information it can provide
about the user.
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Personalization
Users can define and submit personal policies to the card. The user’s PIN
is used to authenticate the policies to the card. Subsequently, the card
automatically enforces the active policies. Service and identity providers can
be blacklisted or whitelisted, or a combination thereof. If whitelisting is used,
new service and identity providers have to be added explicitly to a whitelist
in the card. Users can further select a set of attributes that should always be
cached on the card.
5.3 Evaluation
This section first matches the solution with the requirements defined before,
followed by a discussion and a comparison with related work.
5.3.1 Requirements Review
Functional Requirements
Functional requirements F1 and F3 are realized by a caching table on the
card. The table keeps a set of personal attributes and their retention time.
The identity provider defines the validity interval. The retention time of the
owner’s namemay be unlimited whereas the retention time of student related
information may be limited (i.e. one year). Caching attributes allows oﬄine
use of the card. It, however, does require that they have been fetched from
identity providers before oﬄine use. Note that mutual authentication and
generating provider-specific pseudonyms does not require communication with
external entities. Adding new identity and service providers to the system is
straightforward. After receiving a certificate from a CA, user can enroll and
authenticate (cf. F2). Upon joining one ore more federations, depending on
the model used to realize the audit authority, the provider obtains the required
privileges to request and or provide a specific set of attributes.
Security and Privacy Requirements
Only genuine secure elements contain the common key pair to establish the
secure channel with providers using standard authentication, encryption and
integrity protection protocols. The tamperproof properties of the secure
68 USER-CENTRIC IDENTITY MANAGEMENT USING SECURE ELEMENTS
element ensure that this confidential information cannot be easily extracted
by an attacker. Hence, service providers are assured that the information
obtained over the secure channel originates from a genuine secure element. As
the card issuer is trusted to load an applet on the secure element that correctly
implements the desired functionality and identity providers are certified by an
audit authority, the service provider is assured that only information obtained
from trusted identity providers (i.e. in the same federation(s) as the service
provider) with adequate level of assurance is released. A PIN is required to
activate the secure element and the card (re)validation protocol allows blocking
lost or stolen cards, preventing abuse. This satisfies security requirement S1.
During card issuance and activation, the card issuer obtains only a minimal
set of information (cf. S2). It cannot calculate the card’s pseudonyms, which
prevents impersonation of a specific person by the card issuer.
Multiple measures have been taken to realize the privacy requirements. In
contrast to many identity management systems used in the public domain, this
solution does not require direct communication between identity providers and
service providers. On the contrary, identity providers are unaware about the
services that are consumed by the card holders. To ensure that timing attacks
cannot be used to link the (re)validation process to the authentication, the
middleware should periodically initiate the (re)validation protocol.
An audit authority assigns access rights to service providers. These access rights
can be coarse-grained, such as access to all eHealth data of an individual, or fine-
grained, such as only allow the verification of certain age properties (e.g. age
> 18). Moreover, if several trusted identity providers can supply the requested
information, the service provider does not know which identity provider was
used. For instance, when a service provider queries whether the card owner
is a student, proving that property does not reveal the university providing
this information. Hence, the audit authority ensures that service providers
can only issue queries related to the nature of the provided service. The
access privileges of maliciously behaving providers can be revoked. Additionally,
card personalization and user-consent give the user control over the disclosure
of personal attributes. For instance, the user could specify which identity
providers are used to retrieve the required information. The combination of
these features realizes strong distributed control over the release of identity
information, satisfying requirement P1. The system uses a common key pair to
prove possession of a genuine secure element, releasing no uniquely identifying
information (cf. P2). The card can generate unique, mutually unlinkable
pseudonyms for each provider based on a unique card-specific secret (cf. P3).
Users remain anonymous if they do not reveal the service-specific pseudonym
nor any other uniquely identifying information during authentication or via
context information (as discussed in Section 2.5). Deanonymization allows
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enforcing accountability measures as required by P4. The communication of
identity information between the secure element and providers occurs over a
secure channel, protecting the confidentiality of the data using standardized
protocols. This satisfies privacy requirement P5.
5.3.2 Discussion
The proposed scheme has several advantages but also constraints. In the
following, we discuss the most important ones and show how to tackle them.
Security
The main disadvantage with respect to the security of the system compared to
anonymous credentials and other identity management systems is the lack of
binding between the private key of identity providers and the attribute values
released to service providers. Malicious users with sufficient resources could try
to break the tamper resistance and extract the common private key from the
secure element. This introduces potential threats to the users and providers in
the system.
• Users: Even if the common private key of one user is compromised, an
attacker cannot access profiles of users with service providers. An attacker
needs to know the service-specific pseudonym of the user. Since this is
generated using a secret value generated by and stored on the secure
element of the user and transmitted encrypted to the provider, an attacker
cannot impersonate users other than the owner of the compromised card.
Brute force attempts are prevented with sufficiently long pseudonyms.
An attacker could, however, release forged identity information when
requesting access to a service.
• Providers: Service providers rely on the tamper resistance of the card
to prevent users from directly using their private key to release fake
information. However, if a common key is compromised an attacker can
forge the information released to a service provider, hereby compromising
the integrity of the service. If abuse is detected, the common key that is
used needs to be revoked. This affects each user with a secure element
containing the same common key. Each of these secure elements needs to
be replaced after the revocation of the common key.
Two complementary approaches to mitigate the consequences of hacked secure
70 USER-CENTRIC IDENTITY MANAGEMENT USING SECURE ELEMENTS
• The first approach relies on identity providers timestamping and signing
the attribute values released to the card. Since possession of the
common private key is not sufficient for malicious users to eavesdrop the
communication channel between the card and identity providers of other
users it tackles the problem of malicious users using fake information
or information from other users to gain access to personalized services.
It, however, also introduces several disadvantages to the system. For
instance, service providers learn with which identity providers users
are enrolled. This makes it easier for identity and service provider to
collaborate and link user profiles based on timing information. The
strategy also has an impact on other architectural decisions. For instance,
the caching algorithm needs to be modified since either all or no attributes
obtained from an identity provider need to be cached on the card due to
the signature. Further, if cached attributes are released, all attribute
values asserted by the signature need to be released while only a subset
might be required. Identity providers could sign individual attribute
values. This strategy, however, increases the communication and storage
overhead with a digital signature for each fetched or released attribute.
• To decrease the potential benefits of extracting a private key from a smart
card, a mechanism can be built in to discourage users to share or sell the
secret.
To incorporate this approach in the current prototype, two major
modifications need to be made. First, the card is now equipped with
an anonymous credential, instead of a public-key credential, containing a
validity period. Hence, after initiating a secure session with the provider
based on the provider’s certificate, the card uses the anonymous credential
to prove that it is a genuine card and releases the validity period of
the credential. Short lived credentials are used to avoid the usage of
complex credential revocation techniques. The (re)validation protocol
now performs a credential update during which the validity period is
updated. The service-specific pseudonym is now generated based on the
master secret of the anonymous credential. Hence, when malicious users
extract their private key from the smart card they are discouraged from
sharing or selling it since this allows access to all personal services of the
user (e.g. online tax declaration) as opposed to the current approach
where service-specific pseudonyms are generated based on a separate
master secret that does not need to be shared. Compared to an identity
card based on full fledged anonymous credentials, this approach is more
flexible and allows more efficient proofs, as only a basic credential with a
limited number of attributes is used.
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The lack of attribute certification remains the most important attack
vector. However, the strategy described above limits the impact and
hence, decreases the incentive to hack the card. Using an anonymous
credential will deteriorate the performance. A hybrid system in which
the anonymous credential is only used for authentication towards service
providers can mitigate the performance impact.
Revocation
In the proposed system, card (re)validation and blocking are handled by a
dedicated party. This is a significant advantage for service (and identity)
providers since they no longer need to maintain certificate revocation lists or
support OCSP responders from different CAs, especially since mobile tokens
are easily lost or stolen. For instance, according to a Belgian newspaper
article [176], approximately 200 000 electronic identity cards were lost or stolen
in 2009. All non-activated cards are also contained in the revocation list. This
results in large revocation lists. Moreover, security threats resulting from
outdated certificate revocation lists are avoided. However, sensitive services
should require a recent accValTime resulting in a short vulnerability window
when credentials are compromised. Less sensitive or oﬄine services could accept
a more permissive window of vulnerability.
Provider-specific pseudonyms are generated based on a unique secret generated
on the secure element. However, if the secure element is revoked because it is
lost or stolen, a user should be able to generate the same provider-specific
pseudonyms using a new secure element. Therefore, the system should provide
a mechanism to backup the pseudonym. The card issuance phase can be
extended to allow the user or card issuer to obtain and restore the (password-
encrypted) pseudonym. Note that if the card issuer holds the unencrypted
pseudonym, he can generate all the provider-specific pseudonyms of the user.
5.3.3 Comparison with Existing Systems
The proposed approach is compared to three existing systems namely an
Idemix-based user-centric IdM system [34], Shibboleth and the German
electronic identity card (GeID), each representing a different category of
identity management systems as described in Chapter 2. The results of the
comparison are summarized in Table 5.4.
Both Shibboleth and the German eID only allow the user to use one identity
provider during authentication with service providers. Shibboleth, however,
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allows the user to be registered with multiple identity providers, potentially
increasing the diversity in user information that can be requested. In both
the Idemix-based system and the approach presented in this chapter, the
user can release information obtained from multiple identity providers during
authentication.
In oﬄine settings, no third parties can be contacted during authentication.
Since Shibboleth delegates authentication to a third party (i.e. the identity
provider) it does not meet the requirement for oﬄine systems. The three other
systems can be used in oﬄine settings.
Two aspects of controlled attribute release are distinguished. The first aspect
is the specification of access control rules to the identity information of the user
by one or more entities in the system. The second aspect is the enforcement of
these access control rules by an entity in the system. One or more parties can
specify which information may be provided to which service providers. The
party who specifies the access control rules is, however, not necessarily also
responsible for enforcing these rules. In the German eID system, only certified
service providers can request information from the card. The user can also
restrict the information that can be requested. These rules are enforced by
the identity card. In the Shibboleth system, the identity provider and user are
responsible for specifying, the identity provider for enforcing the access control
policy. In the Idemix-based system, the middleware is responsible for enforcing
the user-specified access control rules. In our approach the audit authority
assigns rights to identity and service providers. The rights of malicious service
providers to request attributes can be revoked. Service providers are assured
that attributes are only retrieved from trusted identity providers. Further, the
user can specify restrictions on which information can be disclosed to which
service providers. These rules are enforced by the secure element of the user.
In the German eID, the Idemix-based system and our approach unlinkable
service-specific pseudonyms can be generated during authentication with
service providers. This limits the ability of service providers to combine their
databases and obtain extensive user profiles. In the Shibboleth system, however,
the identity provider learns which service providers a user accesses and knows
the pseudonyms of the user. Shibboleth, however, does allow the user to release
unique pseudonyms towards service providers that are mutually unlinkable.
In the Shibboleth and the Idemix-based system, attributes are digitally signed
by the identity provider indicating trustworthiness of the released information.
In the German eID and in the architecture presented in this chapter, the
released attributes are not digitally signed. Instead of using digital signatures,
these systems rely on the tamperproofness of the hardware and the correctness
of the hardware and software to ensure the trustworthiness of the released
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information.
In the German eID service specific revocation lists are generated and distributed
to the service providers. This introduces a significant overhead in settings with
many service providers. In the Shibboleth system, the revocation status is
verified by the identity provider and depends on the technology used during
authentication between the user and the service provider (e.g. username/-
password, X.509 credential). Although many revocation schemes exist for
Idemix credentials, currently no scheme enables efficient revocation in large
scale systems [128]. In our approach, an efficient card validation protocol is
implemented to disable revoked cards. However, if the card is compromised,
the card’s credential needs to be revoked using standard revocation lists. Since
common keys are used for a batch of cards, the entire batch needs to be replaced
with new cards.
Table 5.4: Comparison between the system proposed in this chapter and
existing identity management systems.
GeID Shib. Idemix Our approach
Attr. aggregation No No Yes Yes
Oﬄine settings Yes No Yes Yes
Attribute release
Specification AU+U IdP+U U AU+U
Enforcement TM IdP MW TM
Profiling Limited Yes (IdP) Limited Limited
Attr. assurance Trusted HW Sig. Sig. Trusted HW
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented an approach for a user-centric identity management
system using secure elements. We demonstrated the high flexibility and good
privacy and security properties of the proposed architecture. The system does
not rely on anonymous credential systems to realize privacy-preserving features
such as selective disclosure and pseudonymous authentication. Instead, the
public-key credentials and the tamperproof property of the secure element are
used to assert the validity of user information. This makes the performance
of our system less dependent on the number of attributes supported by the
system than systems relying on anonymous credentials for these features. The
release of personal information is controlled at two levels. An audit authority
defines system-wide access rules. Users can further restrict those access
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rules. The main issue when using trusted hardware components is secure
user interaction. Since most secure elements do not allow direct interaction
with the user, a terminal device is required. Recent technologies focus on
establishing a trusted execution environment on commodity devices, such as
smartphones [189, 90, 191, 206, 105, 177] and workstations (see Chapter 7).
These can be used to realize a trustworthy interface with the secure element
or even an entire virtualized secure element [48], potentially considerably
improving the performance.
Chapter 6
User-Centric Identity
Management: Validation and
Case Studies
The previous chapter proposed a privacy-friendly user-centric identity man-
agement approach based on a trusted secure element. The secure element
can aggregate attributes from multiple identity providers and, subsequently,
provide them to service providers. Service providers can enforce fine
grained access control policies based on the user attributes obtained during
authentication. The system supports several desirable features such as
attribute aggregation, selective disclosure and multishow unlinkability. The
information released to service providers is controlled by several parties. First,
an audit authority mandates which attributes can be provided by an identity
provider and requested by a service provider. Second, the user authorizes the
authentication via a PIN.
Where the previous chapter described the architecture of the identity manage-
ment system and presented a theoretical evaluation, this chapter illustrates
the feasibility of the presented system by presenting a proof-of-concept
implementation. The proof-of-concept implementation consists of several
reusable software components that facilitate the integration of the IdM system
in practical case studies. Two case studies are presented in the second part of
this chapter, validating the identity management system.
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6.1 Proof-of-Concept
This section presents a proof-of-concept implementation of the identity
management architecture presented in Chapter 5. The proof-of-concept uses
a single audit authority that assigns rights to service and identity providers
to respectively request and provide attributes. The provider’s privileges are
embedded in certp. A single CA is used that generates the providers’ certificates
based on a report from the audit authority stating which attributes can be
requested or provided. The public key of the CA is stored on the secure element
during initialization. The proof-of-concept relies on the middleware to verify
the revocation status of the providers’ certificates.
The proof-of-concept uses a Mobile Security Card [8] from Giesecke & Devriendt
to realize the secure element functionality. The Mobile Security Card contains
a tamperproof smart card chip but has the form-factor and interface of a µSD.
This allows it to easily interface with a wide range of devices (e.g. laptops,
mobile phones and tablets), contrary to contact smart cards that require
a dedicated reader. This increases the flexibility for deployment. Many
smartphones provide a µSD slot. It can be plugged in to workstations and
laptops via a µSD to USB adapter. This is the setup used for the proof-of-
concept. Giesecke & Devriendt provides a Windows driver that registers the
Mobile Security Card as a smart card with the operating system. Applications
running on the operating system can, hence, interface with the Mobile Security
Card like a regular smart card.
6.1.1 Protocols
This section discusses how the identity management protocols as presented in
the previous chapter are realized in the proof-of-concept.
Authenticated Key Establishment
The authentication and (re)validation protocols rely on an authenticated key
agreement protocol to establish a secure authenticated session between the
secure element and a remote party (i.e. service provider, identity provider
or (re)validation provider). The proof-of-concept uses the Full Unified Model
elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman scheme from the NIST Special Publication 800-
56A [156] to establish a secure authenticated session between the secure element
and a provider. Using elliptic curve cryptography ensures optimal performance
on the resource constrained secure element. The protocol relies on a static
PROOF-OF-CONCEPT 77
certified elliptic curve key pair for both parties (i.e. skCo/certCo and skp/certp)
and an ephemeral key pair generated on-the-fly (i.e. skeph,se/pkeph,se and
skeph,p/pkeph,p). Both parties transfer their static (i.e. certx) and ephemeral
public key to the other party. Subsequently, both parties generate two shared
secrets, one certified and one ephemeral, using the Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Cofactor Diffie-Hellman (ECC CDH) [129] primitive. The session key is then
generated by applying a cryptographic hash function on the concatenation of
the two shared secrets with a string containing public information of both
parties (obtained from the certificates) and a counter to ensure that a session
key of sufficient length can be generated. In the proof-of-concept, the RIPEMD-
160 [82] hash function is used. The protocol realizes several desirable security
properties such as key control and forward secrecy.
The proof-of-concept uses 192-bit elliptic curve keys. The group parameters
prime192v1 as specified in ANS X9.62 [21] are used. After an authenticated
session key is established between the secure element and a provider, all
messages are encrypted using 128-bit AES. A message authentication code
is generated for each ciphertext using the HMAC [126] algorithm with
RIPEMD-160 [82]. This realizes authenticated encryption [31], protecting the
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the messages. The CA uses a 2048-
bit RSA key pair to sign certificates. The CA does not use an elliptic curve
key pair since RSA signature verification is faster than ECDSA verification for
similar security levels [71].
Authentication
Contrary to the revalidation protocol, the authentication protocol is slightly
modified compared to the description in the previous chapter. It is modified
to support a challenge-response protocol flow, as shown in Figure 6.1. The
authentication protocol as described in the previous chapter requires several
exchanges between the secure element and the service provider to authenticate
the user. However, for many case studies it is more convenient to support a
single challenge-response flow. The provider sends a challenge to the secure
element, containing all the information for the secure element to generate
the session key (i.e. certp and pkeph,p), verify the authenticity and privileges
(i.e. certp) and gather and provide the required attributes (i.e. query). The
response contains the required information for the provider to generate the
session key (i.e. certCo and pkeph,se), decrypt the attribute response from
the secure element (i.e. {accValTime||atts}Ks) and verify the authenticity
(i.e. certCo and accValTime). As the accValTime is no longer sent from the
provider to the secure element over the secure channel, the secure element
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now sends the used accValTime to the provider over the secure channel. The
provider is, hence, assured that the correct time was used by the secure element.
P SE
1. certp, accValTime, pkeph,sp, query
2. {accValTime||atts}Ks, pkeph,se, certCo b
b
Figure 6.1: User authentication protocol (P: Provider, SE: Secure Element).
6.1.2 Software
The proof-of-concept consists of five applications. The functionality of each
of the four actors in the system (i.e. secure element, identity provider, service
provider and (re)validation provider) is each realized in a separate application.
The fifth application is the middleware that interacts with the secure element,
providers and the user to facilitate the execution of the IdM protocols. It also
provides the user with an interface to manage his secure element and control the
authentication. It also checks the revocation status of the provider’s certificate.
The secure element application was implemented using the Java Cards 2.2.2 [5]
framework. This framework allows developing applications for several types of
smart cards and derived technologies such as the Mobile Security Card [8] used
in the proof-of-concept. It supports the required cryptographic primitives to
implement the IdM protocols. Since the Java Card framework supports only a
subset of the Java language, several features available in Java are not available
in the Java Cards language. Hence, most Java libraries cannot be used for the
implementation of the secure element application. The other applications are
realized in Java. Each application is discussed in more detail in the remainder of
this section, but first several reusable data structures and software components
are presented. These components facilitate the deployment and integration of
the identity management architecture in applications. The Java Cryptography
Extension (JCE) and Bouncy Castle [59] frameworks are used for to realize the
required cryptographic operations.
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Java Software Modules and Data Structures
Figure 6.2 gives an overview of the data structures and software modules
that can be used by application developers to implement middleware and
service/identity/(re)validation provider applications. The data structures are
shown in bold, the software modules are represented by rectangles containing
italic text. This section discusses each data structure and software module in
more detail.
Figure 6.2: Java software modules and data structures.
CVCertificate implements a custom certificate format to avoid parsing X.509
certificates on the secure element. X.509 is a complex data structure,
implementing the logic to parse it on the secure element would increase
complexity and lower performance. Moreover, several custom fields need to be
added to contain the information regarding the attributes that can be requested
or provided. A simple custom Card Verifiable Certificate (CVC) format was
defined that contains fields for all the required information and is easily parsed.
Apart from the standard information contained in a certificate (i.e. issuer,
subject, serial, validity interval and signature), the CVC also contains two
lists of attribute identifiers, one list for the attributes that can be provided
and one for the attributes that can be requested. The secure element uses
standard X.509 certificates to authenticate towards providers since the common
certificates do not need to contain custom information. Moreover, the standard
is supported by most cryptographic frameworks.
ProviderData wraps all the data required to initialize a provider
(i.e. CVCertificate cert, ECPrivateKey privKey and Long accValOffset).
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AuthenticationRequest wraps the data transferred from the provider to the
secure element during the first phase of the authentication protocol. It
contains the CVCertificate of the provider, an ephemeral ECC public key
(ECPublicKey ephKey), the query containing the list of attribute identifier
(ArrayList<Short> query) and the earliest acceptable (re)validation time
(Long revTime).
AuthenticationResponse wraps all the data transferred from the secure
element to the provider during the second phase of the authentication protocol.
It contains the ephemeral public key of the secure element (i.e. ECPublicKey
ephKey), the common X509Certificate of the secure element and the
encryption (i.e. byte[] encMessage) of the concatenation of the earliest
acceptable (re)validation time with the user’s attributes.
Attribute wraps the data related to a user attribute. It contains the
attribute identifier (Short identifier), the attribute value (byte[] value) and
the retention offset (Short retOffset). The latter indicates the maximum
number of a days an attribute should remain cached on the secure element.
A retention offset of zero means that it should not be cached on the card. This
is only relevant for identity providers. The Attribute class also contains a
static bidirectional map that links attribute identifiers with a human readable
String representation.
IdMPrincipal wraps the attributes of a user (HashMap<Short,byte[]> at-
tributes) and the session key (SecretKey sessionKey) agreed with the secure
element during the authenticated key establishment.
UserAuthentication implements the logic for providers to authenticate users.
It is initialized with ProviderData. After initialization the provider can
use it to generate an AuthenticationRequest and verify the corresponding
AuthenticationResponse. Upon successful verification, the module returns
an IdMPrincipal object from which all the requested attributes and the session
key agreed with the secure element are available.
AttributeRequest wraps the encrypted attribute identifiers (byte[] encAt-
tributeIdentifiers) of the attributes requested by the secure element to the
identity provider.
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AttributeResponse wraps the encrypted attributes and their maximum
retention time on the secure element (byte[] encAttributes) provided by the
identity provider to the secure element in response to an AttributeRequest.
IdentityProvider constructs an AttributeResponse object based on an
AttributeRequest and a IdMPrincipal object. The session key and attribute
information contained in the IdMPrincipal object are used to decrypt the
attribute request and generate the encrypted response. The identity provider
application is responsible for retrieving the attributes of the user from storage,
determining the maximum retention time and populating the IdMPrincipal
object before passing it to IdentityProvider.
IdMMiddleware interprets the AuthenticationRequest object and generates
the necessary APDU1 messages to send to the secure element and construct an
AuthenticationResponse. Since object serialization is not supported by the
Java Card framework, explicit methods need to be implemented to serialize
and deserialize objects. A Tag Length Value (TLV) data structure is used
to represent the data. The data of each entry is preceded by a tag and its
length. For more complex data structures (e.g. CVCertificate), a nested
approach is used. This allows the secure element and client application to
reconstruct the data object(s) from the exchanged APDUs. The primitive data
types such as Short and Long are converted to their big endian representation.
The Strings are converted to bytes using UTF-8 encoding. The point of the
curve comprising the public key is represented as an octet string in compressed
form as defined in ANSI X9.62 [21]. This allows serialization of all the data
structures sent to and received from the secure element. If identity providers
need to be contacted to resolve an attribute query, the secure element sets
a specific status flag in an APDU. This triggers the middleware to query the
secure element for the address of the identity provider and, subsequently, notify
the middleware application that an identity provider needs to be contacted.
Secure Element Application
This section discusses several implementation aspects of the secure element
application. Since secure element does not have an embedded real-time clock,
the lastValTime is used to verify time constraints. The secure element
application authenticates the user via a four digit PIN.
1An APDU is the communication format between a smart card and the off-card
applications.
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Personalized Policies. The user can manage his secure element using his PIN.
First, the user can select a set of attributes that should remain cached on
the card. When the retention time is expired, the secure element notifies the
middleware to retrieve them again from an identity provider. Second, the user
can assign a trust level to service providers: untrusted, default and trusted.
Requests from untrusted service providers are blocked. In the default policy,
user confirmation is required before the attributes are released. If a service
provider is trusted, the user is no longer involved in the attribute disclosure.
The query, however, is still verified using the privileges listed in the CVC.
Attribute Aggregation. The secure element application manages a set of
Attribute objects. Each object wraps an attribute identifier, attribute value,
retention time, persistence flag and the time it was last used. It can be extended
with additional values such as a LOA and the identity provider from which it
was obtained. The latter can be used to add support for multiple federations.
Some attribute values are cached on the card, the identity provider indicates if
an attribute can be cached on the card and what the retention time is. Other
attribute values need to be fetched from identity providers. Therefore, each
card keeps a list of IdentityProvider objects. These objects contain the
contact information of the identity providers with which the user is enrolled
and which attributes each identity provider can provide. During enrollment,
the identity provider initializes the list of attributes which it can provide. The
card verifies whether or not this violates the rights contained in the identity
provider’s certificate. This list can also be updated afterwards.
When an attribute query is received, the query handler first searches the cache.
The remaining attributes are fetched from identity providers. The handler
selects a minimal set of identity providers to supply the remaining attributes,
ensuring optimal performance.
Memory Management. Smart cards and derived technologies typically have
limited memory. The Mobile Security Card used for the prototype has around
70K bytes of available EEPROM.Moreover, the Java Card virtual machine does
not implement a garbage collector, nor is it possible to explicitly release memory.
Therefore, all required memory should be allocated during deployment of the
program and continuously reused to avoid running out of memory during the
lifetime of the card.
Caching Attributes. A fixed set of byte arrays of variable length (to minimize
memory fragmentation) is allocated to store attribute values. These arrays
are embedded in the Attribute objects that also keep the context information
such as the attribute identifier, retention time and time of last usage. For an
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optimal implementation, the distribution of the average length of each type
of attribute should be calculated. When an attribute value is fetched from
an identity provider, it might be necessary to remove another attribute from
the cache. The following selection strategy is applied. First, the Attribute
objects with the smallest memory footprint still large enough to keep the new
attribute value are selected. Subsequently, the least recently used attribute
value is replaced. Persistent attributes are not considered by the cache update
policy. This caching strategy is straightforward while limiting fragmentation.
Static Memory Configuration. Since all memory allocations occur when the
applet is deployed on the card, the maximum attribute query length, the
maximum number of supported identity providers, cached attributes etc. are
fixed. The initialization attributes can be used to define the amount of memory
assigned to the different parts of the program when installing the applet. For
instance, one can opt for allocating only a limited amount of memory for
identity providers while increasing the attribute cache. During initialization,
several system parameters such as the group parameters and the public key of
the CA is also sent to the secure element together with the unique chip_number
and a PIN.
Anonymous Subscriptions. For some applications such as news sites it is
not necessary for a user to disclose a persistent identifier. News sites only
need to verify whether the user has a subscription that allows him to view
the requested content. To support this, a Subscription object is initialized
during enrollment of the user with the service provider. The Subscription
object contains the id of the service provider, a validity period and a type.
The type allows the service provider to verify whether the requested service
(or content) is included in the subscription of the user. Note that the actual
validity period does not have to be released but can be verified by the card
using the current time provided by the service provider. The card can then
return either valid or invalid. The type field constraint can also be verified by
the card but is less critical if released since typically only a limited number of
subscription types are available. A pseudonym that allows the user to retain
his subscription when re-enrolling with a new secure element (e.g. when the
previous card was lost or expired) could be released during enrollment.
Service Provider Application
A proof-of-concept service provider is written that uses the UserAuthentication
class to authenticate the user. The class is initialized with the required
parameters and used to generate the authentication challenge and verify
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the authentication response. The ProviderData required to initialize the
UserAuthentication is read from an XML file. The service provider
starts a server sockets that accepts incoming connections and requires the
user to provide several personal attributes before granting access. An
AuthenticationRequest is sent to the client, together with a list of attribute
identifiers that are optional to release. This can, for instance, be useful in a
user registration phase. The client responds with an AuthenticationResponse.
Java object serialization is used to transfer the objects between the client and
the server. The resulting IdMPrincipal provides the necessary information to
check if the user meets the access control policy.
Identity Provider Application
The identity provider application extends the service provider application with
attribute provisioning. During authentication, the user is required to release
the provider specific pseudonym. This allows the identity provider to fetch the
user’s attributes from local storage. A simple XML file is used to store a set of
user attributes for each user. Apart from the AuthenticationResponse, the
secure element also sends an AttributeRequest, containing an encrypted list of
attribute identifiers, to the identity provider via the middleware. The identity
provider uses the session key contained in the IdMPrincipal object obtained
during user authentication to decrypt the attribute request. The requested
attributes are obtained from local storage, encrypted with the session key and
sent back to the client in the AttributeResponse. Two instances of the identity
provider application are deployed. The educational identity provider can
provide the name, student status and study domain. The governmental identity
provider can provide the name, postal code, street and number, municipality,
gender and place of birth.
Revalidation Provider Application
The (re)validation provider application extends the identity provider appli-
cation. Instead of providing attributes, the AttributeResponse contains a
new lastValTime encrypted with the session key. The (re)validation provider
application holds a certificate containing an entry that gives the provider the
rights to update the lastValTime on the secure element and request a special
attribute, the chip_number. The latter allows verification of the revocation
status before updating the lastValTime.
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Middleware Application
The middleware interfaces with the different actors in the system. It allows
the user to connect to service providers and obtain a personalized service. To
authenticate the user towards the service provider, the middleware connects
with the secure element through the PC/SC API available in Java as of
version 1.6. The middleware connects with service, identity and (re)validation
providers over sockets. The middleware uses the IdMMiddleware component
to interpret and construct the required messages. It, further, informs the user
about the pending authentication and allows the user to enter his PIN. The user
can, further, select which optional attributes to disclose during authentication
towards a service provider. The selected optional attributes are added to the
query in the AuthenticationRequest object. A certificate revocation list is
used to check the revocation status of the providers’ certificates.
6.1.3 Evaluation
The generic software modules and data structures can be used to facilitate
the deployment and use of the IdM system in applications. The software
modules abstract away the details of the IdM protocols. The applications are
only responsible for exchanging the constructed messages and initializing the
software modules with the required data. The proof-of-concept relies on the
middleware to check the revocation status of the provider’s certificate. This
requires the user to trust the middleware. Other approaches, as presented in
the previous chapter, lower the trust required in the middleware but introduce
additional overhead. The middleware can be implemented on a personal device
of the user, such as his smartphone to support this trust. The proof-of-concept
can be extended to support additional features such as multiple federations and
levels of assurance for attributes and deanonymization. Currently the query is
a simple list of attribute identifiers. Adding support for more advanced policy
languages could further increase the privacy of the user [55, 52]. Currently, the
secure element selects a minimal set of identity providers to satisfy the service
provider’s request, ensuring optimal performance. However, to increase user
control the attribute aggregation module and policies should be extended to
allow the user to determine from which identity providers the attributes are
aggregated, given the set of possible identity providers.
The secure element application runs on a Mobile Security Card SE 1.0 [8], all
other applications run on a DELL E6420 laptop with Intel Core i7-2720QM
@ 2.20GHz, 4 cores, 8 logical processors and 8GB RAM. The laptop runs
Windows 7 64-bit with Service Pack 1. The proof-of-concept was used to do
some performance tests. The presented numbers are the averages and standard
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deviations of 20 runs. The establishment of the authenticated session key with
providers takes around 1517±85 ms on the secure element and 53±5 ms for the
provider. A significant part of the duration on the secure element, around a
third, is due to the generation of the ephemeral key pair. A possible strategy to
improve performance could be to reuse the same ephemeral key for a number of
authentications or have the middleware trigger the card to pre-calculate one or
more ephemeral keys when its idle. After the secure channel is established,
the secure element can request attributes from identity providers, provide
them to service providers and update the lastValTime. The secure element
operations for fetching attributes from an identity provider take around 300-
400 ms, depending on the number of requested attributes. The secure element
operations for providing attributes to the service provider take 153±33 ms for
only the pseudonym and 211±34 ms for all nine attributes, assuming they are
cached on the card. Updating the secure element with a new lastValTime
takes around 300±37 ms. The operations executed by the provider take less
than 5±3 ms for each of the three protocols.
The low-bandwidth communication with the secure element and the com-
putational constraints of the secure element are the major constraints for
the performance of the system. The caching strategy has a critical impact
on performance as each identity provider that needs to be contacted during
authentication greatly increases the duration of the authentication. Caching
a set of frequently used attributes on the secure element should ensure that
no identity providers need to be contacted for the majority of authentications.
The user can tune the caching strategy by marking attributes as persistent
and having the secure element prefetch attributes from identity providers.
Releasing more attributes slightly decreases the performance as more attributes
need to be encrypted by and transferred from the secure element to the
middleware. Attributes should be relatively short due to the computational and
communication constraints of the secure element. To support larger attributes,
identity providers could provide the cryptographic hash of the attribute value
to the secure element and transfer the actual attribute to the service provider
via the middleware. The middleware should also periodically (re)validate the
secure element to ensure that this operation does not have to be performed
during authentication. This is feasible if the secure element is permanently
plugged in a personal device of the user, as discussed in Section 6.2.1.
6.2 Validation
This section validates the identity management system presented in the
previous chapter by applying it in two case studies. This research is joint work
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with Faysal Boukayoua. This section summarises the most important results
relevant to this text. More details can be found in [42, 41]. This section consists
of two parts. The first section applies the IdM system to control access to a Web
based service provider. The second part tackles interoperability by illustrating
how it can be integrated in an already deployed Shibboleth environment.
6.2.1 Out-of-Band Web Authentication Using a Smartphone
Many service providers make their remote services available via the Web. The
user browses to the Web page of the service provider where access to the service
can be requested. The identity management architecture is used to assert
the required information for the service provider to make an informed access
control decision. This section validates the identity management architecture
by illustrating how it can be used in a Web based context. A prototype is
implemented to illustrate the feasibility of our approach.
The user mostly uses his own workstation to consume the services of Web
based service providers. However, on some occasions the user might also need
to use public workstations or workstation shared by multiple users. On these
workstations the user might not have the required privileges to install software.
Moreover, malware might be running on the workstation that can compromise
the middleware and intercept the PIN of the user. Hence, our system should not
require the installation of middleware on the workstation and the user should
not have to rely on the workstation to securely handle his PIN and correctly
inform the user about the information that will be released.
Design
The user (U) has a mobile device (MD) containing a secure element that
implements the SE functionality of the identity management architecture.
The smartphone contains an application implementing the IdM middleware
functionality. The user requests access to a remote service (SP) via the Web
browser (WB) on a workstation.
Figure 6.3 presents the messages exchanged between the different actors to
authenticate the user towards the service provider. First, the user requests
access to a remote service via the browser on his workstation (1). The service
providers requires the user to prove certain personal attributes before granting
access. The service provider, therefore, returns a webpage containing a QR code
with the authentication challenge (i.e. certsp, accValTime, pkeph,sp and query)
and an authentication identifier (i.e. authID) (2). The authentication identifier
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is generated by the service provider and linked to the browsing session of the
user. The user now scans the QR code with his mobile phone (3). The mobile
phone now informs the user about the pending authentication (i.e. information
about the service provider and the attributes that will be released) (4). If
the user agrees with the authentication, he transfers his PIN and a possible
modified attributes query to the mobile device (5). The mobile device now
interacts with the secure element contained in the mobile to generate the
authentication response (i.e. pkeph,se, certCo and {accValTime||atts}Ks). The
possible interactions with identity providers are omitted for reasons of clarity.
The authentication response is then transferred from the mobile to the service
provider together with authID via the xG connection of the mobile phone (6).
The service provider can now construct the authenticated session key and use
it to decrypt the attributes. The service provider then assigns privileges to
the browser session of the user based on the obtained attributes. The browser
session of the user is uniquely identified by authID. If the access control policies
are satisfied, the user is granted access to the requested service (7).
U WBMD SP
1. service request
2. QR[authID, certsp, accValTime, pkeph,sp, query]
3. QR[authID, certsp, accValTime, pkeph,sp, query]
4. certsp, query
5. query∗P, PIN
6. {accValTime||atts}Ks, pkeph,se, certCo, authID
7. service
b b
b
b
b
b
b
bb
Figure 6.3: Authentication to a Web-based service provider (U: User, MD:
Mobile Device, WB: Web Browser, SP: Service Provider).
Prototype
This section shortly discusses the software components that were developed
for the prototype, namely a smartphone application and the authentication
and access control logic for the service provider. The software for the identity
providers and the secure element remain the same as in the proof-of-concept
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implementation. The hardware used for the realization of the different entities
is shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: The hardware platforms for the realization of the different entities
(SE: Secure Element, MD: Mobile Device, WB: Web Browser, SP: Service
Provider).
Entity Realization
SE Mobile Security Card SE 1.0 [8]
MD
Samsung i9000 Galaxy S: 1GHz ARM Cortex-A8, 512MB RAM
The smartphone runs Android 2.3.3
WB, SP
DELL E6420: Intel i7-2720QM @ 2.20GHz, 4 cores, 8GB RAM
The laptop runs windows 7 64-bit with service pack 1
Smartphone Application. The mobile application implements the middle-
ware as described in the previous section. The mobile application is developed
for an Android phone. Since Android applications are also written in Java,
large portions of the proof-of-concept’s middleware software can be reused.
The main modification that needed to be made was the communication with
the Mobile Security Card and the user interface. Instead for relying on
the PC/SC API, a library from the seek-for-android [12] project that allows
Android applications to interact with the smart card chip of the µSD. The
application further uses the zxing [9] library to scan and interpret QR codes.
The URLConnection class is used to perform an HTTP POST containing
the serialized AuthenticationResponse to the URL contained in the service
provider’s certificate.
The mobile application also offers multiple management functions to the user.
The application shows the user to which service provider (i.e. URL) the secure
element is about to authenticate. Furthermore, the application also displays
the user attributes (or properties thereof) that are requested. Attributes may
be mandatory or optional. If any optional attributes are requested, the user
can select whether or not to disclose them.
Service Provider Application. The service provider is implemented on an
Apache Tomcat [1] server. Spring Security [13] is used to enforce its access
control policy. A Spring authentication module was added to handle the custom
authentication protocol. Memcached [7], an in-memory key-value store, links
the session information to the authentication identifier.
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Evaluation
Nowadays many communication technologies are supported by the current
generation of smartphones. However, most of them require dedicated software
or configuration on the workstation in order to allow interaction with the
smartphone. Optical communication on the other hand, can easily be used
to transfer data from the browser, running on the workstation, to the mobile
without needing to install any additional software. The mobile device offers a
platform for entering the PIN of the user and controlling the authentication
without needing to trust the software running on the workstation.
The current prototype focuses on authentication to Web-based services that
are consumed via the workstation. However, there are several other scenarios
in which a mobile device can be used to access personalised services. For
instance, users might need to prove that they are old enough to buy alcoholic
beverages at a vending machine. Other scenarios include controlled access to
buildings, loyalty discounts, etc. In these scenarios, the smartphone application
may use NFC or Bluetooth to connect to the service provider. Apart from the
communication layer, no other modifications are required.
A nearby eavesdropper could scan the QR code shown by the browser. This
gives the attacker access to the authentication challenge and the authentication
identifier. An attacker could use it for a denial-of-service attack by using
the authentication ID to invalidate the user’s authentication session with the
service provider. The authentication ID is different from the session identifier,
preventing the attacker from hijacking the browsing session of the user.
6.2.2 Shibboleth Integration
The previous section illustrated how the IdM system can be used for service
providers to enforce access control rules in a Web based context by using the
software modules developed for the proof-of-concept. Each actor is assumed to
install the custom IdM modules. However, in some cases, actors already have
a legacy infrastructure deployed and are reluctant to extend/replace it. This
section discusses the case in which the service providers use the Shibboleth
framework to authenticate its users. This integration allows the service provider
to support a wider range of users and increases the application domain for the
new IdM system. The latter can play an important role when introducing a
new IdM system, since the number of available services is an important factor
for users to start using the system.
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Design
The user requests access to a remote service via the browser on a workstation.
The service provider uses the Shibboleth authentication infrastructure to
authenticate its users. Hence, when the user requests access to a protected
resource of the service provider, the user’s browser is redirected to the
Shibboleth Discovery Service. The Shibboleth Discovery Service allows the
user to select a trusted Shibboleth identity provider that is responsible for the
endorsement of the user’s attributes to the service provider. To avoid naming
confusion with the identity providers from the IdM system presented in the
previous chapter, the Shibboleth identity provider is referred to as identity
broker.
In a standard Shibboleth deployment, the user authenticates to the identity
broker allowing the identity broker to retrieve the user’s information from
a database. However, in our design, the identity broker no longer stores
the attributes of the user. Instead, the user proves the attributes during
authentication towards the identity broker. Attribute storage and provisioning
are moved to the IdM architecture. Each Shibboleth federation appoints one
identity broker that holds a separate certificate for each service provider. Each
certificate contains the information and rights of a specific service provider to
obtain a set of attributes from a secure element. The task of the identity broker
is to convert the attributes retrieved during authentication to a Shibboleth
assertion that can be interpreted by the service provider.
Prototype
The prototype builds upon the open source implementation of Shibboleth v2.
A standard service provider is deployed. Some modifications were made to the
identity provider software to support the custom authentication protocol. The
prototype is tested on the same hardware as in the previous case study
For authentication towards the identity broker, the prototype uses the system
presented in Section 6.2.1. No modifications are required to the smartphone and
identity provider applications. During authentication, the required attributes
are provided to the identity broker. The user is informed regarding the released
attributes by the mobile device. Since the identity broker uses a unique
certificate for each service provider, the user is also informed about the service
provider to which he is authenticating. This ensures that the identity broker
does not use a certificate from another service provider to be able to request
more or a different set of attributes from the secure element.
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Support for the custom authentication system is added to the identity broker
by implementing a Shibboleth LoginHandler. This component uses the service
provider logic from the prototype presented in Section 6.2.1 to authenticate
the user and obtain the required attributes. The certificate used during
authentication depends on the service provider that issued the SAML request.
Evaluation
Next to interoperability with a Shibboleth service provider, the presented
approach also provides several advantages compared to a standard Shibboleth
deployment. Since the identity broker uses separate certificates for each service
provider, the secure element generates unlinkable service provider specific
pseudonyms. This prevents the identity broker from linking authentication
sessions of the same users to different service providers if no other uniquely
identifiable information is released. Moreover, the user is informed about
the pending authentication and can selectively disclose his attributes via his
smartphone. The required attributes can be aggregated from multiple identity
providers. The identity broker is trusted by the user not to abuse the data
obtained during user authentication by, for instance, trying to link different
pseudonyms of the user or impersonate a user towards the service provider.
The identity broker is trusted by the service providers for the provisioning of
the user’s attributes. The Shibboleth trust model decreases the required trust
in one identity provider by distributing this trust over several identity providers
that can each provide a subset of user attributes.
6.3 Discussion
This chapter presented two case studies validating the IdM system presented
in the previous chapter. Both case studies rely on a mobile device to
provide a secure interface to interact with the secure element and manage the
authentication. It provides a mobile and convenient platform to manage the
credentials of the user. These mobile device are, moreover, typically managed
by the user which makes it more trusted than, for instance, a public workstation.
Mobile device operating systems are, however, also vulnerable to infection
by malware. To increase the security Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
technologies [189, 90, 191, 206, 105, 177] embedded in several commodity off-
the-shelf smartphones could be used to provide a secure interface to the user.
Ideally, the TEE hardware support ensures that the secure element can only
be accessed by a trusted TEE application.
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Several identity management systems use SAML tokens to request and assert
properties about users. Our implementation, however, uses customized
protocols and message formats since parsing SAML messages would greatly
increase the complexity and impact the performance [154] of the secure element
module. An alternative would be to exchange SAML messages between service
and identity providers via the secure element. Although this avoids the need
to parse SAML messages on the secure element, it introduces multiple other
disadvantages. For instance, the privacy advantages compared to current
solutions would diminish as the trust would again shift from the secure element
to the identity providers. Hence, the communication overhead to the secure
element would significantly increase, which would seriously impact performance.
The previous section discussed another approach in which a trusted third party
performs a protocol conversion between two IdM systems. Another approach
to stimulate adoption is adding support to identity management frameworks
such as the Higgins [4] framework. This strategy is not pursued in this text.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented a proof-of-concept implementation of the identity
management system presented in the previous chapter. The proof-of-concept
consists of several reusable software components that can be used to integrate
the IdM system in applications. Several implementation aspects that need to
be considered when implementing the IdM system are discussed. The proof-of-
concept uses a standardized elliptic curve based authenticated key agreement
protocol to provide strong security while maintaining good performance on the
resource constrained secure element.
The second part of this chapter validates the identity management system by
applying it in two case studies. The first case study handles user authentication
towards a Web-based service provider. The user accesses the service via a
browser on his workstation. The smartphone of the user is used to authenticate
the user towards the remote service provider. A Mobile Security Card
is plugged in the smartphone on which the secure element functionality is
implemented. The middleware is implemented on the smartphones and allows
the user to manage and approve authentication requests. This approach ensures
that the user does not need to enter his PIN on an untrusted workstation,
reducing the trust required in the workstation. Moreover, the solution does
not require the installation of any dedicated software on the workstation,
supporting user authentication on workstations on which the user has no
administrator privileges. The second case study presents an approach for
using the IdM system to authenticate towards a Shibboleth service provider.
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This allows the system to be used with legacy infrastructures, increasing the
application domain. The approach also provides several advantages compared
to a standard Shibboleth deployment. It adds support for attribute aggregation
and increases the privacy and control of the user over the disclosure of his
attributes. It however, breaks the trust model of Shibboleth and requires the
service provider to trust a single identity provider with the provisioning off
all the user’s attributes. A similar approach can be used for other identity
management systems such as OpenID [167].
Chapter 7
An Architecture for
TPM-Backed Identity
Management
Many identity management systems rely on the workstation to provide an
environment on which the user can securely use his credentials, and assess
and approve transactions or authentication requests. However, the regular
operating systems, such as Windows, Linux distributions and OS X, typically
running on these workstations are vulnerable to malware due to the large
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) [170]. Using credentials on these workstations,
hence, potentially exposes them to abuse by malware [120, 175].
Existing works [142, 141, 140, 48] describe the realization of a Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE) on a workstation and present a framework for
developing applications running in the TEE. The system works on commodity
off-the-shelf workstations and laptops, and does not require the user to buy
additional hardware. The trusted execution environment runs next to and
isolated from the regular operating system. The system, hence, does not hinder
the user in the day-to-day work on his computer but is only activated when
user authentication is required. By migrating all credential related operations
from the regular operating system to a trusted application running in the TEE,
malware is prevented from obtaining the credentials or misleading the user
about the pending authentication (i.e. secure I/O). To realize these features,
the user must be able to distinguish between a trusted application running on
the workstation or malware trying to mislead the user.
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This chapter introduces the state of the art regarding TPM-based TEEs.
Further, an extended enrollment phase is presented that allows the user to
establish trust in the software running in the trusted execution environment
on the workstation via his smartphone. This ensures that the user is correctly
informed regarding the pending transaction. During the enrollment phase, the
mobile device also obtains the public key of the trusted application. This
allows secure data transfer between the mobile device and the TEE application.
An USB-UHCI driver is added to an existing framework for developing TEE
applications. This allows TEE applications to access external hardware security
technologies via the USB interface. The advantage of this setup compared to
trusting the mobile phone to handle the user’s credentials is that the TEE
can interface with hardware technologies such as a smart card reader or a
biometric scanner whereas mobile phones typically cannot. Moreover, the
attestation capabilities of the TPM can be used to assure a relying party that
the correct protocols were executed. This setup is used in Chapter 8 where two
advanced case studies are presented that use the TEE environment to increase
the security and privacy of identity management systems.
7.1 Preliminaries
7.1.1 TCG Trusted Computing
Nowadays, commodity computers are equipped with a trusted platform
module [186]. This is a hardware module physically attached to the computer’s
motherboard, extending the system with a set of security related features. One
of these features is the measurement of the state of the system. To this end,
the TPM contains several Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). These are
cleared upon power up and can only be modified using the extend operation,
performed inside the TPM. This operation requires two parameters: a PCR
register and a value. This value is typically the hash of a binary software
component. The result of this operation is a new PCR value, being the hash of
the value currently contained in the register and the value to extend (i.e. P CRn
:= SHA1(P CRn || value)).
A transitive trust model is employed: each software component, starting from
the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) in the BIOS, is responsible for
measuring the following component in the chain before passing control. Hence,
before loading subsequent software components, the preceding component
hashes the binaries of the components to be loaded and extends the result in a
specific PCR. As a result, the PCRs represent the state of the system (i.e. the
loaded software configuration). Some PCR registers are designated to contain
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measurements of specific software components or settings. For example, the
BIOS and the motherboard configuration are measured respectively in PCR
registers zero and one. Other PCR registers can be freely used by software
developers.
Based on this state, the TPM also supports a number of additional operations.
Data can be encrypted with the seal operation and only if the system resides in
the state specified during the seal operation can the data be decrypted (unseal).
Additionally, the quote command returns a proof of the state (i.e. a quote)
which a, possibly remote, third party can verify (verifyQuote) asserting that the
(remote) system runs in a specific (trusted) state. Quote uses the private key
and certificate of the TPM (i.e. sktpm and certtpm) to assert that the operation
is performed by a genuine TPM. These credentials can either be generated
by the hardware manufacturer/vendor or during an initialization phase. The
widely supported TPM specification 1.2 supports both attestation based on an
RSA key pair and Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [49]. If the latter is
used, the validity of the TPM is asserted without releasing uniquely identifying
information.
7.1.2 Trusted Execution Environment
While TPMs have been built-in in workstations for several years now, a
more recent evolution is the adoption of TEE technologies such as Intel’s
Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) [68] and AMD’s Secure Virtual Machine
(SVM) [80]. These technologies allow the execution of measured code
independently of previously executed software. The TPM specification has
been extended with additional capabilities to support these new technologies.
These technologies tackle the main disadvantage of using a chain of trust
established from the BIOS to the operating system, namely the large trusted
computing base. The AMD SVM and Intel TXT technologies were developed
to provide a hardware-based Dynamic Root of Trust Measurement (DRTM).
A special command is implemented in the processor that takes as input a
physical start address referencing code contained in memory. Before the
processor begins execution of the referenced code, the code is extended in
special purpose registers in the TPM. Where other registers can only be reset by
rebooting the workstation, these registers are reset by the previously mentioned
command, before the code is extended in the registers. Hardware protections
such as disabling interrupts, preventing DMA access to the code in memory and
even prohibiting access by hardware debuggers attached to the motherboard,
ensure that the measured code is the code executed by the processor. This
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technique allows trustworthy assertion of code without requiring an entire chain
of trust [123] starting from the BIOS.
McCune et al. [142, 141, 140] presented a framework called Flicker that uses
these technologies to allow developers to isolate security critical code from
applications and run it in a secure environment. The main, possibly untrusted,
OS is temporarily suspended after which the sensitive Piece of Application
Logic (PAL) is securely executed. When the execution of the sensitive code
is completed, the OS resumes execution. Typically, the PAL extends its state
in the TPM with a fixed known value before releasing control back to the
OS. This prevents the OS from gaining access (i.e. unseal) to secrets from
the PAL. Before extending its state in the TPM with a fixed value, the PAL
can also extend its state with a data entry. The OS can then use the quote
command of the TPM to assert that the specified data entry was produced
by a trusted PAL (i.e. the asserted state equals the known state of the PAL
extended with, subsequently, the data entry and the known fixed value). The
framework supports data transfer between the main OS and the PAL. The
TPM operations can be used to assert to a remote party that certain data
was generated by a trusted PAL. The framework supports both Intel TXT
and AMD’s SVM technology on Windows and Linux based systems. Brasser
et al. [48] extended this framework to allow secure user interaction (i.e. input
via the keyboard and output via the monitor). An enrollment procedure is
used during which a user-specific picture is sealed to the state of the trusted
application. This is done in a trusted enrollment environment (e.g. on a freshly
installed workstation, not yet connected to the Internet) so that an attacker
cannot obtain the picture of the user. Since only that specific application can
access the picture, the user is assured that the trusted application is running
if the correct picture is shown.
7.2 Related Work
Even though the solution presented above minimizes the trusted computing
base, there is no guarantee that even with a small TCB the code correctly
represents the desired functionality and that there exist no bugs that can be
exploited. Therefore, tools have been developed to check a codebase for the
existence of bugs. For instance, the seL4 microkernel, consisting of 8,700 lines
of C code and 600 lines of assembler, has been formally proven to be consistent
with its specification and free from programmer-induced implementation
errors [124]. The proof is constructed and checked in Isabelle/HOL [155],
a proof assistant for higher-order logic. Other tools for formally verifying
certain correctness properties of C programs are VeriFast [117], Why3 [94]
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and Dafny [133]. Similarly, compilers need to be verified [135] that the security
properties that are proven on the source code also hold for the compiled code.
During the development of this PhD, the developers of Flicker continued
to work on the topic. Subsequent work took a slightly different approach,
trying to overcome some of the disadvantages of the Flicker system. One
of the disadvantages of Flicker is the intensive use of TPM operations
which significantly decreases performance due to the constrained nature of
the TPM. In [190], Vasudevan et al. present an eXtensible and Modular
Hypervisor Framework (XMHF). The regular OS runs on top of a small
hypervisor. The hypervisor leverages hardware virtualization primitives to
allow the regular OS direct access to all performance-critical system devices
and device interrupts while maintaining memory integrity. This model greatly
decreases the complexity of the hypervisor (6018 lines of code) and enables high
performance due to the low hypervisor overhead. The hypervisor bootloader
uses the DRTM capabilities of modern processor to measure the integrity
of the hypervisor. A virtualized TPM [139] running as a hypapp on top
of the hypervisor and next to the regular OS is used to greatly improve
the performance of PALs. This work can, hence, be used to increase the
performance of the PAL prototypes developed with the Flicker framework
further in this text. In [212] this work is extended with a module that enables
users to establish trust in the software running on the workstation. A dedicated
hardware module with a USB interface is used to interface with the workstation.
The hardware module indicates with a red and green led when the system is
in a respectively untrusted or trusted state. A similar approach is adopted
in [179, 180].
7.3 Design
This section presents an extension of the enrollment phase proposed by Brasser
et al. [48]. A mobile device is used to verify the trustworthiness of the PAL.
The extended enrollment procedure allows the user to establish trust in a PAL
running on a workstation that is (possibly) infected by malware or untrusted
software (e.g. a workstation in a hotel, library). This increases the mobility of
the user as he is no longer restricted to his own workstation(s). The enrollment
also facilitates secure data transfer between the mobile device of the user and
the PAL.
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7.3.1 Roles
We assume a user (U) carrying a mobile device (MD) and working on a
workstation that runs a legacy operating system (W) and supports TEE
technologies for running a trusted application (PAL).
7.3.2 Requirements and Adversary Model
Functional requirements
F1 The enrollment allows the user to establish trust in a PAL running on an
untrusted workstation.
F2 The enrollment phase facilitates secure transfer of data from the mobile
device to the PAL on the workstation.
Adversary Model
We assume an attacker that can manipulate the user’s operating system
and application. Regarding the secure execution environment, the same
assumptions as those of the Trusted Computing Group [186] are made.
The system is mainly focused on protecting the user from software attacks.
Hardware (key)loggers and shoulder surfing are considered out of scope. With
respect to the cryptographic capabilities of the attacker, we follow the Dolev-
Yao attacker model [85]: attackers cannot break cryptographic primitives, but
they can perform protocol-level attacks. The mobile device is trusted by the
user.
7.3.3 General Approach
The mobile device verifies the integrity of the PAL running on the workstation
on behalf of the user. Subsequently, the mobile device allows the user to select
an authentication picture and binds the selected authentication image to the
trusted PAL on the workstation. Since only a correct PAL can access the
authentication picture, the user is assured that the trusted PAL is running on
the workstation if the correct authentication picture is shown on the monitor.
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7.3.4 Protocols
Prerequisites
The TEE technologies on the workstation are enabled in the BIOS and the
TPM has been certified (i.e. either sktpm and certtpm are generated or a DAA
credential creddaa is issued). The PAL running on the workstation of the user
has been initialized. During initialization the PAL generates a keypair (pkpal
and skpal) and seals it to its state resulting in the sealed object denoted as
keyStore. The mobile device obtained the certified PCR state of the trusted
PAL. Hence, it can verify that the application running on the workstation is
indeed the intended trusted application. A trusted third party certified the
state of the PAL after reviewing the source code. The PAL could also be
open source so that independent developers can verify that the certified state
correctly represents the desired functionality.
The mobile required the user to choose a unique authentication picture (imgu)
that will allow the user to visually verify that the software running on the
workstation is indeed trustworthy.
Enrollment
The mobile device verifies that a valid trusted application is running on the
workstation. As part of this protocol, the mobile retrieves the PAL’s public key
(pkpal), which is used to encrypt data addressed to the PAL. The mobile device
stores this public key for future authentications. We denote this protocol as
the enrollment protocol.
MD PAL W
1.cat
7. (quote, pkpal , certtpm, ws.id)
2. activatePal (keyStore)
3. pkpal = unsealPK(keyStore)
4. extend(pkpal); extend(0)
5. (pkpal)
6. quote := quote(cat)
8. verifyQuote(P AL, [pkpal , 0], certtpm, quote, cat)
b
b
b
b
9. store(pkpal , ws.id)b
Figure 7.1: The enrollment protocol (MD: Mobile Device, PAL: Piece of
Application Logic, W: Workstation).
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Figure 7.1 illustrates the steps of the enrollment protocol. First, the mobile
sends a random attestation challenge to the workstation (1). The workstation
activates the trusted PAL with the sealed keystore (2) and the PAL retrieves
its public key from the sealed keystore (3). To allow attestation that this public
key is indeed managed by the trusted application, the state is extended with
this key (4). The PAL returns its public key to the workstation which resumes
its execution (5). A quote operation on the state resulting from the PAL
execution is performed using the attestation challenge (6). As the public key
was extended in the state, this ensures the authenticity of the public key sent
to the mobile. The challenge ensures freshness of the quote. The quote, public
key, certificate and an identifier of the workstation is sent back to the mobile,
which then verifies the quote (7-8). If the quote verification was successful, the
public key is stored together with the workstation’s identifier (9).
7.4 Realization
Table 7.1 shows the hardware used for the realization of the different entities.
For the functionality of the mobile device, an Android app has been developed.
It allows the user to select an authentication picture and, during enrollment,
binds the picture to the state of the PAL. A subset of the PolarSSL [11]
library was used to realize the cryptographic operations in the PAL, namely
generating and using a keypair. The TPM is used to generate a seed for the key
generation. Further, an USB-UHCI stack was added to the Flicker framework
to enable access to USB security devices. On the workstation, the TrouSerS1
TCG software stack is used to implement the attestation of the PAL towards
the mobile device.
Our PAL application consists of two main components. The USB-UHCI stack
(1001 lines of code) and the implementation of the enrollment protocol itself
consists of 1040 lines of code. This adds a total of 2041 lines of code to the
Flicker framework, preserving a minimal trusted computing base.
Table 7.2 illustrates the performance of the prototype. The computations on
the mobile have negligible impact on the overall system performance. The PAL
and theW introduce the largest overhead as they use the constrained resources
of the TPM. The workstation uses the TPM for the quote operation, the PAL
for the unseal functionality and the establishment of the TEE.
1TrouSerS is an open source implementation of the TCG software stack, more information
can be found on http://sourceforge.net/projects/trousers.
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Table 7.1: The hardware platforms for the realization of the different entities
(MD: Mobile Device, PAL: Piece of Application Logic, W: Workstation).
Entity Realization
MD
Samsung i9000 Galaxy S: 1GHz ARM Cortex-A8, 512MB RAM
The smartphone runs Android 2.3.3
PAL, W
DELL E4200: Intel Core2 Duo U9400 @ 1.4GHz, 4GB RAM
The laptop runs Ubuntu 12.04 32-bit, 3.2.0 kernel
Table 7.2: The performance (i.e. averages and standard deviations of 30
runs) of the enrollment in milliseconds (PAL: Piece of Application Logic, W:
Workstation, MD: Mobile Device).
Performance PAL W MD
enrollment 1917±123 725±53 31±4
7.5 Evaluation
7.5.1 Requirements Review
The user relies on his mobile device to correctly verify the integrity of the PAL
running on the workstation before sealing the authentication picture to the
state of the PAL. Since, apart from the mobile device, only the PAL can access
the authentication picture, the user is assured that the trusted PAL is running
if the image is shown on the monitor, satisfying requirement F1.
During the enrollment procedure, the mobile device obtains the public key of
the PAL. Since only that PAL can access the corresponding private key, the
public key can be used to securely transfer data between the mobile device and
the PAL, satisfying requirement F2.
7.5.2 Security and Privacy Considerations
The main focus of the system is protecting the user from software attacks on
the workstation, as these are the most common and scalable types of attacks.
Although TPMs are not designed to be secure against hardware attacks, they
are not trivial to execute for regular users. Since a TPM’s credentials can be
revoked, compromising a TPM does not affect the security of the entire system.
During the enrollment procedure, malware running on the workstation could
relay the data from the mobile device to another workstation on which a trusted
104 AN ARCHITECTURE FOR TPM-BACKED IDENTITY MANAGEMENT
PAL is running, effectively enrolling the mobile with a different workstation.
When the user wants to start the PAL after finishing the enrollment procedure,
the malware on the workstation of the user could start the PAL running on the
other workstation and, subsequently, capture the image shown on the monitor
via, for instance, a camera. This allows the malware on the workstation
to show the correct image and, hence, mislead the user into believing that
the trusted PAL is running on that workstation, while it is in fact running
on another workstation. This may lead towards the user entering security
sensitive information on the workstation infected with malware. This relay
attack is described in [161] and referred to as the Cuckoo attack. The system
is, hence, more suited to use on private workstations where this attack is
much less pertinent than in a public setting. To extend the system to public
workstations, additional measures can be implemented to protect against this
attack. Several approaches have been proposed [161, 143, 97] to tackle this
problem. A QR-code containing a hash of the TPM’s public attestation key
could be embedded in the workstation’s case. The smartphone can then scan
the QR-code and verify if the TPM used to generate the attestation is embedded
in that workstation. A second approach is to trust the machine’s BIOS to
correctly transfer the TPM’s public attestation key to the smartphone. The
user reboots the machine and enters the BIOS to obtain the TPM’s public
key, before executing the enrollment phase. This assumes that the BIOS is
protected from malicious updates (e.g. by only installing signed updates).
The system relies on the mobile device to correctly verify the PAL on the
workstation and securely manage the authentication picture. The mobile device
is typically owned and managed by the user, making it more trustworthy
than workstations not managed by the user. Moreover, current mobile device
operating systems have, by default, stronger application isolation properties
than commodity workstations and the market based software management
system is more closed than their desktop counterparts. This hinders the
development and deployment of malware on these devices. However, these
operating systems also rely on a huge trusted computing base making the
existence of exploitable bugs inevitable. Moreover, some users change the
default security settings (e.g. enabling side-loading, rooting and unlocking
the bootloader) to gain more control over their device but making it more
vulnerable to malware. The impact of malware on the operating system could
be mitigated by using recent technologies that focus on establishing a trusted
execution environment on mobile devices [191, 206, 105, 177] to verify the
attestation of the workstation and seal the authentication picture to the state
of the PAL in an isolated environment.
The system assumes that the authentication picture of the user is only
accessible to the PAL. While this assumption holds under the TPM security
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assumptions for malware running on the OS, during the authentication of the
PAL towards the user the authentication picture is shown on the monitor.
This allows an attacker to capture the image by taking a picture from the
monitor and misleading the user in subsequent authentications. The current
pairing protocol, hence, may be secure on the workstation of the user but for
public areas and shared workstations, a minor modification of the enrollment
procedure is required to ensure adequate security in those settings. Instead of
sealing the authentication picture to the state of the PAL and using that image
in all subsequent authentications on that device, the enrollment procedure
should be executed each time the users wants to use the secure environment
on that system. During enrollment, the mobile device chooses a random
authentication picture from a large set of pictures and securely transfers it
to the PAL. The user can compare the image on the monitor and mobile
device to verify the integrity of the PAL. This decreases performance as
the enrollment procedure is executed more often, but increases the security
for public workstations. If the home workstation is shared by multiple
users, multi-user support could be added by requiring the user to enter a
PIN before the authentication image is shown. Another approach is used
in [192]. A dedicated embedded device with a USB interface is plugged into the
workstation. The embedded device can verify the attestation of the workstation.
If the workstation is running a specific trusted application, a light attached to
the embedded device turns green. This replaces the procedure with the mobile
device and authentication picture and, hence, prevents attacks relying on the
authentication picture. Moreover, since the functionality of the embedded
device is limited, it is less vulnerable to malware attacks compared to the
mobile device. It, however, increase the cost and requires the user to carry
around an additional device.
Recent work by Wojtczuk et al. [207, 208] also manages to compromise
the rather novel SEE implementations via security bugs in BIOS and PC
firmware. They illustrate that TPM-based TEE implementations still require
secure BIOS implementations. This can be verified using the respective TPM
PCRs representing the BIOS binary. These vulnerabilities are not specific to
our solution and should be remedied by the platform manufacturer. These
vulnerabilities are, moreover, rare and typically very hard to exploit compared
to common Trojan horse or phishing attacks. Overall, using the TEE can
increase the security of existing identity management systems.
7.5.3 Discussion
While the TPM and related technologies can be used to provide several
interesting security features, the adoption of these technologies remains very
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limited. This section discusses several problems that hinder wide adoption.
For the service provider to trust the attestation of a TPM, he must be assured
that the attestation was generated by a genuine TPM. The TPM should,
therefore, be equipped with a certificate from the TPM or platform vendor.
Many vendors, however, ship their products with uncertified TPMs. Before
users can start using the quote functionality of their TPM, a third party
should, hence, be contacted to certify the TPM. In a closed environment
such as a corporate environment, a central authority (e.g. the IT department)
can be made responsible for the TPM certification process. Each entity in
the environment trusts the certificates issued by that authority. In open
environments, such as citizens using TPM attestation functionality towards
third parties, the TPM certification is less scalable since it is not a procedure
that can be executed remotely. This hinders wide adoption of TPM based
systems that use the attestation capabilities of the TPM. The most scalable
solution would be to have the TPM/platform vendors to start certifying the
TPMs in their devices.
The TPM and TXT/SVM technologies need to be activated in the BIOS before
they can be used. Where accessing and changing BIOS settings is not an
everyday task for most computer users, it might even be an insurmountable task
for some computer users. Settings in which a central authority is responsible
for managing the hardware (e.g. the corporate application domain) could be
an interesting first validation path.
The workstation can attest towards a relying party that a certain result was
produced by a specific application. This gives a relying party assurance that
the data was generated following specific protocols. The application and its
functionality is uniquely identified/represented via its PCR values. In order
to provide meaningful attestation, the relying party should be able to check
that the application correctly implements the desired functionality. Having
each relying party go through the source code, however, is not a scalable
approach and requires considerable expertise from the relying party. Hence,
this process should be delegated to a trusted third party which can bind PCR
values with an informal description of the associated functionality and a serial
number. This trusted third party can revoke/blacklist specific versions of a
PAL if a bug is discovered by adding the serial number to the revocation list.
During the attestation process, the relying party can verify the revocation
status of the PAL by checking that the serial number is not contained in the
revocation list composed by the trusted third party. Ideally, the source code of
the PAL is also open source so that independent developers can also check if
a certain PCR state matches the desired functionality. Currently, there is no
real infrastructure in place to realize this PAL certification process. To limit
implementation flaws that could be exploited, the functionality of the PAL
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should be kept to the minimum. A small TCB decreases the chance of bugs
and suggests that formal verification is possible.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we extended a system for realizing a trusted execution
environment on commodity off-the-shelf workstations or laptops. The user
can establish trust in a software component running in the trusted execution
environment using his mobile device. Subsequently, the user can visually verify
that the trusted application is running on and in control of the workstation.
The trust can be established on workstations possible infected by malware.
The trusted execution environment can be used to increase the security and
privacy of existing identity management systems by executing security sensitive
operations in the trusted environment. Moreover, the attestation capabilities
of the TPM can be used to assert to a relying party that certain operations
were executed in a secure execution environment. This allows service providers
to enforce a minimal security level.
Chapter 8
TPM-Backed Identity
Management: Validation and
Case Studies
The previous chapter described a system for establishing trust in an application
running in a trusted execution environment on the workstation of the user.
During the enrollment procedure, a mobile phone was used to verify the
integrity of the application running in the trusted environment. The user
selected an authentication image that is bound to the trusted application. The
user is assured that, when that specific image is shown on the monitor, a specific
trusted application is running as only this trusted application has access to the
image. During enrollment, the mobile phone also retrieved the public key of the
trusted application, allowing secure transfer of data from the mobile device to
the trusted application. The trusted execution environment on the workstation
provides ample opportunities to increase the security and privacy in existing
identity management systems. This chapter explores these opportunities by
presenting two complementary case studies that each tackle several security
and privacy issues related to identity management systems/technologies. To
demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, a prototype was implemented for
both case studies.
1. Traditionally, a user requires substantial trust in workstations for
correctly handling his credentials (e.g. password/login). Unfortunately,
malware and compromised software makes them unsuitable for secure
credential management. Credentials are easily stolen and the user cannot
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trust what is being displayed on his workstation, obstructing informed
consent. Further, service providers trust the user not to share his
credentials with other users.
The first case study, client-side biometric verification, presents a new
solution that addresses these issues. Credentials are bound to the owner
using biometrics, effectively impeding abuse through credential sharing
and theft. Binding the user’s biometrics to an X.509 certificate can, for
instance, be achieved by including a cryptographic hash of the biometric
template in the certificate. The biometric verification is performed on
the client side, preserving the privacy of the user. The solution ensures
that the user is correctly informed about the pending authentication,
preventing abuse by malware.
2. Smart cards are popular devices for storing authentication credentials
because they are easily (trans)portable and offer a secure way for storing
these credentials. They have, however, a few disadvantages. First, most
smart cards do not have a user interface. Hence, if the smart card
requires a PIN, users typically have to enter it via an (untrusted) terminal.
Some smart cards contain a limited user interface (i.e. a PIN pad with
a small display). This interface is used as an alternative to the regular
contact/contactless interface. The user manually transfers the challenge
from the terminal to the smart card, confirms the transaction with his
PIN and, subsequently, enters the response generated by the card in the
terminal. However, if larger amounts of data (e.g. certificates, identity
information) need to be transferred from the card to the terminal, this
is not a feasible solution. Alternatively, a smart card reader with PIN
pad and display can be used. This is a convenient solution if such a
reader is available. However, currently far from most smart card readers
have an embedded PIN pad. For instance, some laptops have a smart
card reader built-in. These require the user to enter his PIN via the
keyboard. Second, smart cards are resource constrained devices which
impedes the adoption of advanced privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs)
such as anonymous credentials or, at least, they require quite a lot of
assistance (collaboration) from that same untrusted workstation.
The second case study, increasing security and privacy in eID authen-
tication, presents a new solution that addresses these issues. It allows
users to securely enter their PIN via the workstation and transfer
it to the smart card. The solution further extends existing smart
card assisted authentication technology based on X.509 credentials with
privacy-preserving features such as multi-show unlinkability and selective
disclosure. The system can, hence, be used to improve the privacy
properties of these rolled-out infrastructures. It improves the security
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of the user interface (i.e. secure input of PIN) and preserves the privacy
of the user (i.e. selective disclosure of user attributes).
8.1 Client-Side Biometric Verification
Merely using digital credential technologies is not sufficient to fulfill the complex
security and privacy requirements of identity management systems. Credential
technologies themselves, for instance, do not prevent users from sharing their
credentials (e.g. digital credentials can be copied and distributed among users).
Moreover, credentials can also be abused by malicious software. For instance,
malicious software can use the credentials of the user to access personalized
services, without consent of the user. This impedes abuse detection and
consequently credential revocation.
These issues can be tackled by binding the credentials to the owner. This
section presents a new solution for activating credentials bound to the owner
by means of biometrics. The verification is performed on the workstation by an
application running in a trusted execution environment. It therefore uses the
system described in the previous chapter. In the prototype solution the user’s
credentials are stored on his mobile device and are bound to his biometrics.
Both the biometric scan and its binding to the credential are verified in the
TEE at the client side, trusted by both the user and the service provider.
This strategy avoids leaking biometric information to, for instance, the service
provider and requires no additional hardware infrastructure to be rolled out.
The contribution of this section is threefold. First, it presents a solution for
the secure verification of biometric traits on a workstation by applying TEE
technologies. Second, access to remote services is controlled by credentials that
can only be used after a successful biometric verification on the workstation.
A mobile device is used to carry the user’s credentials. Third, a prototype
implementation of the system was realized, validating our solution. For the
implementation, a biometric scanner driver and algorithm were added to the
Flicker framework.
8.1.1 Related Work
Some credential systems such as the Identity Mixer library [58] provide all-or-
nothing non-transferability to discourage users from sharing their credentials.
All the credentials of the user are tied together. Hence, assuming that the
user owns at least one valuable credential, he will not be willing to share
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his credentials with other users. A similar approach is PKI-assured non-
transferability where the credentials are bound to a valuable secret outside
the system (e.g. credit card information). Whereas these systems focus on the
discouragement of credential sharing, the system proposed in this section also
addresses abuse prevention after theft and informed consent (i.e. the owner
of the used credential confirms or aborts the transaction based on the correct
transaction information).
Another approach to prevent digital credentials from easily being copied or
shared is by embedding them inside tamperproof hardware. The system
proposed in [51] leverages the DAA [49] protocol, available in Trusted Platform
Modules (TPMs) of modern workstations, to bind the user’s anonymous
credentials to a TPM. Similarly, smart cards are used to implement anonymous
credential systems [35, 178, 201, 34, 150]. Although smart cards prevent
the credentials from being copied, they do not fully prevent sharing of the
credentials. Moreover, anonymous credential systems have other unsolved
issues, such as their performance and correctly informing which information
is being disclosed.
Biometry can be used to uniquely identify a person [119, 118]. Commonly used
biometric traits include a fingerprint, iris, face and voice. A special purpose
sensor device is used to read the biometric trait of the user. During enrollment,
a distinguishing feature set is extracted from the biometric data and stored as
a biometric template (BTu) of the user. During authentication, the user scans
his biometric trait (BioScan) and the resulting feature set is matched to the
feature set contained in the template of the user. Based on the similarity of
the two sets, the authentication is either accepted or rejected (BioVerify).
Biometrics can, hence, be used to bind credentials to the owner. For
instance, in [114, 39] the wallet with observer architecture [66] is extended
to include biometric authentication towards the observer. The user is issued a
tamperproof card containing his credential and biometric template. To use the
credential in the card, the holder is required to scan his biometric data. Only
if the scanned data matches the template stored in the card, the credential
is activated. As an example, a privacy preserving identity card has been
designed [78, 79] taking advantage of this approach. Another approach [37] uses
fuzzy extractors [83, 84] to generate a cryptographic key based on the retrieved
biometric features. This key is never stored and the tamperproof device is
trusted to erase the value after authentication. Hence, fresh biometric readings
are required to reconstruct the cryptographic key. These systems focus on the
prevention of abuse through theft and sharing, but do not fully realize the
aspect of informed consent. This is especially important in case anonymous
credentials are used. Moreover, tamperproof devices rarely receive software
updates and their resource constrained nature impedes the performance of
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complex credential technologies.
8.1.2 Design
This section first lists the different actors in the system, followed by the
requirements and a general description of the system. Finally, a detailed
description of the protocols is presented.
Roles
We assume a user (U), carrying a mobile device (MD). The mobile device stores
the user’s credentials and is used as a credential vault for accessing remote
services (SP) from the workstation. The workstation runs a legacy operating
system (W) and supports TEE technologies for running a trusted application
(PAL). A biometric scanner is attached to the workstation.
Requirements
Functional Requirements.
F1 The system uses the user’s credential to authenticate the user towards
the service provider.
F2 The system is extensible and modular, allowing for new biometric systems
or algorithms and credential technologies to be included.
F3 When vulnerabilities are found in the system, software updates are easily
applied.
Security and Privacy Requirements.
S1 The service provider is assured that the owner of the credential approved
the authentication.
S2 Malicious software cannot mislead the user into approving malicious
signing transactions or authentication attempts.
P1 The system protects the biometric information of the user.
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General Approach
A user authenticates on the workstation towards a remote service provider. The
service provider requires that the user proves ownership of the used credentials,
before allowing access to its services. To his end, the user’s credentials are
bound to his biometrics. Binding the user’s biometrics to an X.509 certificate
can, for instance, be done by including a cryptographic hash of the biometric
template in the certificate. For other types of credentials such as anonymous
credentials similar principles can be applied. The verification of the biometric
binding is further denoted as verifyBinding. The verification of the biometric
binding between the credentials and the user is performed by a dedicated
trusted application (i.e. the PAL). In addition, the PAL informs the user about
the details of the pending authentication. This ensures that malware cannot
mislead the user into approving malicious transactions. This is especially
important in case anonymous credentials are used, as the user should give
consent on the selective disclosure of attributes. The quote functionality of
the TPM is used to assert to service providers that a trusted PAL properly
executed the verification. The credentials and biometric data are stored on
the mobile device of the user and are only released towards the trusted PAL,
running on the workstation. This ensures that the user does not release his
biometric data to malicious applications.
Adversary and Trust Model
The same adversary model as the previous chapter is used. The PAL is
trusted by both the user and the service provider. The user trusts the PAL
not to release his biometric information to third parties and for informed
consent regarding the pending authentication. The service provider trusts the
PAL to correctly verify the biometric binding between the user and the used
credential(s). This trust is supported by the attestation of the PAL towards the
service provider and mobile. The state of the trusted PAL can be certified by a
trusted third party. The PAL should also be open source so that independent
developers can verify that the certified state correctly represents the desired
functionality.
Protocols
Prerequisites. The user has gone through the enrollment phase as described in
the previous chapter. Hence, the user knows the trusted PAL is running if the
correct picture is shown and the mobile device can securely transfer information
to the PAL using the latter’s public key obtained during enrollment. The
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service provider obtained the certified PCR state of the trusted PAL. Hence,
the service provider can verify that the application running on the workstation
is indeed the intended trusted application. A credential issuer issues credentials
bound to the user’s biometrics, which are stored on the user’s mobile device.
User Authentication. Figure 8.1 presents the protocol for authenticating the
user towards a remote service provider. First, the user requests access to a
protected resource from the remote service provider (1). The provider responds
with an authentication request containing its certificate, an authentication
challenge and an attestation challenge (2). The mobile now receives the
authentication challenge, certificate of the service provider and a unique
identifier of the workstation (3). The mobile informs the user about the
workstation on which the authentication will be performed and towards
which service provider (4). If the user acknowledges, the mobile signs the
authentication challenge with the user’s credential and encrypts the signature,
the user’s authentication certificate, the biometric template and the user’s
unique image using the public key of the PAL (5-7). The encryption is sent to
the workstation where it is then passed as a parameter to the PAL, together
with the PAL’s sealed keys in keyStore (8-9). The PAL now unseals its private
key to decrypt the encrypted data enc (10-11). Subsequently, the binding
between the biometric template and the authentication credential is verified
(12). If the verification succeeds, the user is informed about the pending
authentication and requested to scan his biometric data. The user’s unique
image is shown to indicate to the user that the trusted environment is running
(13). The user can, hence, trust all information shown on the monitor. To
acknowledge the authentication, the user scans his biometric data using the
biometric scanner attached to the workstation (14). As the PAL is in complete
control of the workstation, it can directly interact with the hardware. This
ensures that the data shown on the monitor and read from the biometric scanner
cannot be tampered with. The PAL can now verify if the biometric template
matches with the scanned biometric data (15). Upon successful verification,
the PAL is assured that the user is the owner of the authentication credentials
and extends its state with the signature, authentication certificate and the
certificate of the service provider (16). The PAL ends its execution and returns
the user’s signature and certificate back to the regular OS, that resumes its
operation (17). The OS now performs a quote operation on the state resulting
from the PAL execution (18). This quote attests towards the service provider
that the trusted PAL indeed verified the biometric binding (i.e. the PAL state
is extended with the user’s certificate and signature) and that the user was
shown the correct information about the service provider (i.e. the PAL state
is extended with the service provider’s certificate). The resulting quote is sent
to the service provider along with sig, certu and certtpm (19). The service
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provider now verifies the quote, the user’s certificate and signature (20-21).
Upon success, the service provider grants access to the requested resource (22).
U MD SPPAL W
1. page_request
2. (certsp, cauth, cat)
3. (cauth, certsp, ws.id)
4. show (ws.id, certsp)
5. proceed
6. sig = sign(cauth, sku)
7. enc = encrypt([sig, certu, certsp,BTu, imgu], pkpal)
8. enc
9. activatePal (enc, keyStore)
10. skpal = unsealSK(keyStore)
11. [sig, certu, certsp,BTu, imgu] = decrypt(enc, skpal)
12. verifyBinding (BTu, certu)
13. requestBioScan (certsp, imgu)
14. bio_features := BioScan()
15. BioVerify(bio_features,BTu)
16. extend(sig||certu||certsp); extend(0)
17. (sig, certu)
18. quote := quote(cat, sktpm)
19. (sig, certu, quote, certtpm)
20. verifyQuote(P AL, [(sig||certu||certsp), 0], quote, certtpm, cat)
22. returnPage
21. verifySig(certu , sig, cauth)
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
Figure 8.1: The authentication protocol (U : User, MD: Mobile Device, PAL:
Piece of Application Logic, W: Workstation, SP; Service Provider).
8.1.3 Realization
For the realization of the prototype, an off-the-shelf USB fingerprint scanner
(i.e. Eikon II UPEK [2] fingerprint reader) was used as biometric reader. The
user’s credential is a X.509 certificate with a 1024-bit RSA key. The user’s
fingerprint template is bound to his authentication credential by including a
cryptographic hash of the fingerprint template in the X.509 certificate. The
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same hardware is used as in the previous chapter for the realization of the
different entities.
For the functionality of the mobile device, an Android app has been developed.
The service provider is implemented on an Apache Tomcat [1] server. Spring
Security [13] is used to enforce its access control policy. A Spring authentication
module was added to handle the custom authentication protocol. Nevertheless,
the focus of the prototype lies in the development of the software components
on the workstation. The user accesses the service provider via the browser
on the workstation. When authentication is required, the authentication
request (bioauth:authRequestData) is forwarded to a local application on the
workstation. For demonstration purposes a bidirectional network connection
is setup between the local application and the mobile device. To this end,
a QR code, containing the workstation’s IP address, is displayed by the
local application and scanned with the mobile device. Using this IP address,
the mobile connects to the workstation and uses this channel for further
communication. The local application also informs the user about the progress
of the authentication protocol. Note that the actual authentication is delegated
to a background daemon that accepts incoming TCP/IP connections from the
mobile of the user and has the required privileges to suspend the OS and start
the PAL.
For the biometric verification, a fingerprint driver for the Eikon reader was
implemented on top of the USB-UHCI stack. For parsing X.509 certificates
and other cryptographic operation, parts of the PolarSSL [11] library were used.
When the PAL has finished execution, the daemon uses the TrouSerS [14] TCG
software stack to implement the quote operation which is used to attest the PAL
towards the service provider.
Our PAL application consists of three main components. The Eikon fingerprint
driver (447 lines of code) running on top of the USB-UHCI stack (1001 lines
of code). The implementation of the PAL protocol itself consists of 1040 lines
of code. This adds a total of 2488 lines of code to the Flicker framework,
preserving a minimal trusted computing base.
Table 8.1 illustrates the performance of the prototype. The computations on
the mobile and server have negligible impact on the overall system performance.
The PAL and the W introduce the largest overhead as they use the constrained
resources of the TPM. The workstation uses the TPM for the quote operation,
the PAL for the unseal functionality and the establishment of the SEE. The
actual scanning of the fingerprint is not included in the measurement to avoid
impact of the user interaction. The measurements of the PAL, however, do
include the initialization of the USB stack and fingerprint driver. Once, the
reader is initialized, the actual swiping is only a fraction of the total time.
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Although the authentication phase of the PAL is the most time consuming
operation, the user experience isn’t degraded as some operations can be
performed while the user is reviewing the authentication details on the monitor.
Table 8.1: The performance (i.e. averages and standard deviations of 30 runs)
of the authentication in milliseconds (PAL: Piece of Application Logic, W:
Workstation, MD: Mobile Device, SP: Service Provider).
Performance PAL W MD SP
Authentication 4553±153 748±56 42±3 8±0
8.1.4 Evaluation
Requirements Review
Functional Requirements. The mobile device signs the authentication
challenge of the service provider with the user’s authentication credential. The
authentication response is transferred to the service provider over a secure
channel, authenticating the user (cf. F1). The PAL can easily be updated by
distributing a new binary to the workstation and certifying the new state of
the application with the mobile device of the users and the service providers.
This can be managed by a trusted third party that certifies and revokes these
states. The software on the mobile device and server can be updated using
traditional mechanisms. This allows the integration of additional biometric
and/or credential technologies and security updates to be installed, satisfying
requirements F2 and F3.
Security and Privacy Requirements. The authentication credentials of the
user are bound to his biometrics. The PAL ensures the correct verification of
the user’s biometrics before asserting the authentication. The service provider
can verify the assertion and, hence, check that the actual owner authorized the
authentication, satisfying requirement S1.
The mobile device verifies integrity of the PAL running on the workstation,
before sending any personal data. Moreover, the user is assured that the trusted
application is running, as his personal picture imgu is shown on the workstation.
The user is, hence, assured that the provided information about the pending
authentication is correct. Furthermore, the PAL binds the verification process
to the service provider presented to the user. This satisfies security requirement
S2.
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In the prototype, the biometric template of the user is bound to the user’s
certificate by including a cryptographic hash of the template in the certificate.
This prevents biometric information of the user from being leaked when the
certificate is released. The mobile device only discloses the biometric template
to a trusted PAL (i.e. the PAL does not reveal the fingerprint to a third party)
over a secure channel. Moreover, the user can verify that a trusted PAL is
running when scanning his fingerprint. This prevents freshly scanned biometric
information of the user from being leaked, satisfying requirement P1.
Security and Privacy Considerations
Currently, the system assumes that all service providers require biometric
verification. If a service provider does not require this proof of ownership,
malware running on the workstation could mislead the user into authenticating
to this service provider. If not all service providers require biometric
verification, the protocol requires some minor modifications to ensure that
an authentication response for a trusted service provider is not abused to
authenticate the user towards a service provider that does not require biometric
verification. One simple solution could be to have the mobile verify the service
provider’s certificate and encrypt the user’s signature with the contained public
key.
Ideally, the biometric reader used for obtaining a biometric scan of the user
is bound to the workstation on which the user is working. However, most
biometric scanners are plug-and-play and can easily be removed and replaced
with other hardware devices. If a fingerprint scan is eavesdropped, it can
be replayed as a fresh reading. This risk can be mitigated by implementing a
cryptographic protocol between the trusted application and the reader to ensure
freshness of the scan. Although hard to achieve, to prevent relay attacks, the
PAL should also be able to verify that the used biometric reader is actually
attached to the workstation on which the PAL is running.
The system presented in this section increases the user’s privacy with respect
to the biometric authentication. Nevertheless, this system is easily extended
to further increase privacy by supporting anonymous credentials in which
no linkable information should be released to the service provider. In the
prototype, the quote generation requires a certificate bound to the TPM. This
makes all transactions performed on a single workstation linkable. Therefore,
modern TPMs also support the DAA protocol. This protocol allows anonymous
attestation of the platform. As such, the system only leaks the state of the PAL
and the data disclosed during the user authentication.
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The system focuses on protecting the authentication credentials/process from
malware on the workstation. However, after the user has established an
authenticated channel from the workstation to the service provider, malware
could take over the established channel and access the service. The system,
hence, does not fully neutralize the impact of malware on the workstation
but limits the scope of the abuse to the session established by the user. To
increase the security, high value transactions can be processed by the trusted
application.
Note that it is even possible to support password based authentication with
our system. In that case the certification authority should bind the biometric
data to the login or username.
Applicability
This section discusses three possible application domains in which the system
presented in this section can be used to realize increased security compared
to currently deployed systems, namely secure corporate networks, eID systems
and online banking.
Secure corporate networks allow local and remote employees to login with
their workstation to the corporate network and access protected resources.
Using the biometric authentication system, the authentication server is assured
that the correct employee is working on the device. This mitigates the impact
of an attacker getting access to a device on which the authentication credentials
are stored or company employees sharing their credentials, bypassing the access
rights associated to their credential. This is a complementary solution to the
Trusted Network Connect (TNC) [185] architecture proposed by the Trusted
Computing Group (TCG).
eID systems typically allow the user to access a wide range of personal services.
This can go from very privacy sensitive services such as online tax submission
to less privacy sensitive services such as pay-per-view news site. While these
privacy sensitive services will typically only be accessed from a trusted home
computer, other services might be accessed on workstations not fully trusted
by the user. However, when using the same authentication credentials for the
privacy sensitive and the other services, malware on an untrusted workstation
could use the authentication credentials to access other services than requested
by the user. The system presented in this section prevents this type of abuse
by correctly informing the user about the service which will be accessed and
can, hence, be used as an alternative to a smart card reader with a pin pad
and a display.
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Online banking enables a wide variety of banking services (e.g. viewing the
status of your bank accounts, loans and execute bank transactions) via a
workstation connected to the Internet. The user owns a credential with which
he can log in and authorize transactions (e.g. wire transfer).
In current eBanking systems this secret is stored in an smart card (i.e. the
bank card of the user). To authorize transactions, the details of the transaction
are transferred to the bank card that subsequently generates an authorization
response. This approach protects the credentials of the user but is vulnerable
to phishing attacks. To prevent fishing attacks banks can use an oﬄine device
in which the user can insert his card to generate Transaction Authentication
Numbers (TANs) based on information entered by the user in the device.
To increase usability, banks can have users only enter partial information
about the transaction (e.g. the amount and the last four numbers of the
destination bank account). If only partial transaction information is entered,
targeted attacks are still possible. Our approach tackles this since the secure
execution environment application correctly informs the user about the pending
transaction. It, moreover, replaces PIN authentication of the user with stronger
biometric authentication.
Comparison with Existing Systems
As discussed in related work, several systems for misuse protection of
credentials exist. For this comparison, the existing systems are categorized
as follows. Hardware based protection (HBP) systems [51, 35, 201] rely on
tamperproof hardware to prevent credentials from being digitally copied and,
hence, easily abused. Software based protection (SBP) systems [58] rely on
binding the credentials of the user to a valuable secret of the user, discouraging
users to share their credentials. Finally, biometry-based protection (BBP)
systems [114, 39, 66, 79, 78, 37] embed the user’s credentials in a tamperproof
module that requires biometric authentication of the user before the credentials
can be used. The results of the comparison are summarized in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2: Comparison between the system proposed in this section and existing
misuse protection systems.
HBP SBP BBP Our system
Informed consent No No No Yes
HW resources Constr. Powerful Constr. Powerful
Protection Copy prev. Disc. sharing Bio. bind. Bio. bind.
Flexibility Low High Low High
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the owner of the used credential confirms or aborts the transaction based on
the correct transaction information
Informed consent ensures that the owner of the credential confirms or aborts
the transaction based on the correct transaction information. The tamperproof
hardware components used in HBP and BBP systems typically do not
allow direct communication with the user. Therefore, other, potentially
compromised, devices are required to inform the user about the transaction.
In SBP systems, the credential operations are typically executed on a regular
workstation. In the system presented in this section, the trusted application
has full control over the hardware of the workstation and can, therefore, use
the monitor to reliably inform the user about the transaction. Note that the
BBP system could realize similar features if a smart card reader with a display
and biometric scanner is used.
The HBP and BBP both rely on tamperproof hardware components to store the
user’s credentials and execute the credential and biometric operations. These
devices are typically resource constrained limiting the usage of computationally
intensive credential technologies such as anonymous credentials and the number
of authentication credentials that can be stored inside those devices. The SBP
and the system proposed in this section are implemented on a general purpose
workstation.
The HBP system implements misuse protection by embedding the credentials in
a tamperproof module preventing them from being digitally copied. The SBP
system discourages the user from sharing his credentials. The BBP and the
approach discussed in this section both implement misuse protection by binding
the credentials to a specific user using biometrics. The solution presented in
this section, however, could easily be extended to support these credentials
without checking the biometric binding.
The HBP and BBP both rely on tamperproof modules for executing credential
and biometry related operations. The software installed on these modules is
typically difficult to update providing less flexibility compared to the SBP and
the system presented in this section. These systems run on general purpose
hardware in which updates can be part of the update infrastructure of the
operating system.
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8.2 Increasing Security and Privacy in eID Authen-
tication
This section presents the second case study of this chapter. Many governments
are issuing eID cards that enable citizens to authenticate and prove several
personal properties (e.g. name, address, birthdate). This allows the user to
establish a secure authenticated session between a workstation and a remote
service provider. The remote service provider can control access to his service
based on the released information. These identity card systems are often
implemented using a smart card to protect the credentials of the user. Typically
user consent (e.g. via a PIN) is required before the credentials can be used for
authentication.
These systems, however, also have multiple drawbacks. First, as with many
smart card based systems, there is no trusted interface with the card [101, 26].
The user typically enters his PIN via the workstation. This allows malware
on the workstation to misinform the user about the pending transaction [120,
175] or intercept the PIN which may lead to further abuse. More advanced
smart card readers with a PIN pad could tackle this problem. They, however,
come at a higher cost than regular card readers and are, hence, a less popular
choice. Further, many laptops have built-in smart card readers that also rely
on the laptop for user interaction. Second, many systems use X.509 credential
technology to authenticate the user. This type of credential, however, does not
offer the same privacy preserving features as anonymous credential systems.
This section presents a strategy that tackles these issues using the setup
presented in the previous chapter. The PIN of the user is entered via the TEE
application that runs on the workstation of the user. This prevents malware
on the workstation from intercepting, and consequently abusing the PIN. To
improve the user’s privacy, the TEE application also acts as an authentication
proxy. The eID authenticates towards the TEE application that subsequently
attests the authentication towards the remote service provider. The attestation
is realized using privacy preserving credential technologies. It, hence, does
not require releasing uniquely identifiable information, allowing multi-show
unlinkability. The TEE application can choose to release only a subset of
the information contained in the eID, realizing selective disclosure.
The contribution of this section is twofold. First, it presents a solution
that allows users to securely enter their PIN via a workstation to activate
the authentication credentials on their smart card. The solution further
extends existing smart card assisted authentication technology based on X.509
credentials with privacy-preserving features such as multi-show unlinkability
and selective disclosure. It can, for instance, be used to increase the privacy
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and security of several governmental electronic identity infrastructures [22, 110,
70, 75]. It, therefore, applies the secure virtualization technologies contained
on the workstation. Second, a prototype implementation of this system is
presented to validate our solution. For the prototype, a CCID stack is added
to an existing framework for building SEE applications. The CCID standard
specifies the communication protocols between an USB host and a smart card
reader. It is supported by most commercial smart card readers.
8.2.1 Design
This section first lists the different actors in the system, followed by the
requirements and a general description of the system. Finally, a detailed
description of the protocols is presented.
Roles
We assume a user (U) working on a workstation (W) that runs a legacy
operating system and supports TEE technologies for running a trusted
application (PAL). A smart card reader is attached to the workstation. The
user also carries a smart card (SC), from a rolled-out eID infrastructure, that
contains an X.509 authentication credential (i.e. X.509 certificate and private
key) of the user. This is used to authenticate the user to a remote service
provider (SP) via the workstation. Before authentication, the user needs to
unlock the credential on his smart card using his PIN.
Requirements
S1 Malware running on the workstation cannot intercept the PIN of the user.
S2 Malicious software cannot mislead the user into approving a malicious
signing transaction/authentication attempt or disclosing more informa-
tion than desired by the user.
S3 The user can select which attributes are disclosed to the service provider.
If no uniquely identifying attributes are disclosed, service providers
cannot link different authenticated sessions.
S4 The service provider is assured that the attributes released during
authentication are certified by a trusted CA.
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General Approach
The user authenticates towards a remote service provider via a workstation
using his smart card. Instead of using the X.509 credentials on the smart card
to authenticate towards the service provider, they are used to authenticate
towards a trusted PAL running on the workstation. To this end, the public
key of the CA (pkca) is embedded in the PAL binary. During authentication,
the user is required to enter his PIN. Instead of entering the PIN via the
regular operating system, the OS is suspended and the trusted PAL is started
to handle the input of the PIN and the authentication by the smart card.
This protects the PIN from being intercepted by malware running on the
workstation. The PAL verifies the authentication and can, subsequently,
selectively attest the attributes, obtained during the authentication, towards
the service provider using the quote functionality of the TPM. Since the TPM’s
anonymous attestation capabilities (i.e. DAA) can be used for the attestation,
no information but the selectively disclosed attributes, the fact that the user
had a valid credential and that the filtering was performed by a known trusted
application is released. The trusted PAL not only acts as an authentication
proxy between the eID and the service provider, it also gives the user control
over the attributes released to the specified service provider. This prevents
malware running on the workstation from misleading the user into approving
malicious transactions.
Adversary and Trust Model
The same adversary model as the previous chapter is used. The PAL is trusted
by both the user and the service provider. The user trusts the PAL for informed
consent regarding the pending authentication. The service provider trusts the
PAL for the provisioning of the user’s information.. This trust is supported by
the attestation of the PAL towards the service provider and mobile. The state
of the trusted PAL can be certified by a trusted third party. The PAL should
also be open source so that independent developers can verify that the certified
state correctly represents the desired functionality.
Protocols
Prerequisites. The user has gone through the enrollment phase as described
in the previous chapter. After the enrollment phase, the user selected an
authentication picture (imgu) on the mobile device which was subsequently
encrypted with the public of the PAL (encimg) and transferred to the
workstation where it was stored. Hence, the user knows the trusted PAL is
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running if the correct picture (imgu) is shown. The service provider obtained
the certified PCR state of the trusted PAL.
User Authentication. Figure 8.2 presents the protocol for authenticating the
user towards a remote service provider. First, the user requests access to a
protected resource from the remote service provider (1). The provider responds
with an authentication request containing its certificate, the attribute request
(i.e. a list of identifiers representing the attributes that need to be released) and
an attestation challenge (2). Subsequently, the PAL is started and the attribute
request is passed as a parameter, together with the encrypted authentication
image (encimg) and the certificate of the service provider (certsp) (3). The
PAL now unseals encimg (4). The user is subsequently informed by the
PAL regarding the pending authentication and requested to enter his PIN.
Meanwhile, the user’s unique image is shown to indicate to the user that the
trusted environment is running (5). The user can, hence, trust the information
shown on the display. To acknowledge the authentication, the user enters his
PIN (6). The PAL can now unlock the credentials on the smart card using the
obtained PIN and send an authentication challenge to the smart card (7). If the
PIN verification succeeds (8), the card signs the authentication challenge and
transfers the resulting signature (sig) and the authentication certificate (certu)
to the PAL (9-10). The PAL now verifies the authentication (11-12). If the
authentication verification succeeds, the PAL extracts the requested attributes
(atts) from the authentication certificate (13). The PAL extends its state with
the requested attributes and the certificate of the service provider (14). The
PAL ends its execution and returns the user’s attributes back to the regular OS,
that resumes its operation (15). The OS now performs a quote operation on the
state resulting from the PAL execution (16). This quote attests towards the
service provider that the trusted PAL indeed obtained the user’s attributes from
a valid smart card (i.e. the PAL state is extended with the user’s attributes)
and that the user was shown the correct information about the service provider
(i.e. the PAL state is extended with the service provider’s certificate). The
resulting quote is sent to the service provider along with atts (17). The service
provider now verifies the quote and, hereby, checks the authenticity of the
received attributes (18). Upon success, the service provider grants access to
the requested resource (19).
8.2.2 Realization and Validation
This section validates and illustrates the feasibility of our approach by
developing a prototype for the Belgian eID infrastructure. Several service
providers, both commercial and governmental, use the eID infrastructure to
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U SC SPPAL W
1. page_request
2. (certsp, atReq, cat)
10. sig, certu
7. cauth
9. sig = sign(cauth, sku)
3. activatePal (encimg, atReq, certsp)
4. imgu = unsealSK(encimg)
6. pincode
14. extend(atts||certsp); extend(0)
15. atts
16. quote := quote(cat, creddaa)
17. (atts, quote)
18. verifyQuote(P AL, [(atts||certsp), 0], quote, cat)
19. returnPage
11. verifySig(certu , sig, cauth)
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
5. requestPIN (certsp, atReq, imgu)
12. verifyCert(certu , pkca)
b 13. atts = getAttributes(certu, atReq)
b 8. verifyPIN (pincode)
Figure 8.2: Privacy friendly authentication using X.509 credentials (U : User,
SE: Secure Element, PAL: Piece of Application Logic, W: Workstation, SP:
Service Provider).
handle user authentication. To test the compatibility with these existing service
providers, the prototype is forced to release the entire authentication certificate.
Adding the selective disclosure parts of the protocol, however, does not pose
any additional technical challenges but requires some additional logic at the
service provider.
The Belgian electronic identity card contains an RSA private key and an X.509
certificate that is used for user authentication. This credential is activated
via the PIN of the user. The government provides a middleware package that
needs to be installed on the workstation of the user. It offers an interface
(i.e. PKCS#11) that other applications (e.g. the browser) can use to support
eID authentication. It handles the communication to the card and allows the
user to enter his PIN. For authentication towards a remote service provider
via the browser, the card is typically used to set up a mutually authenticated
HTTPS session between the browser and the service provider. The browser uses
the PKCS#11 interface made available by the middleware during the HTTPS
handshake.
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The same hardware is used as in the previous chapter for the realization of
the different entities. A smartphone (MD) is used in the enrollment procedure
during which the user seals an authentication image to the state of the trusted
PAL. On the workstation, Ubuntu 12.04 is running. The PKCS#11 module of
the existing middleware has been modified so that the operations requiring a
verified PIN are delegated to the trusted PAL. The software architecture of the
prototype software on the workstation is shown in Figure 8.3. When Firefox is
used to access a remote protected resource, the browser calls the PKCS#11 token
to authenticate the user. The PKCS#11 token calls the SEE driver to delegate
any operations requiring a verified PIN to the PAL. For the PAL application,
a CCID driver was implemented on top of the USB-UHCI stack. This allows
the PAL to communicate with the eID inserted in the smart card reader. The
PAL further contains a minimal version of the eID middleware to unlock and
use the credentials on the eID.
Our PAL application consists of three main components. The CCID driver
and eID middleware (646 lines of code) run on top of the USB-UHCI stack
(1214 lines of code). The implementation of the PAL protocol itself consists
of 781 lines of code. This adds a total of 2641 lines of code to the Flicker
framework, preserving a limited trusted computing base. Although adding
the selective disclosure part of the protocol (filtering of attributes, parsing of
the access control policy, etc) will slightly increase the TCB, it will remain
sufficiently small to suggest that it can be formally verified not to contain
common vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows. In terms of performance, the
whole authentication process takes about seven seconds compared to about two
seconds for the regular authentication process.
The prototype has been tested with several existing service providers. The
system only requires the user to install the modified middleware, no modifica-
tion of the browser or service provider are required. The selective disclosure
functionality, however, does require adding some additional logic to the service
provider. A similar implementation approach can be taken for other European
eID cards as many (e.g. Italy [22], Spain [110] and Portugal [70]) use a similar
design to that of the Belgian eID.
8.2.3 Evaluation
Requirements Review
During authentication the user is assured that the trusted application is running
by displaying the personal image. Since the personal image is only accessible
to the trusted PAL and the user only enters his PIN if the correct image is
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Figure 8.3: Overview of the software architecture of the prototype.
shown, the PAL is in full control of the workstation during the entering of
the PIN. Hence, malware running in the OS cannot intercept the entered PIN.
This satisfies security requirement S1. Similarly, the user is assured that the
provided information about the pending authentication is correct. The PAL
binds the authentication proof to the service provider shown to the user by
extending its state with the service provider’s certificate. This satisfies security
requirement S2.
During the authentication of the eID to the PAL, the latter obtains all of
the user’s attributes contained on the card. The PAL, however, filters the
received information and only releases the attributes required to satisfy the
access control policy of the service provider. This allows the user to selectively
disclose attributes. The DAA protocol used for attestation does not require
releasing uniquely identifying information, satisfying requirement S3.
The PAL verifies the authenticity of the used smart card via a challenge-
response protocol using the key of the CA which is embedded in the PAL
binary. The PAL only continues the authentication process if a valid smart
card is used. The service provider is assured that a trusted PAL checked the
validity of the used smart card via the attestation protocol. Hence, the service
provider is assured that only users with a valid smart card can authenticate. If
attributes are released, they are included in the assertion. The service provider,
hence, is assured that the released attributes are obtained from a genuine smart
card. This satisfies requirement S4.
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Security and Privacy Considerations
Currently, the user trusts his mobile device to correctly verify the integrity
of the PAL. This additional hardware component allows the system to be
used with existing rolled out identity card infrastructures. It however, also
introduces an additional trust relationship (i.e. user and mobile device). If the
software on the smart card would be extended to include the verification of the
PAL environment, the user would no longer need a mobile device to use the
system. Moreover, the software running on the smart card is more trustworthy
than software running on a mobile device.
Identity cards that have been stolen or otherwise compromised can be revoked.
This has no impact on the trusted PIN input system as the service provider
receives the authentication certificate and can, hence, check the revocation
status. In the privacy friendly authentication system, however, the service
provider only receives the attributes released by the PAL. The PAL, therefore,
is responsible for checking the revocation status of the card. If the revocation
list contains a limited number of serial numbers, it can be passed along to the
PAL as an argument. The PAL checks the signature on the revocation list and
then uses the revocation list to check the revocation status of the eID. In case
the revocation list is too large, the PAL generates a nonce that is transferred to
an OCSP server together with the serial number of the eID. The nonce should
be transferred via the regular OS to the OCSP server to ensure that the PAL
doesn’t have to contain networking drivers which would bloat the TCB. The
response is subsequently transferred back to the PAL that can now verify the
revocation status of the card. The use of OCSP, however, also has privacy
implications. Timing attacks could be used by the relying party and OCSP
server to link the identity of the user to the service request.
8.3 Conclusion
This chapter presented two case studies in which the system presented in the
previous chapter is applied to increase the security and/or privacy of identity
management systems.
In the first case study a new solution for activating credentials bound to its
owner by means of biometrics. It assures that users are physically present when
their credentials are used, effectively impeding credential sharing and abuse
by theft. Moreover, credential abuse by malware is prevented by isolating
the credential operations in a secure environment on a workstation. Apart
from the hardware support available in modern commodity workstations, no
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additional infrastructure is required. The system can be applied to general
client-server authentication use-cases or dedicated use-cases such as electronic
identity systems or eBanking. A prototype implementation demonstrates the
feasibility of our system. In future research, this approach can be extended to
include the verification of contextual information such as geographical data. A
service provider could require the workstation to be located in a certain country,
providing location based/restricted services.
The second case study presented a system that can be applied to increase both
the security and privacy of existing smart card based authentication systems
that use X.509 credentials. The security enhancement allows users to securely
enter their PIN via the workstation to activate the authentication credentials
on the smart card. The PIN is entered via an application running in a trusted
execution environment on the workstation. The system further allows the user
to select which attributes contained in the authentication credential to disclose
towards the service provider, increasing the privacy of the user. The attributes
are attested by the application running in the trusted execution environment,
hereby assuring the service provider that the released information is correct.
A prototype using the Belgian eID card as authentication token is presented,
illustrating the feasibility of the system.
Chapter 9
General Conclusion
As stated in the introduction, this thesis tries to contribute to answering the
question how hardware based security technologies, more specifically secure
element and trusted execution environment technologies, can be applied to
realize the diverse set of requirements inherent to identity management systems
and technologies. This thesis consists of three parts that each use hardware
security technologies to tackle a specific set of requirements. This chapter
reflects on the use of those hardware security technologies.
9.1 Hardware-Backed Authentication using Sym-
metric Key Technology
In the first part, a security architecture was presented that allows resource
constrained devices to establish an authenticated channel with powerful devices.
Data can be securely exchanged over this channel. The constrained device can
enforce fine-grained access control policies based on the information obtained
during authentication. The system specifically aims at settings in which
low-cost constrained devices are used that can only execute symmetric key
operations and have to securely exchange data with general purpose devices
(e.g. smartphones or laptops) from different users, each with a specific set of
privileges.
In open environments, an online authority has to issue credentials to
powerful devices on-the-fly. In application domains with a limited scope, key
management can be considerably simplified by storing a shared secret key in
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a tamper-resistant module on the constrained device. This avoids the need for
an online key authority. Several types of tamper-resistant modules can be used
(e.g. secure element, apply a secure casing, using SoC memory). The key never
leaves the protected hardware, ensuring that it is not possible for an attacker to
retrieve or modify it without resorting to invasive or side-channel attacks. The
limited scope of the closed environment and the low-value application domain
should ensure that the cost for extracting the key is higher than the potential
gains for an attacker. Depending on the type of tamper-resistant module used,
a dedicated mechanism can be used to update the shared key and, consequently,
mitigate the impact of compromised keys.
9.2 SE-Backed Identity Management
9.2.1 Summary
Most identity management systems rely on digital signature algorithms to
assert the validity of attributes to service providers. The identity management
system proposed in part two relies on a trusted application running on
a tamperproof secure element. The service provider is assured that the
received information originates from a genuine secure element in the system
by establishing an authenticated secure channel with the secure element. The
tamperproofness ensures that an attacker cannot directly access the memory of
the secure element to extract or modify information. This assures the service
provider that the information received over the secure channel from the trusted
secure element application is genuine.
The use of a secure element has several disadvantages. First, secure elements
are typically resource constrained devices. The limited computational power
and storage and the low bandwidth communication have a significant impact
on the performance of the system. Several measures can be taken to
optimize performance. The system should be designed to make the secure
element application as efficient as possible. For instance, the proof-of-concept
implementation uses an elliptic curve cryptography-based key agreement
protocol and the RSA signature verification algorithm to establish a secure
authenticated session with providers. The implementation further uses efficient
data structures and encoding rules and limits the number of asymmetric key
operations on the secure element (e.g. avoid the verification of intermediate
CA certificates, use a caching system to avoid having to aggregate many
attributes from identity providers). The secure element can also precalculate
values (e.g. ephemeral keys), periodically execute the (re)validation protocol
and prefetch commonly used attributes from identity providers during idle
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periods to increase the performance during authentication. Allowing sufficient
personalization can also have a beneficial impact on the performance. For
instance, allowing users to trigger the card to prefetch specific attributes can
limit the number of contacted identity providers during authentication. To
support large attribute values and keep the communication overhead to the
secure element limited, large attribute values could be transferred via the
middleware while a cryptographic hash is asserted by the secure element.
Second, secure elements typically rely on additional hardware to interface with
the user and providers. To establish a trusted path between the user and the
secure element, dedicated certified hardware could be used. An alternative
approach is to implement (a part of) the middleware in a trusted execution
environment. The advantage of this approach is that it does not require
separate hardware since TEE technologies are (starting to be) integrated in
commodity devices such as workstation, laptops and smartphones. The third
part of this text investigates how TEE technologies on workstation and laptops
can be used to provide a secure trustworthy interface to the secure element.
While most applications rely on a secure element to provide additional
security, the identity management system presented in this part relies on
the tamperproofness of the secure element for its core security requirements.
Whether or not this assumption holds in practice in the context of an identity
management system remains an open question. Especially since the build-
in privacy-preserving features impede the discovery and revocation of hacked
secure elements. A system with similar trust assumptions that has recently
been deployed is the German electronic identity infrastructure [32]. This system
can provide a good indication whether or not systems that rely on a secure
element for more than just an additional layer of security are feasible in practice.
9.2.2 Future work
The current implementation only provides a proof of concept of the presented
system. The proof of concept only supports a limited number of attributes,
providers and policy options. Hence, to assess how the system would behave
in practice, the proof of concept should be extended to evaluate the impact of
increasing the number of providers and policy options on the performance of
the system. Currently, the proof of concept uses the trust model with a single
audit authority. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, this model is less suited to
accurately represent the trust relationships between providers when the number
of providers increases. The introduction of multiple audit authorities increases
the complexity and will, hence, affect performance. After extending the proof
of concept, the usability of the system can be evaluated via user studies.
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Although secure elements provide protection against hardware attacks, given
sufficient investment hardware attacks are feasible. Hence, to prevent a Break
Once, Run Everywhere attack, the same common key is only shared by a batch
of cards. The number of secure elements on which the same key is used is
crucial factor in the system. The number of secure elements in a batch should
be chosen so that the impact of a hacked secure element is sufficiently low.
The impact is largely determined by the cost for hardware (i.e. new cards need
to be issued), logistics (i.e. the process of issuing a new batch of cards), user
convenience (i.e. all the users with a card in the affected batch need to replace
their card) and provider integrity (i.e. the hacked key could be used to gain
access to services). However, lowering the number of cards in a batch negatively
impacts the privacy of the user since it makes it easier to uniquely identify
the user. Hence, for determining the number of cards in a batch, the system
administrator will need to balance these two factors. A thorough comparison
of the cost, scalability, usability and privacy of a similar system based on
anonymous credentials provides an interesting topic for future research.
Since the system relies on both the hardware and software integrity of the
secure element, also software attacks have to be considered. Formal verification
of the code running on the secure element would, hence, provide a more solid
foundation for deploying the system.
9.3 TEE-Backed Identity Management
9.3.1 Summary
In this part, the trusted execution environment that can be established on
commodity workstations and laptops using TPM-based technologies is used to
increase the security and privacy of existing identity management technologies.
Two complementary case studies are presented.
The first case study focuses on the prevention of credential abuse through
sharing or theft. The trusted execution environment is used to assert to the
service provider that the owner of the credential approved the transaction
(i.e. informed consent). The user’s credential is, therefore, bound to one or
more of his biometric traits. The TEE application informs the user about the
pending transaction and verifies the binding between the used credential and
the user using a live reading of the biometric trait(s) of the user.
The second case study focuses on increasing the security and privacy of
authentication infrastructures that rely on a smart card containing an
X.509 credential and the identity information of the user. Several existing
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governmental electronic identity infrastructures use such an approach. The
system increases the security by having the user enter his passcode via a TEE
application. This prevents malware running on the regular operating system
from intercepting the passcode. Several governmental identity systems only
implement limited privacy-preserving features. The TEE application gives the
user more control over the disclosure of his information. It offers features such
as multi-show unlinkability and selective disclosure. The electronic identity
card, therefore, authenticates to the TEE application that, subsequently, filters
the obtained information and attests a user-approved subset to the service
provider.
For both case studies a proof-of-concept is implemented to illustrate the
feasibility of the presented system. The current implementation intensively
uses the TPM for the realization of the trusted execution environment. The
resource constrained nature of the TPM, hence, has a significant impact on the
performance of the system. A promising approach for significantly improving
the performance of TEE application is the use of a virtual TPM. During boot, a
small measured hypervisor is loaded that contains a virtual TPM. This virtual
TPM runs on the general purpose processor and is, hence, much less constrained
than the hardware TPM. The hardware TPM is used during boot to ensure
the integrity of the hypervisor and software TPM. The system, hence, provides
better performance with a small increase in the trusted computing base (i.e. the
hypervisor and virtual TPM).
Currently, there is no central authority that issues TPM certificates. Most
TPMs are shipped uninitialized and uncertified. Hence, before a user can
start using the TPM embedded in his device it must be initialized. During
the trusted enrollment procedure, the user can establish trust in the TPM’s
credential generated during initialization. Hence, to establish a secure interface
to the user, the certification of the TPM is a less stringent requirement.
However, if the TPM is used to assert data towards a remote party, the remote
party needs to be assured that a valid TPM was used. The most scalable
application domain for use cases using the assert functionality of the TPM
towards remote parties are those in which a central authority is responsible for
managing the hardware (e.g. the corporate application domain).
9.3.2 Future Work
Currently, the system uses the Flicker framework to realize the trusted
execution environment of the workstation. More recent work [190, 179, 180],
further developed that approach and addressed the performance. The systems
presented in Chapter 8 could be implemented using these new systems to
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improve performance. Apart from the performance, also the switching between
the two environments affects the usability. A user study would be able to assess
whether or not the system meets the usability requirements of users and what
aspects should be further improved. Apart from increasing the performance,
also the quality of the software would need to be improved and tested before
the system could be used in practice. Formal methods [117, 94, 133] could be
used to ensure that the application running in the trusted environment is free
from several commonly exploited types of bugs.
Currently the mobile device is used to measure the state of the system. Mobile
devices are computational rich devices that run a rich software stack and third-
party software, making them vulnerable to abuse via exploits. The mobile
device could be replaced with a dedicated USB device with the sole purpose of
measuring the software state of the workstation. An alternative would be to
realize a trusted environment on the mobile device. If a biometric scanner is
embedded in the mobile device, which is currently the case in some high-end
smartphones, the trusted application could be migrated from the workstation
to the trusted environment on the mobile device. Since the biometric scanner
is actually embedded in the casing of the mobile device and not a plug-and-
play device as is often the case with workstations and laptops, the system can
provide more assurance that the biometric scan is an actual live reading of the
user holding the device.
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